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A DISSIMILARITY REPRESENTATION APPROACH TO DESIGNING SYSTEMS
FOR SIGNATURE VERIFICATION AND BIO-CRYPTOGRAPHY
George S. Eskander EKLADIOUS
ABSTRACT
Automation of legal and financial processes requires enforcing of authenticity, confidential-
ity, and integrity of the involved transactions. This Thesis focuses on developing offline sig-
nature verification (OLSV) systems for enforcing authenticity of transactions. In addition,
bio-cryptography systems are developed based on the offline handwritten signature images for
enforcing confidentiality and integrity of transactions.
Design of OLSV systems is challenging, as signatures are behavioral biometric traits that
have intrinsic intra-personal variations and inter-personal similarities. Standard OLSV sys-
tems are designed in the feature representation (FR) space, where high-dimensional feature
representations are needed to capture the invariance of the signature images. With the numer-
ous users, found in real world applications, e.g., banking systems, decision boundaries in the
high-dimensional FR spaces become complex. Accordingly, large number of training samples
are required to design of complex classifiers, which is not practical in typical applications. In
contrast, design of bio-cryptography systems based on the offline signature images is more
challenging. In these systems, signature images lock the cryptographic keys, and a user re-
trieves his key by applying a query signature sample. For practical bio-cryptographic schemes,
the locking feature vector should be concise. In addition, such schemes employ simple error
correction decoders, and therefore no complex classification rules can be employed.
In this Thesis, the challenging problems of designing OLSV and bio-cryptography systems are
addressed by employing the dissimilarity representation (DR) approach. Instead of designing
classifiers in the feature space, the DR approach provides a classification space that is defined
by some proximity measure. This way, a multi-class classification problem, with few samples
per class, is transformed to a more tractable two-class problem with large number of train-
ing samples. Since many feature extraction techniques have already been proposed for OLSV
applications, a DR approach based on FR is employed. In this case, proximity between two
signatures is measured by applying a dissimilarity measure on their feature vectors. The main
hypothesis of this Thesis is as follows. The FRs and dissimilarity measures should be properly
designed, so that signatures belong to same writer are close, while signatures of different writ-
ers are well separated in the resulting DR spaces. In that case, more cost-effecitive classifiers,
and therefore simpler OLSV and bio-cryptography systems can be designed.
To this end, in Chapter 2, an approach for optimizing FR-based DR spaces is proposed such
that concise representations are discriminant, and simple classification thresholds are suffi-
cient. High-dimensional feature representations are translated to an intermediate DR space,
where pairwise feature distances are the space constituents. Then, a two-step boosting feature
selection (BFS) algorithm is applied. The first step uses samples from a development database,
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and aims to produce a universal space of reduced dimensionality. The resulting universal space
is further reduced and tuned for specific users through a second BFS step using user-specific
training set. In the resulting space, feature variations are modeled and an adaptive dissimilarity
measure is designed. This measure generates the final DR space, where discriminant proto-
types are selected for enhanced representation. The OLSV and bio-cryptographic systems are
formulated as simple threshold classifiers that operate in the designed DR space. Proof of
concept simulations on the Brazilian signature database indicate the viability of the proposed
approach. Concise DRs with few features and a single prototype are produced. Employing a
simple threshold classifier, the DRs have shown state-of-the-art accuracy of about 7% AER,
comparable to complex systems in the literature.
In Chapter 3, the OLSV problem is further studied. Although the aforementioned OLSV im-
plementation has shown acceptable recognition accuracy, the resulting systems are not secure
as signature templates must be stored for verification. For enhanced security, we modified the
previous implementation as follows. The first BFS step is implemented as aforementioned,
producing a writer-independent (WI) system. This enables starting system operation, even if
users provide a single signature sample in the enrollment phase. However, the second BFS is
modified to run in a FR space instead of a DR space, so that no signature templates are used for
verification. To this end, the universal space is translated back to a FR space of reduced dimen-
sionality, so that designing a writer-dependent (WD) system by the few user-specific samples is
tractable in the reduced space. Simulation results on two real-world offline signature databases
confirm the feasibility of the proposed approach. The initial universal (WI) verification mode
showed comparable performance to that of state-of-the-art OLSV systems. The final secure
WD verification mode showed enhanced accuracy with decreased computational complexity.
Only a single compact classifier produced similar level of accuracy (AER of about 5.38 and
13.96% for the Brazilian and the GPDS signature databases, respectively) as complex WI and
WD systems in the literature.
Finally, in Chapter 4, a key-binding bio-cryptographic scheme known as the fuzzy vault (FV)
is implemented based on the offline signature images. The proposed DR-based two-step BFS
technique is employed for selecting a compact and discriminant user-specific FR from a large
number of feature extractions. This representation is used to generate the FV locking/unlock-
ing points. Representation variability modeled in the DR space is considered for matching the
unlocking and locking points during FV decoding. Proof of concept simulations on the Brazil-
ian signature database have shown FV recognition accuracy of 3% AER and system entropy of
about 45-bits. For enhanced security, an adaptive chaff generation method is proposed, where
the modeled variability controls the chaff generation process. Similar recognition accuracy is
reported, where more enhanced entropy of about 69-bits is achieved.
Keywords: Dissimilarity Representation, Dissimilarity Learning, Offline Signature Verifica-
tion, Bio-Cryptography, Fuzzy Vault.
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RÉSUMÉ
L’automatisation des processus légaux et financiers exige des transactions sécuritaires qui as-
surent l’authenticité, la confidentialité et l’intégrité de l’information. Cette thèse porte sur le
développement de systèmes de vérification hors-ligne des signatures manuscrites (SVSM) dans
le but de rehausser la sécurité des transactions. De plus, un système de bio-cryptographie est
également proposé afin d’assurer la confidentialité et l’intégrité des transactions.
La conception des systèmes de vérification de signatures manuscrites représente un défi impor-
tant étant donné la grande variabilité intra-classe et des similarités interclasses importantes. Les
méthodes traditionnelles reposent sur une représentation de l’image de la signature dans des
espaces de caractéristiques de grande dimension afin de capturer les invariants dans l’image de
la signature. Dans un contexte d’applications bancaires, le nombre d’usagers (classes) devient
très important ce qui implique des frontières de décision complexes. De plus, une quantité
importante de signatures sont requises pour l’apprentissage ce qui est impraticable pour les
applications réelles. À l’opposé, la conception des systèmes de bio-cryptographie représente
un défi encore plus grand. En effet, les images de signatures manuscrites servent pour bloquer
les clés cryptographiques, conséquemment l’usager utilise sa propre signature comme requête
afin de récupérer sa clé. Les systèmes de bio-cryptographie imposent comme contrainte un très
petit nombre de caractéristiques discriminantes. Enfin ces systèmes utilisent un décodeur qui
utilise un mécanisme très simple de correction d’erreur, ce qui implique l’utilisation de règles
de classification très simples.
Dans cette thèse, la conception des systèmes de vérification de signatures et de bio-cryptographie
est basée sur l’utilisation des espaces de différences (DR, dissimilarity representation). Con-
trairement à l’utilisation des espaces de mesures, les approches basées sur les vecteurs de
différences reposent sur la notion de mesure de proximité. Conséquemment, un problème
de classification avec un grand nombre de classes devient un problème à deux classes dans
l’espace des différences. Un avantage important est que le nombre de références devient très
important avec une formulation dans l’espace des différences. Étant donné qu’un nombre im-
portant de caractéristiques est déjà disponible alors les espaces basées sur les différences sont
faciles à construire. L’hypothèse formulée dans cette thèse est que les signatures d’un même
scripteur sont semblables dans l’espace des caractéristiques ce qui se traduit par une projection
proche de l’origine dans l’espace des différences. Conséquemment, les signatures de scripteurs
différents sont projetées très loin de l’origine. Cette formulation du problème de vérification
permet l’utilisation de classificateurs très simples basés sur des seuils de décision ce qui permet
également la conception des systèmes de bio-cryptographie performants.
XLe Chapitre 2 présente une approche pour l’optimisation des espaces DR qui permet une réduc-
tion importante de la dimensionnalité. Ces espaces optimisés sont également très discriminants
ce qui permet l’utilisation de classificateurs très simples. Des espaces de caractéristiques de
grande dimension sont transformés dans un espace intermédiaire composé d’un vecteur de dif-
férences mesurées deux à deux. Ensuite, une sélection de caractéristiques est effectuée en deux
étapes par un algorithme de type Gentle Adaboost. La première étape consiste à définir un es-
pace de représentation universel à partir d’une base de développement. Ensuite, une deuxième
étape consiste à spécialiser l’espace de représentation pour chaque abonné au système de véri-
fication. De plus, la représentation finale comprend une phase où la variabilité intra-classe est
modélisée dans l’espace des différences et les prototypes les plus discriminants sont sélection-
nés. Une contribution importante de l’approche proposée est que la conception des systèmes
de bio-cryptographie et de vérification de signatures sont formulée de la même façon ce qui
permet l’utilisation de simples classificateurs basés sur des seuils de décision dans l’espace des
différences. Une preuve de concept est réalisée à partir de la base de signatures brésiliennes
(PUCPR). Il résulte des espaces de représentation de très faible dimension (environ 20 carac-
téristiques) ce qui permet l’utilisation d’un seul prototype de référence par scripteur. Un taux
d’erreur moyen de 7% est obtenu avec ce système, ce qui est compétitif avec les approches
beaucoup plus complexes publiées dans la littérature.
Au chapitre 3, le problème de la conception des systèmes de vérification de signatures dans les
espaces de différences est approfondi. La première version du système était performante, mais
pas suffisamment sécuritaire. En effet, les prototypes de référence sont conservés en mémoire
ce qui favorise une utilisation frauduleuse du système. Conséquemment, une nouvelle ap-
proche pour la conception de classificateurs dépendent du scripteur est proposée. Brièvement,
la deuxième étape de traitement permet de revenir dans un espace de caractéristiques réduit ce
qui favorise l’apprentissage d’un classificateur dans l’espace des mesures pour chaque scrip-
teur. En conséquence, seul un classificateur est conservé en mémoire ce qui diminue les risques
de fraudes pour les systèmes de vérification de signatures. Les résultats expérimentaux obtenus
sur deux bases de signatures sont comparables à ceux publiés dans la littérature pour un clas-
sificateur beaucoup plus simple. Les performances moyennes obtenues sont de 5.38% et de
13.96% respectivement pour les bases PUCPR et GPDS.
Finalement, une première approche fonctionnelle et performance d’un système de bio-cryptographie
basé sur les images de signatures manuscrites est présentée au Chapitre 4. Une méthode
d’encapsulage de la clé cryptographique basée sur le Fuzzy Vault (FV) est détaillée dans ce
chapitre. L’étape la plus importante et la plus innovante est la sélection de caractéristiques
stables, discriminantes et adaptées pour le FV. La méthode de sélection de caractéristiques en
deux étapes basée sur la représentation par différences et présentée au Chapitre 2 est reprise et
adaptée pour la conception de systèmes de bio-cryptographie. De plus, une méthode originale
pour la génération de points fantômes (chaff points) basée sur une mesure de variabilité dans
l’espace des différences est également exposée. Une preuve de concept sur la base PUCPR
montre un taux d’erreur moyen de 3% pour une valeur d’entropie de 45 bits. La méthode de
génération de chaff points adaptative permet d’augmenter l’entropie du système à 69 bits avec
la même performance.
XI
Mot-clés : Représentations par différences, Apprentissage dans les espaces de différences,
Vérification hors-ligne des signatures manuscrites, Bio-Cryptographie, Fuzzy
Vault.
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XXX
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Si Number of signature samples processed by a classifier i
WI − SV Writer-independent signature verification function
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A Locking set
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p Locking polynomial
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(Aˆ, Pˆ) FV chaff points
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(A˜, P˜) FV all points
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Q
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A¯ Matching set
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SSQ Similarity score of a query Q
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mwi Matching window for a FV element i
FI Indexes of selected features
FIi Index of a feature i
VI Virtual indexes of selected features
V Ii Virtual index of a feature i
T Set of signature templates
UR User representations matrix
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BCT Bio-Cryptography Template
XT FV locking set extracted from a template T
YQ FV unlocking set extracted from a template Q
XXXII
l Quantization size
G1 Group 1 chaff set
G2 Group 2 chaff set
Ω Chaff separation
α Chaff groups ratio
g1 Amount of chaff features belong to G1
g2 Amount of chaff features belong to G2
r FV size
z Total number of chaffs
p
′ Reconstructed polynomial
K
′ Reconstructed cryptographic key
KS Length of cryptographic key
R Reference subset
Q Questioned subset
P Population-based dataset
U User-based dataset
e Public key
q Public parameter
E Signature message
DigSig Digital signature
INTRODUCTION
Automation of legal and financial processes requires enforcing of authenticity, confidentiality,
and integrity of the involved transactions. For the paper-based processes, handwritten signature
is the most universally accepted method of authentication, and offline signature verification
(OLSV) systems are developed to automate this security issue (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008).
However, the other security issues are not fulfilled within manual systems. For instance, con-
fidentiality of a document is lost when it is accessed by an intruder. In addition, integrity of a
document is not guaranteed, as its content might be altered by impostors after being issued and
signed by its producer.
Confidentiality and integrity of electronic documents maybe achieved through the encryption
and digital signature cryptographic schemes, respectively. These schemes rely on long cryp-
tographic keys that are usually stored on, e.g., smart cards, and they are accessed by shorter,
easy to remember, passwords. Using biometrics (physical or behavioral human traits) like
fingerprint may replace the traditional passwords for more trusted user authentification, by
implementing the so-called bio-cryptographic schemes (Uludag et al., 2004).
Despite the intensity of research on bio-cryptography based on more physiological traits like
fingerprints, iris, face, etc., there is no conclusive research on more behavioral traits such as
offline handwritten signature images.
Developing a reliable bio-cryptography system based on the offline handwritten signatures
might enforce confidentiality and integrity of the automated transactions. In this case, au-
tomating the existing paper-based processes is transparent to users, as they continually employ
their handwritten signatures and they become isolated from the details of the new technology,
and its related security issues.
This Thesis focuses on developing accurate, simple, and secure OLSV and signature-based
bio-cryptography systems, so automation of legal and business processes becomes possible.
2Standard OLSV and bio-cryptography systems are designed in the feature representation (FR)
space, where discriminative features are extracted into patterns that can be viewed as points
in the feature space. With the numerous classes (writers), high dimensional representations,
and with a limited number of training samples per class, design of an efficient FR becomes
impractical (Guyon and Elisseeff, 2003). Indeed it is hard to extract many reference signa-
tures from a person for enrollment. In addition, designing FRs and FR-based classifiers using
signature samples of existing users, does not necessarily produce systems that generalize for
unseen users and samples during operations. In practice, it is impossible to locate a FR space in
which signatures of all current and future users share the same distribution. The dissimilarity
concept, where samples that belong to same class should be similar, while samples that come
from different classes should be dissimilar, provides a solution. Instead of learning representa-
tions of specific unseen signatures, which is impossible, it is possible to learn a generic model
of the intra-personal and inter-personal variabilities using a huge number of signature samples
extracted from a development database.
In this Thesis, the design of OLSV and signature-based bio-cryptography systems, is tackled by
employing the dissimilarity representation (DR) approach (Pekalska and Duin, 2002). Instead
of designing classifiers in the feature space, the DR approach provides a classification space
that is defined by some proximity measure.
It is argued that the core task of biometric authentication is actually a multiple classification
problem in the sense that it solves several authentication tasks simultaneously (Bengio and
Marithoz, 2007). As a result, there is a need of a joint learning among the individual au-
thentication systems. Some approaches designed multiple single-user classifiers jointly, like
parameter sharing among several classifiers (Reynolds, 2000). In the context of offline sig-
nature verification, the DR approach provides a way to learn dissimilarity ranges of the intra-
personal and the inter-personal signature samples. During verification, two signature samples
are matched by comparing the difference in their representations to the modeled dissimilarity
ranges. Moreover, computing proximities between signature images enlarges the number of
3samples available for training, and avoids the curse-of-dimensionality problem (Rivard et al.,
2013).
Since many feature extraction techniques are already proposed for the OLSV application, we
employed a FR-based DR approach where the DR space is build on top of a FR space (Duin
et al., 2010). In this case, proximity between two signatures (a query and a prototype) is
measured by applying a certain dissimilarity measure on their feature vectors. The FRs and
dissimilarity measures should be properly designed, so that signatures belong to same writer
are close, while signatures of different writers are well separated in the resulting DR spaces.
In that case, simple classification rules, e.g., thresholds, might be sufficient, and simple OLSV
and bio-cryptography systems can be designed based on these representations.
Problem statement
Design of the OLSV systems is challenging, as signatures are more behavioral biometrics that
have intrinsic intra-personal variations and inter-personal similarities. Static features extracted
from the offline signature images may incorporate a lower level of stability and discrimination
than that with the online signatures, where dynamic signals, e.g., pressure, velocity, etc., are
acquired during the signing process. Standard signature verification (SV) systems are designed
in the Feature Representation (FR) space. For OLSV systems, high-dimensional feature rep-
resentations are needed to capture the variations of the signature images. With the numerous
users, as found in real world applications, e.g., banking systems, decision boundaries in the
high-dimensional FR spaces become complex. Enough training samples are needed to learn
such complex models and collecting these samples is not practical with typical SV applications.
Two main techniques are proposed for OLSV, namely, writer-dependent (WD) and writer-
independent (WI) systems. These techniques have shown a compromise between security,
accuracy, and complexity of the produced OLSV systems. For the WD-SV systems, a single
classifier is designed for each user using his reference signatures. Such systems are secure,
as no templates are stored for verification. However, it is not easy to achieve high recognition
accuracy, when few number of reference samples are available for training. In addition, models
4that are designed based on samples of users enrolled during the design phase, might be invalid
when other users are added to the system. Some authors proposed complex systems, e.g., multi-
classifier systems, dynamic selection of classifiers, etc., for enhanced recognition accuracy
(Batista et al., 2012).
On the other hand, the WI-SV technique produces a single classifier for the whole population.
Signature samples from a development database are used for training, while the classifier is
exploited on real users whose signatures are not seen during the design phase. Although WI
systems provide better generalization for unseen users, they are still complex, and insecure as
templates are stored for verification (Rivard et al., 2013).
Design of bio-cryptography systems based on the offline signature images is more challenging
than designing classical OLSV systems. In these systems, signature images lock the crypto-
graphic keys, and a user retrieves his key by applying a query signature sample. For practical
bio-cryptographic schemes, the locking feature vector should be concise, and the limited rep-
resentation might not capture the variance of the intra-personal and inter-personal classes. In
addition, such schemes employ simple error correction decoders, and therefore no complex
classification rules can be employed. These systems also involve similar trade-offs between
security, accuracy, and complexity, like that with classical OLSV systems.
Reliable bio-cryptographic schemes run in a key-binding mode, where both cryptographic and
biometric keys are coupled in a way that neither one can be decoupled without using a genuine
biometric query sample. The most commonly used key-binding scheme is the Fuzzy Vault
(FV). It relies on embedding chaff (noise) information to hide the genuine information ex-
tracted from the biometric signal (Juels and Sudan, 2002). Security of a FV depends on the
amount of embedded chaffs. However, in case that chaffs interfere with the genuine biometric
information, accuarcy of the FV decoder degrades. Due to high variability of the offline signa-
ture images, it is not easy to extract stable genuine information that do not interfere with the
chaffs, and this requires a trade-off between security and accuarcy of the designed FV.
5Tackling these design challenges using a DR approach aims to use a limited number of sig-
nature templates (available for training) to produce a concise, stable, and discriminant user-
specific DR space, in which accurate, simple, and secure OLSV and FV bio-cryptography
systems are developed. This approach leads to the following main research questions:
a. Using a limited user-specific training set, how to generate a concise FR space that is
stable for the specific user, and its discriminating power generalizes for unseen users
(compromising advantageous of WD and WI techniques)?
b. How to design a proximity measure that alleviates the intrinsic variability of the offline
signature images?
c. How to select efficient prototypes that produce the DR space?
d. How to formulate the OLSV and the FV systems as simple classifiers in the DR space?
e. How to generate enough chaffs without significantly degrading the FV accuracy?
Objective and contributions
The main objective of this Thesis is to develop reliable SV and bio-cryptographic systems
that enable automating legal and business processes. As most of the existing processes are
paper-based and they employ handwritten signature images for authentication, so we design our
systems for the offline handwritten signatures. Physical presence of persons is not mandatory in
case of the OLSV systems, so it can be applied in a broader range of applications than the online
SV systems. Since both FR and DR spaces are exploited in the literature for designing WD
and WI systems, respectively, and they have shown trade-offs between performance measures,
we propose a hybrid technique as a compromise of the two approaches. Different than the DR
approaches found in the literature, that focus on designing classifiers in a defined DR, we focus
on learning the DR itself.
The main contribution of this Thesis is a DR optimization approach that learns a reliable DR
build on top of a concise and discriminant FR. Resulting DRs are designed so that a global
6class-independent representation (CIR) represents all, and even classes that are unseen during
the design phase, where it could be tuned for specific classes by means of class-specific training
data. Since the proposed approach involves feature selection, it can also be considered as a tool
to design pure feature-based classifiers. Moreover, as it involves distance function learning
and prototype selection, the approach can be employed to design distance-based classifiers that
work in the FR space.
First, a reliable DR is designed through employing the proposed DR optimization approach,
and the OLSV and bio-cryptography systems are formulated as simple classifiers in the re-
sulting space. Then, the OLSV system is enhanced, by considering the proposed optimization
approach as a tool for feature selection. The designed DRs are translated to a reduced and
discriminant FR space, where more secure, simpler, and more accurate OLSV classifiers are
designed. Finally, a complete bio-cryptographic FV implementation is developed based on the
designed DR.
In the first contribution, high-dimensional FRs are translated to an intermediate DR space,
where pairwise feature distances are the space constituents. Then, a two-step boosting feature
selection (BFS) algorithm is applied (Tieu and Viola, 2004). The first step uses samples from
a development database, and aims to producing a universal space of reduced dimensionality.
The resulting universal space is further reduced and tuned for specific users through a second
BFS step using user-specific training set. In the resulting space, feature variations are modeled
and an adaptive dissimilarity measure is designed. This measure generates the final DR space,
where discriminant prototypes are selected for enhanced representation. It was demonstrated
that concise representations produced separable clusters in the dissimilarity space. Accord-
ingly, a simple threshold provides a high level of accuracy comparable to complex OLSV
systems in the literature. Moreover, the bio-cryptography design problem is formulated as a
traditional classifier in the produced DR space, where designing such systems is more tractable.
In the second contribution, the OLSV problem is further studied. Although the aforemen-
tioned SV implementation has shown acceptable recognition accuracy, the resulting systems
are not secure as signature templates must be stored for verification. For enhanced security,
7the previous implementation is modified as follows. The first BFS step is implemented as
aforementioned, producing a writer-independent (WI) system. This enables starting system
operation, even if users provide a single signature sample in the enrollment phase. However,
the second BFS is modified to run in a FR space instead of a DR space, so that no signature
templates are used for verification. To this end, the universal space is translated back to a FR
space of reduced dimensionality, so that designing a writer-dependent (WD) system by the few
user-specific samples is tractable in the reduced space. It was demonstrated that the secure WD
verification mode showed enhanced accuracy with decreased computational complexity than
that of the universal WI verification mode.
In the third contribution, a FV bio-cryptographic scheme is implemented based on the offline
signature images. The proposed DR-based two-step BFS technique is employed for selecting
a compact and discriminant user-specific FR from a large number of feature extractions. This
representation is used to generate the FV locking/unlocking points. In the encoding phase, the
locking points lock user cryptographic key in a FV. During decoding, the unlocking points are
used to unlock user key from his FV. Representation variability modeled in the DR space is
considered for matching the unlocking and locking points during FV decoding. Proof of con-
cept simulations have shown an acceptable compromise of recognition accuracy and system
entropy of the designed FVs. For enhanced security, an adaptive chaff generation method is
proposed, where the modeled variability controls the chaff generation process. Similar recog-
nition accuracy is reported with a higher security level.
Organization of this Thesis
This manuscript-based Thesis is organized into four chapters. In Chapter I the areas of bio-
metrics, handwritten signature biometrics, bio-cryptography, and the fuzzy vault scheme are
presented and reviewed.
In Chapter II the DR optimizing approach is presented. This approach is generic as it might
be applied for different pattern classification problems that are designed with limited data from
many classes, then they adapt whenever new data becomes available, e.g., adaptive biometric
8systems. Validating the approach on the OLSV and bio-cryptography systems design prob-
lems has demonstrated its viability. Some concepts of applying this approach for designing
OLSV verification systems was published at International workshop on Automated Forensic
Handwriting Analysis (Eskander et al., 2013a). Also, applicability of this approach to the
bio-cryptographic system design was published the 2nd International workshop on Similarity-
Based Pattern Analysis and Recognition (Eskander et al., 2013f). The complete approach
with applications on OLSV and bio-cryptography was submitted to the special issue of the
IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems on "Learning in non-(geo)metric
spaces" (Eskander et al., 2013e).
In Chapter III the DR optimization approach is employed to provide a solution for compromis-
ing between pure WD and WI techniques for OLSV. A universal WI classifier is designed
with a development database, to enable starting system operation with few signature tem-
plates. Switching to a more secure, less complex, and more accurate WD operational mode
is possible whenever enough samples are collected for a specific user. Adaptation of the WI
classifiers to specific users is achieved through tuning the universal signature representation
to each user, while training his WD classifier. Simulation results on two real-world offline
signature databases demonstrated the feasibility and robustness of the proposed solution. The
initial universal (WI) verification mode showed comparable performance to that of state of the
art OLSV systems. The final user-specific WD verification mode showed enhanced accuracy
with decreased computational complexity. Only a single compact classifier produced similar
level of accuracy as complex WI and WD systems in literature. In addition, the produced WD
classifiers are more secure than the baseline WI classifiers, eliminating the need to store user
templates for verification. Preliminary version of this solution was published at the 13th In-
ternational conference on Frontiers in Handwriting Recognition (Eskander et al., 2012). The
complete system design and analysis was published at the IET-Biometrics Journal, Special
issue on Handwriting Biometrics (Eskander et al., 2013c).
In Chapter IV the DR optimization approach is applied to design a complete FV bio-cryptography
system based on offline signature images. A few number of features is selected based on the
9designed DR space, and used to produce the bio-cryptographic tokens. The feature variability
that is learned in the DR space are used for decoding the tokens and release the keys for genuine
users. It is shown that selecting features based on signatures from an independent (develop-
ment) database could represent the actual system users. While, running another user-specific
feature selection process enhanced the quality of feature representation. Also, adapting the
features matching window based on their expected variations results in better FV performance.
A user password is used as a second authentication measure to enhance FV system accuracy.
For further enhancement of the FV recognition performance, a simple ensemble of FVs is pro-
duced through applying the majority vote decision fusion concept. A preliminary version of
this system was published at the IEEE Workshop on Computational Intelligence and Identity
Management (Eskander et al., 2011). The complete system implementation and performance
was published at Information Sciences (Eskander et al., 2014a).
In Appendix I we explore different scenarios for employing the DR approach for replacing
and/or enhancing the standard SV systems. A general framework for designing FR/DR based
systems is proposed where the DR approach can be applied in different scenarios. This frame-
work might enable the design of a new family of classification systems, such as global and hy-
brid global/user-specific classifiers. Also, the proposed framework suggests employing the DR
approach as an intermediate design tool for enhanced performance of standard feature-based
systems. Content of this appendix was published at the International workshop on Automated
Forensic Handwriting Analysis (Eskander et al., 2013a).
In Appendix II an adaptive FV chaff generation method is proposed, where the modeled vari-
ability controls the chaff generation process. Similar recognition accuracy is reported, where
more enhanced entropy is achieved. This method was published at the International workshop
on Emerging Aspects in Handwritten Signature Processing (Eskander et al., 2013b)
In Appendix III the designed signature-based FV implementation is employed to produce dig-
ital signatures using off-line handwritten signatures. This methodology facilitates the automa-
tion of business processes, where users continually employ their handwritten signatures for
authentication. First, signature templates from a user are captured and employed to lock his
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private key in a FV. Then, when the user signs a document by hand, his handwritten signature
image is employed to unlock his private key. The unlocked key produces a digital signature that
is attached to the digitized document. Verification of the digital signature by a recipient implies
authenticity of the manuscript signature and integrity of the signed document. Experimental
results confirms the viability of the proposed approach. The content of this appendix was pub-
lished at the 9th International conference on Machine Learning and Data Mining (Eskander
et al., 2013d).
In Appendix IV a novel approach is proposed for enhancing the accuracy of signature-based
biometric cryptosystems. Instead of using an additional password for enhanced security, the
same signature sample is processed by a SV classifier before triggers the FV decoders. Using
this cascaded approach, the high FAR of FV decoders is alleviated by the higher capacity
of SV classifiers to detect impostors. The content of this appendix is published at the 14th
International Conference on Frontiers in Handwriting Recognition (ICFHR-2014) (Eskander
et al., 2014b).
CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
1.1 Biometric systems
Biometrics is the science of recognizing an individual based on his physiological or behavioral
traits (Anil K. Jain, 2004). Examples of more physiological traits are: face, fingerprint, hand
geometry, iris, retina, ear, and DNA. Examples of more behavioral traits are: signature, gait,
and keystroke. Some traits could be considered as mixture of physiological and behavioral
characteristics, e.g., voice.
There are three main categories of biometric applications: verification, identification, and
surveillance. Verification systems verify the authenticity of a claimed identity based on the
input biometric sample. Identification systems determine if the input sample is associated with
any of a large number of enrolled identities. Surveillance systems determine whether a person
belongs to a watch list of identities.
A biometric verification system is considered as a signal detection system with pattern recog-
nition architecture. Hence it consists of the following modules: a signal sensor that senses the
raw biometric, a signal processor that extracts some informative set of features from the raw
signal, and a classifier that compares features against a biometric model or some templates
stored in system database. In the enrollment phase, some biometric samples are acquired by
a sensor then quality of samples is checked. If a sample passes the quality test, features are
extracted and stored as a template in system database, or they are used to develop a biometric
model for the enrolled person. In the authentication phase, a query sample is acquired and used
for feature extraction, then it is matched with stored templates or model of the claimed person.
1.1.1 Performance of biometric systems
Quality of a biometric system is represented by its accuracy of recognition, security and com-
plexity. Accuracy of a biometric system is the ability to detect genuine signals and discriminate
12
forgeries. Some measures for recognition accuracy are the false reject rate (FRR) and the false
accept rate (FAR). FRR is the percentage of the genuine samples rejected by the system. FAR is
the percentage of impostor samples accepted by the system. Different than simple passwords,
biometric passwords do not provide a perfect recognition tool, because of the intra-personal
variability and the inter-personal similarity of biometric traits. Fuzziness of biometrics might
result from imperfect signal acquisition, e.g., unaligned fingerprints, or it might be an intrinsic
feature of the biometric traits, e.g., variations in the handwritten signatures. The later is harder
to cancel and a trade-off between FRR and FAR exists.
Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve is a visual tool that permits compromising this
trade-off. Classifier outputs (scores) are stored and used for ROC curve generation. A point
on the ROC curve represents a compromise between genuine accept rate (GAR = 1 − FRR)
and FAR, when a specific score is used as a classifier threshold. Therefore, FAR for a specific
threshold is the ratio of forgery samples with a score higher than this threshold. GAR is the
ratio of genuine samples with a score higher than the threshold. Area under the curve (AUC)
reflects the recognition power of the classifier, as high AUC implies possibility to achieve high
GAR and low FAR simultaneously.
Although biometrics provides a trusted mean of authenticity, it might involve security vulner-
abilities (Uludag, 2006). One source of attacks is bypassing the system with fake biometric
samples. For instance, dummy fingers or forged signatures might be used. This security issue
can be alleviated by increasing the classifier threshold, so fake samples are rejected. Another
issue is related to security of the biometric templates. In case that templates are stored for ver-
ification, they can be copied from the system. Once compromised, the biometric sample might
be used to access multiple accounts of the user. In addition, compromised traits might be ir-
revocable. For instance, a user has to change his handwritten signature if it is compromised.
A counter measure against such attacks is to enforce template protection through applying the
cancelable biometrics approach (Ratha et al., 2001). Templates are stored in a transformed
form so that they are more secure. Once compromised, a different transformation function
can be applied to same trait, so it is revocable. Finally, a biometric system can be attacked by
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insiders through overriding classifier functionality. For instance, outputs of a biometric system
can be overridden so it produces predetermined decision labels. This type of attacks might be
prevented by employing the so-called bio-cryptography approach (Uludag et al., 2004). In-
stead of generating traditional classification labels, cryptographic keys are produced through a
relatively complex process that is hard to overridden. A released key can be considered as a
positive classification label, or it could be further employed to execute an encryption or a dig-
ital signature cryptographic scheme. For the aforementioned biometric security approaches, a
sample is classified in a transformed domain, which impacts recognition accuracy.
Besides accuracy and security of a biometric system, its complexity is an important aspect. Re-
liable systems should be simple in terms of operational memory and processing time. There is
a trade-off between system complexity and its accuracy and security. For instance, for unstable
behavioral biometrics, like handwritten signatures, high dimensional feature representations
are needed to capture variation of signatures. In addition, with numerous users that have high
inter-personal similarities, user clusters are split by complex decision boundaries. Therefore,
complex classifiers must be designed to model these boundaries and provide acceptable recog-
nition accuracy. Moreover, enforcing security of biometric systems involves overhead on the
resource required for operation.
1.1.2 Handwritten signature biometrics
Handwritten signature is the biometric trait the most universally employed for authentication.
Designing verification systems based on this behavioral biometric trait is challenging, as it
involves high intra-personal variability and inter-personal similarity. Signature Verification
(SV) systems are either online or offline systems (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008). In online SV,
dynamic signals, e.g., pressure, velocity, stroke order, etc., are acquired during the signing
process by special pens and tablets. On the other hand, OLSV systems rely on static features
acquired from the signatures images scanned after the signing process. Since physical presence
of signer is not mandatory for the offline systems, they can be employed in a broader range for
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applications. However, the offline static features are less stable and easier to forge than the
online features.
Signature forgeries can be classified in three main categories: random, simple, and simulated
forgeries. For random forgery, the forger produces the signature randomly, as neither he has
access to a signature template nor he knows the name of the signer. For simple forgery, the
forger has no access to the signature but he knows the name, so he produces signatures based on
the name. For simulated forgery, the forger has access to a signature sample, and he simulates
the genuine signature.
Similar to the other biometric verification systems, SV systems consist of signature acquisition,
feature extraction, and classification modules. Generally, signature features can be classified
into two main categories: global and local. Global features concern with the whole signa-
ture. Typical global features are number of components, global orientation of the signature,
envelopes, coefficients obtained by mathematical transforms, etc. Local features are extracted
from specific parts of the signature. Depending on the level of details captured, local fea-
tures can be divided into component oriented features which are extracted at the level of each
component, e.g., height to width ratio of the stroke, relative positions of the strokes, stroke
orientation, etc., and pixel-oriented features, which are extracted at pixel level, e.g., grid-based
information, pixel density, graylevel intensity, texture, etc. It is worth noting that some param-
eters, which are generally considered to be global features, can also be applied locally, and vice
versa. For instance, contour-based features can be extracted at the global level, e.g., envelopes
of the whole signature, or at the local level, e.g., envelopes of each connected component.
1.2 Bio-cryptography
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information security
such as confidentiality, data integrity, and authenticity (A. Menezes, 1996). Different crypto-
graphic schemes has been applied to achieve such security goals as data encryption and digital
signatures. Most of cryptographic techniques rely on keys for operation. There are two main
categories: symmetric-key and asymmetric-key cryptosystems. Symmetric-key algorithms use
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trivially related, often identical, cryptographic keys. On the other hand, asymmetric-key cryp-
tography uses different keys for encryption and decryption. The encryption keys are public and
they are used by all users to encrypt data, while each user has his own private key by which he
decrypts the data.
The drawback of cryptography lies in its dependency on secret cryptographic keys, that if
compromised, security of the system is compromised. Although the cryptographic keys are too
long to be guessed by impostors, they are also too long to be memorized by the legitimate users.
This problem is alleviated through storing the key in a secure place, e.g., a smart card, and a
user retrieves his key by providing a simple password. Such token/password solution forms a
weak point in a security system, as whatever strong is the cryptographic key, overall system
security is determined by the password length. Moreover, these authentication measures are not
strongly associated with the user identity, so they cannot really distinguish between attackers
and legitimate users. Any person who steals the password and the card can access the system.
To alleviate this key management problem, biometric passwords, e.g., fingerprint, iris, hand-
writings, etc., replace the traditional passwords within the so-called bio-cryptographic schemes
(Uludag et al., 2004). For instance, a cryptographic key is locked by a handwritten signature
image and a user must provide a genuine signature sample to unlock his cryptographic key.
Once unlocked, the key can be used to decrypt user confidential data or it is used to sign his
information digitally. As biometrics are strongly associated with user identity, and it is less
likely that they are stolen or forgotten, so they guarantee authenticity of the cryptography sys-
tem users. However, design of the bio-cryptography systems is challenging due to the fuzzy
nature of the biometric traits. The intra-personal variability and inter-personal similarity of
biometric signals lead to false rejection of authorized users and acceptance of unauthorized
users, respectively.
1.2.1 Bio-cryptographic schemes
The main bio-cryptographic schemes are: key release, key generation, and key binding (Jain
et al., 2006). In the key release mode, both cryptographic keys and biometric passwords are
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stored separately in system database. A key is released to its owner through a traditional bio-
metric verification process. This scheme is not secure, as both the cryptographic and biometric
information are stored in a plain form and they can be stolen or edited. In key-generation
schemes, the biometric trait is used to generate the cryptographic key directly through some
transformation functions. It is not easy to generate strong, robust, and random cryptographic
keys from variable and correlated biometric signals.
The key-binding scheme is the most reliable bio-cryptographic scheme. Both the cryptographic
key and the biometric template are combined in a single template in a way that it is impossible
to decouple these two parts without knowing the decoupling scheme, and providing a gen-
uine biometric sample (Soutar et al., 1999). In these schemes, classical crypto-keys are used.
Therefore, keys are as strong, random, accurate, and unique as with the classical cryptographic
systems. However, the inter-personal similarity and the intra-personal variability of biometrics
might lead to false acceptance of impostors or false rejections of genuine users, respectively.
The Fuzzy Vault (FV) scheme is the most commonly employed key-binding scheme that alle-
viates this fuzziness problem (Juels and Sudan, 2002).
1.2.2 Fuzzy Vault scheme
The FV is a cryptographic construction that binds a secret message, e.g., cryptographic key,
with an unordered and/or fuzzy locking set (Juels and Sudan, 2002). In the authentication time,
the secret message can be decoupled if the unlocking set substantially matches the locking set .
Accordingly, the FV construction can be used efficiently to secure cryptographic keys by using
fuzzy and unordered features extracted from the biometric traits, e.g., minutiae in fingerprints,
cross points in signatures, etc, as locking/unlocking sets.
A FV scheme locks a cryptographic keyK by means of a biometric template T . To unlockK, a
biometric query sample Q is provided by the user. Figure 1.1 illustrates this locking/unlocking
process. For key locking, K is split into k + 1 strings and constitutes a coefficient vector
C = {c0, c1, c2, ...., ck}. A polynomial p of degree k is encoded using C, where p(x) =
ckx
k+ ck−1xk−1+ .....+ c1x+ c0. Then, a locking set F T = {fTi }ti=1 is extracted from T . The
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Figure 1.1 Illustration of the FV locking/unlocking process.
polynomial is evaluated for all points in F T and constitutes the set p(F T ) = {p(fTi )}ti=1. The
points (F T , p(F T )) constitutes the genuine vault points.
It is known that, for a polynomial of degree k, only k + 1 points on its curve are needed to
reconstruct the polynomial equation. So, the genuine vault points can be used to reconstruct
the polynomial p, and thereby the cryptographic key K. Hence, any person who accesses the
genuine points can retrieve the key. Accordingly, to conceal these data from attackers, a set
of z chaff (noise) points (Fˆ = {fˆii}zii=1, Pˆ = {pˆii}zii=1) are generated. Then, the chaff and
genuine points are mixed to constitute the vault VT of length r points. Security of the vault
relies on the amount of concealing chaffs. In case that an impostor accesses the vault data, he
has to search for at least k + 1 genuine points, out of r = t + z points of the FV. This search
task becomes infeasible with high number of chaff points z.
The proper way to unlock K from the vault VT , by legitimate users, is to apply a biometric
query sample Q. An unlocking set FQ = {fQj }tj=1 is extracted from Q. Then, the chaff
points are filtered by matching items of FQ against all items in VT . In the ideal case, each
feature encoded in FQ locates the corresponding genuine feature encoded in F T (e.g., point 1
in Figure 1.1). On the other hand, due to the fuzzy nature of biometrics, some elements of FQ
differ from their corresponding elements in F T , and two types of errors might occur, namely
erasures and noise. For the erasures case, fQi does not match with any vault point, so it does not
add any element to the matching set (e.g., point 2 in Figure 1.1). For the noise case, a feature
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fQi might equate a chaff fˆii, so that it adds a noise point (fˆii, pˆii) to the matching set (e.g., point
3 in Figure 1.1).
Finally, the resulting matching set is fed to a polynomial reconstruction algorithm, to recon-
struct the encoded polynomial p. This process succeeds only if the matching set contains at
least k + 1 genuine points. However, even if enough genuine points exists, it is not possible
to differentiate between the genuine and noise points. To overcome this, FV decoders employ
error correction codes, like Reed-Solomon (R-S) codes. The genuine set (F T , p(F T )) is con-
sidered as a code word of length t, that encodes a secret message of length k + 1, where there
are t − k − 1 redundancy elements. During the decoding process, some noise is added to this
code producing a corrupted version of it. The error correction codes can correct some of these
errors and recover the secret message.
1.2.2.1 State of the art of FV
In literature, the FV design problem is addressed with different approaches. Generally, authors
proposed methodologies to absorb dissimilarities between template and query biometric sig-
nals, so that they are within the error correction capacity of the decoder. Researchers applied
the FV scheme using different biometric traits. For instance, Clancy (Clancy et al., 2003) and
Yang (Yang and Verbauwhede, 2005) proposed FV systems based on fingerprints and studied
impact of FV parameters on system performance. The later replaced the Cartesian coordinates
by the polar coordinates for aligning fingerprint queries and templates before matching. Also,
they used multiple templates for FV encoding.
Uludag (Uludag et al., 2005) proposed an error detection approach for fingerprint-based FVs,
where CRC-codes replace the Reed-Solomon (RS) correction codes for polynomial recon-
struction. In addition, a methodology for chaff points generation is proposed, where chaffs are
separated from locking points by a specific distance threshold. Therefore, the probability that
chaffs interfere with the genuine points decreases. Moreover, the authors proposed a fingerprint
alignment technique using helper data.
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Nandakumar (Nandakumar et al., 2007) proposed a FV system based on fingerprints. The
contributions of this work are: i) filtering most of chaff points by a coarse filter, ii) usage of
the minutiae point orientation as an extra discriminating feature, iii) quantization of features
adaptively based on the noise level of the signal, and vi) usage of multiple queries for authen-
tication.
Y. Wang (Wang and Plataniotis, 2007) proposed a FV system based on the face images. Fea-
tures variability is alleviated through quantization of distances vectors instead of the absolute
feature values. Lee (Lee et al., 2008) proposed a FV system based on the iris traits and used
the polar representation for alignment. Features are extracted from multiple region of interest
(ROI) of the iris. A group of ROI from multiple iris templates constitute a batch. Batches are
represented in a high dimensional features space. Using k-means, centers of different clusters
are identified and mapped to fixed feature codes used to encode the FV.
Freire (Freire-Santos et al., 2006) and (Freire-Santos et al., 2007) investigated applicability of
FV implementation based on the handwritten signatures. While the online signatures demon-
strated acceptable FV accuracy, the authors observed that static features extracted from the
offline signature images involve too much variability to build reliable FV systems.
Some authors proposed modified FV schemes that utilize passwords for an additional security
layer (K.Nandakumar et al., 2007) and (Reddy and I.Babu, 2008). In the encoding phase,
the feature vector is encrypted using a random function derived from user password. Then, the
transformed features vector generates the vault points. At last, the constituted vault is encrypted
by a key derived from the password. If the password is compromised, system security degrades
to the original FV security level. Also, this approach alleviates the FAR without having much
impact on the FRR.
Some authors proposed FV systems based on multiple biometric traits, where performance of
multi-modal FV systems outperformed the single modal systems (Nagar et al., 2011), (Nan-
dakumar, 2008), (Hirschbichler, 2008), (Meenakshi, 2010).

CHAPTER 2
OPTIMIZED DISSIMILARITY REPRESENTATIONS WITH APPLICATION TO
SIGNATURE VERIFICATION AND BIO-CRYPTOGRAPHY
The dissimilarity representation (DR) provides a classification space that is defined by some
proximity measure. One case where the DR approach is advantageous is when patterns are
represented in high-dimensional feature spaces, and only simple classification rules are appli-
cable. For instance, bio-cryptographic schemes use biometric signals to secure cryptographic
keys. These schemes mostly employ an error correction code that is considered as a sim-
ple threshold classifier. In addition, for behavioral biometrics, e.g., handwritten signatures,
effective verification systems rely on high-dimensional feature representations and complex
classifiers. It is a challenge to produce discriminant bio-cryptographic implementations based
on behavioral biometrics, with these limitations on representation size and classification com-
plexity. In this chapter, an approach is proposed for optimization of DRs, so that a concise
representation is discriminant even by employing a simple threshold classifier. To this end,
high-dimensional feature representations are translated to an intermediate space, where pair-
wise feature distances are the space constituents. Then, Boosting Feature Selection algorithm
is applied in this intermediate space, and produces an adaptive dissimilarity measure that re-
lies on a concise feature representation. This measure generates the final dissimilarity space,
where pattern proximities to some prototypes are the space constituents. Finally, discriminant
prototypes are selected in the dissimilarity space for enhanced representation. The proposed
approach is applied to classical and bio-cryptographic systems for offline signature verification.
Proof of concept simulations on the Brazilian signature database indicate the viability of the
proposed approach. Concise DRs with only 20 features and a single prototype are produced.
With employing a simple threshold classifier, the produced DRs have shown state-of-the-art
accuracy of about 7% average error rate, as that of complex systems in the literature. The
content of this chapter was published at the 2nd International workshop on Similarity-Based
Pattern Analysis and Recognition (Eskander et al., 2013f), the 2nd International workshop on
Automated Forensic Handwriting Analysis (Eskander et al., 2013a), and submitted to the spe-
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cial issue of the IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems on "Learning
in non-(geo)metric spaces" (Eskander et al., 2013e).
2.1 Introduction
Traditional classification techniques employ feature representations (FRs), where discrimina-
tive features are extracted from patterns that can be viewed as points in the feature space. An
effective FR implies that patterns belong to same class are close, while patterns of different
classes are well separated in the feature space. In case with numerous classes, with high di-
mensional representations, and with a limited number of labeled patterns per class, the design
of an efficient FR becomes infeasible (Guyon and Elisseeff, 2003).
Recently, the concept of dissimilarity representation (DR) has been introduced (Pekalska and
Duin, 2002). Instead of designing classifiers in the feature space, proximity (similarity/dissim-
ilarity) measures define the classification space. The rational behind this approach is that mod-
eling the proximity between patterns may be more discriminative than modeling the objects
themselves. Indeed, objects belonging to a specific class have a shared degree of commonality
that can be captured by dissimilarity measure. To this end, proximity measures are computed
and considered as features for classification. These measures can be derived in many ways,
e.g. from raw (sensor) measurements, histograms, strings or graphs. However, it can also be
build on top of a FR space (Duin et al., 2010).
Defining a DR by measuring proximities between patterns is beneficial when designing a clas-
sifier in the original FR space is intractable (Pekalska and Duin, 2005). For instance, for
applications with patterns represented by high-dimensional FRs, and that with complex deci-
sion boundaries, complex nonlinear classifiers must be designed. By exploiting a DR space,
proximities between high dimensional patterns are reduced to patterns in a lower dimensional
space, where simple linear classifiers may be sufficient.
Efficiency of a DR depends on the extend to which the proximity measure reflects the real
proximities between patterns. In case of a feature-based DR, a feature vector is extracted
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from both the questioned and prototype samples, and a certain distance function measures the
proximity between the two feature vectors. Designing a proximity measure implies selection
of suitable features and a distance function. Moreover, the class prototypes should be selected
to be robust and discriminant (Pekalska et al., 2006).
This chapter proposes an approach for optimizing DRs through selection of representative fea-
tures, distance functions, and prototypes. A global DR is initially optimized based on training
data from a set of classes, and then tuned for new classes using their specific data.
The advantages of the proposed approach are as follows:
The DR is designed so that the within-class (WC) and between-class (BC) dissimilarities con-
stitute two compact and separated clusters. Accordingly, the problem is shifted from represent-
ing objects of known classes to representing the relation between any two objects from similar
or dissimilar classes. As we model the relation between classes, not the classes themselves, so
designed representations are considered as class-independent representation (CIR). The CIR
could be further tuned to specific classes to produce class-specific representations (CSR). This
property might facilitate designing global systems that can be tuned to specific classes. For
instance, biometric systems, that rely on physiological or behavioral human traits for authen-
tication, e.g., fingerprint, face, iris, signatures, etc., are designed based on samples from users
who are already enrolled prior to the design phase (Jain et al., 2006). Classifiers that are de-
signed in the original FR space produce systems that are tuned to users who provide training
samples. These systems might not generalize well for new users, who are enrolled after design-
ing the system. The proposed approach can be employed to design global biometric classifiers
that generalize for future users.
In addition, the proposed approach absorbs some of the intra-class dissimilarities, and increases
the inter-class dissimilarities. Hence, the WC and BC distributions are easily separable in the
DR space, and simple classification rules, e.g., thresholds, could be sufficient.
Finally, although the ultimate goal of the approach is to design reliable DRs, where the dissimilarity-
based classifiers can be developed, the proposed approach can also employed to design tradi-
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tional feature-based classifiers. For instance, it could be used as a tool for feature selection,
where the curse of dimensionality is alleviated through shifting the multi-class problem, with
few samples per class, to a more tractable two-class problem with large number of class sam-
ples. This way, the features embedded in the designed DR are filtered and feature-based classi-
fiers are designed in the resulting feature space. Moreover, performance of some feature-based
distance classifiers, e.g., KNN., rely on the employed distance functions and prototypes, and
intensive research focused on this area (Ramanan and Baker, 2011),(Garcia et al., 2012). The
distance functions and prototypes embedded in the designed DR can support the design of such
distance classifiers.
Two applications are considered for proof-of-concept in this chapter: offline signature verifica-
tion (OLSV) (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008) and Bio-cryptography (Uludag et al., 2004). OLSV
systems verify that a signature image belongs to a specific writer. Design of these systems
is challenging, as signature images are represented by high-dimensional vectors and there is
no knowledge on either the forgeries nor signatures of future users during the design phase.
Recently, Rivard et al., proposed a writer-independent (WI) OLSV system that generalizes for
unseen users and forgeries (Rivard et al., 2013). The approach proposed in this chapter extends
this system, where here we generalize this approach for designing class-independent represen-
tations, that can be further tuned to new classes. Basic concepts of the proposed approach
has been appeared in (Eskander et al., 2013a). Also, a detailed implementation of employing
the proposed approach as an intermediate tool for feature selection, where final classifiers are
designed in the resulting FR spaces, has been appeared in (Eskander et al., 2013c). Here, we
implement the overall DR optimization methodology, in order to investigate the discriminative
power of the optimized DRs. To this end, accuracy of a simple classifier (just a threshold), that
uses the resulting concise DRs (based on few features and a single prototype), is compared to
complex systems in the literature.
Bio-cryptographic system design is another application considered in this chapter. In these
systems, biometric signals lock the cryptographic keys within security schemes like encryp-
tion and digital signatures (Uludag et al., 2004). The idea behind these schemes is to consider
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the query biometric signal as a noisy version of its prototype. If the query sample is gen-
uine, the dissimilarity between the query and its prototype is limited, so this noise can be
eliminated and the locked cryptographic key is released to its owner. This problem is also chal-
lenging as while biometric signals might be represented with high-dimensional vectors, such
systems need that only few features are used to lock the cryptographic key. In addition, the
error correction decoders embedded in such systems can be considered as simple classification
thresholds, and therefore no complex classification rules can be employed. We employ the
proposed approach to design representations that are adapted to this application. A preliminary
version of this approach has been appeared in (Eskander et al., 2013f), and a complete bio-
cryptographic implementation has been appeared in (Eskander et al., 2014a). Here, we show
that the design of a bio-cryptographic system can be formulated as a classical classifier in the
dissimilarity (D-space). Accordingly, same design approach is applied for both verification
and bio-cryptographic systems. Also, we show that applying the prototype selection method,
provides a way for enhancing accuracy and complexity of these systems.
For proof of concept simulation, the Brazilian signature verification DB is used (Freitas et al.,
2000). Representations are optimized based on the proposed approach, where the effect of each
processing step on the representation effectiveness is measured by its impact on separating WC
and BC samples. The resulting representations are used to design signature based systems, and
the classification error rates are reported.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, some related works for
dissimilarity learning are discussed. Section III presents the proposed dissimilarity represen-
tation optimization approach. The application on OLSV and bio-cryptography are presented
in sections IV and V respectively. Finally, the experimental methodology and some research
results are presented and discussed in section VI.
2.2 From learning features to the dissimilarity representation
Designing a classifier relies somewhat on the concept of dissimilarity. Ideally, similar objects
should produce similar classification labels and dissimilar objects should produce dissimilar
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labels. Similarity learning takes place either implicitly or explicitly, based on the applied rep-
resentation and learning strategy. In this section, we discuss these different forms and their
relation to the proposed approach.
2.2.1 Learning feature representations
The approach to independently design a FR, as a pre-processing step for the classifier design,
is known as filter feature selection approach (Guyon and Elisseeff, 2003). As the compactness
and isolation of different class distributions implies that real dissimilarities between objects
are captured, some methods rely on these measures to guide the feature selection process. For
instance, the Fisher criterion is extensively employed, where the ratio between WC and BC
variance reflects the effectiveness of the representation (Fisher, 1936). This approach, mostly,
involves optimization problems that becomes infeasible, when large number of classes are
represented by few training samples and high dimensional feature extractions.
Alternatively, some methods, namely, wrapper and embedded feature selection, combine the
design of both representation and classifier in a single process. For the wrapper approach, a
fixed predictor is tested based on different candidate representations, where the minimum clas-
sification error determines the best representation (Kohavi and John, 1997). For the embedded
approach, the predictor is built and tuned concurrently with selection of an effective represen-
tation. Examples under this category are classification and regression trees (CART) (Breiman
et al., 1984), and boosted feature selection (BFS) (Tieu and Viola, 2004), where individual
features are selected in a greedy manner, while building the classifier. Although they make
searching in high dimensional spaces more tractable, these methods do not produce generic
representations, as they tune the representation to specific classification rules. Moreover, fea-
ture selection techniques do not necessarily produce FRs that generalize for unseen classes and
samples during operations.
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2.2.2 Learning distance functions
A more explicit way for dissimilarity learning is done with classifiers that take explicit dis-
tances (or kernels) as inputs, e.g., KNN, SVM, etc. For such distance/kernel-based classifiers,
a distance function that measures the true proximity between FRs of patterns are firstly de-
signed, then they are fed to the classification stage. Performance of such classifiers relies on
the quality of the resulting proximity measure, which in turn relies on the employed FR, the
distance function applied to the representation, and the prototypes that used as references for
distance computations.
In the literature, such systems are optimized through employing distance function learning
(Ramanan and Baker, 2011), and/or prototype selection (Garcia et al., 2012). Distance func-
tion learning is done through optimizing a parametrized function, so the WC distances are
minimized and BC distances are maximized. Examples of the employed distance functions
are L2 distance (Frome et al., 2007), Chi-squared (Domeniconi et al., 2002), wighted simi-
larity (Babenko et al., 2009), probability of belongingness to different classes (Mahamud and
Hebert, 2009). However, most of employed distance functions take the following form:
DQ(x, xi) = (xi − x)TQ(xi − x). (2.1)
where, xi and x are the FR, for the questioned and the prototype samples, respectively. This
technique provides a way to translate hardly separable distributions to a space where the dis-
tributions are more separable. In order that conventional pattern recognition approaches holds
in the new space, Q is restricted to be a symmetric and positive definite matrix (or kernel), so
that D is a metric function (Ramanan and Baker, 2011). According to Eq. 2.1, it is obvious
that entries of the Q matrix determine the impact of the pairwise distances between individual
features on the proximity measure. So, learning Q implies feature selection. It is shown that
accuracy of this metric increases, when full matrices are considered (i.e., not only a diagonal
matrix but some weighted relations among individual distances exist) (Bar-Hillel et al., 2005).
However, this comes with the expense of increased complexity of the optimization problems.
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Also, it is shown that global distance functions does not frequently represent all classes (Wein-
beger and Saul, 2009). Instead, the concept of local distance functions is presented (Ramanan
and Baker, 2011). For instance, the metric tensor concept is represented, where instead to learn
a metric Q for the whole space, specific metric QT is learned for every class T . This approach
becomes complex for large number of classes, and some authors suggested grouping similar
classes under larger classes, so trade-off between global and class specific similarity functions
can be achieved (Babenko et al., 2009). Moreover, as aforementioned, quality of the proximity
measure depends also on the prototype set used as a reference for distance measuring. Pro-
totype selection is extensively studied for distance-based classifiers like KNN (Garcia et al.,
2012).
2.2.3 Learning dissimilarity representations
Recently, the concept of distance function learning is generalized to learning dissimilarity rep-
resentations (DRs) (Pekalska and Duin, 2002). While distance functions are restricted to be
feature-based and metric, conversely, these conditions are relaxed in the DRs, so any proximity
measure can be employed. Through this, the statistical pattern recognition methods are ap-
plicable to subjects indescribable by traditional feature representation and/or that involve none
metric proximities. Previously, such subjects could only be classified through structural pattern
recognition methods, hence, the DR approach is considered as a bridge between structural and
statistical pattern recognition techniques. In addition, the DR approach can also be applied to
feature-based systems, where the learning and classification tasks are more tractable in the DR
space than in the FR space. This last scenario relies on same reasoning like that of the kernel
trick, while, here, any proximity measure can be employed (Pekalska and Duin, 2005).
To produce a DR, firstly, the pairwise distances constitute a dissimilarity matrix, where a row
of this matrix represents distances of questions samples to all prototypes. The prototypes may
include the whole training set, however, some approaches are applied to reduce the prototype
set for the most informative ones (Pekalska et al., 2006). Then, the dissimilarity matrix can
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be translated to the so-called dissimilarity (D-space) through two main techniques, namely,
embedding and vectorial representation (Pekalska and Duin, 2005).
In the embedding technique, the dissimilarities are embedded in a new space where the dis-
similarities are preserved. The transformation function should guarantee that the new space is
Euclidean, so classical pattern recognition theories hold their. For the vectorial representation
technique, the dissimilarities are used to produce a vectorial space directly, where distances to
the prototypes are the space dimensions. So, a row in the dissimilarity matrix is a vector in
this space (Pekalska and Duin, 2006). Designing classifiers in such space models the relations
between pattern proximities. Instead of applying local rules to a dissimilarity cell, like KNN,
more globally aware rules, that consider the other rows of the dissimilarity matrix, are applied.
It is found that simple classifiers applied in the dissimilarity space, perform even better than
complex classifiers that run in the original feature space (Pekalska and Duin, 2006).
2.2.4 Proposed approach
The proposed approach seeks, not to design DR-based classifiers, but to learn the DR itself.
This way, simple classification rules, e.g., thresholds, might be sufficient when employed in
the DR space, or even if they are directly applied to the dissimilarity matrix.
In this Thesis, we are concerned only with the feature-based DRs, and vectorial D-spaces.
As the proposed approach involves feature selection, it can also be considered as a tool to
design pure feature-based classifiers. Moreover, as it involves distance function learning and
prototype selection, the approach can be employed to design distance-based classifiers that
work in the FR space. Compared to the formal distance function defined in Eq. 2.1, our
approach learns a simple identity matrix, so only unweighted feature selection is achieved, and
no cross-feature relations are modeled. Through this simplified metric, the learning process is
lighter but it might not be optimal. To compensate against such lack of information, an adaptive
dissimilarity measure is proposed, that absorbs some of the intrinsic feature variability.
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Most important, the produced DRs are designed so that a global class-independent represen-
tation represents all, and even unseen, classes, where it could be tuned for specific classes by
means of class-specific training data. This strategy is analogue to the global and local distance
concepts applied for the distance-based classifiers, and the proposed approach could be em-
ployed in such context. Also, this property might facilitate the design of adaptive systems, that
are designed with limited data, then they adapt whenever new data becomes available, e.g.,
adaptive biometric systems.
2.3 Dissimilarity Representation Optimization approach
In this section, the proposed approach for optimizing DRs is illustrated. Although the DR is
a general approach, where dissimilarity measures can be derived directly from patterns, e.g.,
sensor measurements, we discuss here the special case where the DR is build on top of a
feature representation (FR). This approach is suitable for applications, where many techniques
of feature extraction are already proposed.
Figure 2.1 illustrates a DR constituted on top of a FR. Assume a system is designed for U
different classes, where for any class u there are R prototypes (templates) {pur}Rr=1. Also, a
class v provides a set of J questioned samples {Qvj}Jj=1. The dissimilarity between a ques-
tioned sample Qvj and a prototype pur is δQvjpur . Dissimilarities between all the questioned
and prototypes samples constitute a dissimilarity matrix, where each row contains distances
from a specific query to all of the prototypes.
In case that questioned and prototype samples belong to the same class, i.e., u = v, the dissim-
ilarity sample is a WC sample (black cells in Figure 2.1). On the other hand, if questioned and
prototype samples belong to different classes, i.e., u = v, then the dissimilarity sample is a BC
sample (white cells in Figure 2.1).
Effective DR implies that all of the WC distances have zero values, while all of the BC distances
have large values. This occurs when the employed dissimilarity measure absorbs all of the WC
variabilities, and detects all of the BC similarities. The proposed approach aims to enlarge
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Figure 2.1 Illustration of a dissimilarity representation (DR) built on top of a feature
representation (FR): black and white cells represent WC and BC dissimilarities,
respectively. The third dimension represents the feature dissimilarity (FD) space, where
dissimilarities between prototype and query samples are measured by the distance
between their feature representations. The dissimilarity cells constitute a dissimilarity
matrix, where each row contains the distances from a specific query to all of the
prototypes.
the separation between the BC and WC distributions, so that simple classification rules can be
applied in the resulting dissimilarity space, or even applied directly to the dissimilarity matrix.
2.3.1 Feature selection and dissimilarity learning
As shown in Figure 2.1, the third dimension represents the feature dissimilarity (FD) space,
where dissimilarities between a query Qvj and a prototype pur are measured by the dissimilar-
ity between their feature representations {fQvjn }Nn=1 and {f purn }Nn=1, respectively. These repre-
sentations are translated to a FD space of same dimensionalityN , and constitute a dissimilarity
vector:
dQvjpur = {δfQvjpurn }Nn=1, δfQvjpurn = ‖fQvjn − f purn ‖ (2.2)
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Distance of a dissimilarity vector is measured through employing a distance function g, to
determine the value of corresponding dissimilarity matrix cell:
δQvjpur = g({δfQvjpurn }Nn=1) (2.3)
It is obvious that, independently on the distance function g, discriminative power of the em-
ployed FD representation controls the separability of the WC and BC cells. However, proper
selection of the function g is also important, to capture the maximum power of the underlying
representation. Accordingly, we first select features that discriminate between the WC and BC
samples in the FD space, then a proper distance function is designed.
Figure 2.2 Illustration of feature selection in the original feature space F (left) and in
the feature-dissimilarity space FD (right). Distance between two samples in the F space
is translated to a vector in the FD space, where each dimension represents the distance as
measured by a single feature.
To illustrate the proposed feature selection approach, consider the example shown in Figure 2.2.
In the left side objects from three classes are represented in the FR space F . For simplicity,
only two features f1 and f2 are shown in this figure, while typical representations might have
high dimensionality. In this example, we assume that class 1 has two prototypes p11 and p12.
Also, consider, for now, that the employed distance function g is the Euclidean distance:
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It is clear that a DR that is built on top of this FR is discriminative. WC distances (like δQ11p11E )
are generally smaller than the BC distances (like δQ21p11E ). However, in the F space, the im-
pact of each feature on the WC and BC distances is not clear. With representations of high
dimensionality, high number of classes, a small number of training samples per class, it is not
feasible to select the most discriminative features in the feature space F .
On the other hand, in the FD space, the impact of every individual feature on the WC and BC
distances is clear, (see right side of Figure 2.1). In this space, a distance δQvjpurE is represented
by the distance from the origin point to dQvjpur (as defined in Eq. 2.2 and Eq. 2.4). Ac-
cordingly, projecting the dissimilarity vector on different axis of the FD space, determines the
discriminative power of each dimension. For instance, it is obvious that δf2 is more discrimi-
native than δf1. For all samples belonging to class 1, (like Q11), δf
Q11p1r
2 < δ2 and for all other
class samples (like Q21 and Q31), δf
Qvjp1j
2 > δ2. On the other hand, δf1 is less discriminant.
For class 2 query Q21, δf
Q21p11
1 < δ1, same as that for class 1 sample Q11. Besides that it is
easier to rank features in the FD space, the multi-class problem with few training samples per
class in F space is transformed to a two-class problem in the new space, with more training
samples per class.
It is also important to note that, proper ranking of dissimilarity features in the FD space leads
to proper ranking of the features in the original F space. For instance, the BC sample dQ21p11
is correctly classified by the dissimilarity feature δf2 (see right side of Figure 2.2), while it
is misclassified as a WC dissimilarity by δf1. Similarly, while f2 easily splits the different
clusters in the F space (see left side of Figure 2.2), f1 hardly splits class 1 and class 2 as f
p11
1
is very close to fQ211 . This property enables employing the FD space as a tool for designing
reliable FRs, for traditional feature based classifiers. FRs are designed in the FD space, then
samples are represented and classified in the resulting feature space.
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2.3.2 A two-step feature selection approach
The aforementioned feature selection methodology can be applied to optimize a dissimilarity
matrix that includes pairwise distances relating to all classes. Such approach has some draw-
backs:
• The resulting representation might fit only the classes used for training, and might not
generalize well for unseen classes.
• The resulting representation, and in turn the designed proximity measure, are designed
to fit all of the classes, i.e., global measures. This is not easily achievable, and it is shown
that local distance functions outperform the global ones (Ramanan and Baker, 2011). To
illustrate that, see Figure 2.1 (left side). While f1 is not discriminant enough to separate
class 1 from the other 2 classes, and f2 is better for this task, f1 is more suitable to sep-
arate class 3 from the other classes. In order to design class specific solutions, one may
suggest that one-against-all dissimilarity matrix is optimized for each class. However,
the WC entries for each matrix will be few, so searching in high dimensional representa-
tions will be intractable.
To avoid the above drawbacks, and achieving effective representations/proximity measures that
generalize for unseen classes, we propose a two-step feature selection approach as shown in
Figure 2.3. In the first step, a class-independent database (CID) containing samples from a set
of classes, is used for training. These classes should represent the other unseen classes. For
example, in case of designing OLSV systems, these classes (users) have their objects (hand-
written signatures) written with same alphabet, collected under same acquisition conditions,
etc. This way a measure that discriminates between WC and BC dissimilarities extracted from
the training samples, will be discriminant for other classes that are not used for training (Rivard
et al., 2013). To this end, high dimensional feature extractions from the CID samples are trans-
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Figure 2.3 A framework of the optimizing dissimilarity representations approach,
consists of a) class-independent optimization phase and b) class-specific optimization
phase. a) High dimensional FRs are extracted from a class-independent dataset (CID),
and translated to the FD space of same dimensionality M . The composed dissimilarity
matrix (1) are not optimized and the WC and BC entries are not separable. A
class-independent feature selection process runs in the FD space, producing a
class-independent representation (CIR) of reduced dimensionality L. The resulting
reduced dissimilarity matrix (2) should have more separable clusters. b) whenever
class-specific data (CSD) exist, R1 samples from this data, and some samples from the
CID, are represented in the CIR of dimensionality L. Then, a class-specific dissimilarity
matrix (3) is composed, where WC entries consist of dissimilarities within the R1 class
prototypes, and the BC entries consist of dissimilarities between samples from the CID
and the R1 prototypes. This matrix (3) still has its clusters not well separated as the
embedded FR is not tuned to the specific class. A second feature selection process runs in
the reduced FD space, producing a class-specific representation (CSR) of reduced
dimensionality N . The resulting matrix (4) might have their clusters more separable, as
the CSR is further tuned. However, not all columns of (4) have same separability. For
enhanced representation, entries of matrix (4) are translated to a dissimilarity (D-space),
where the R1 prototypes are the space dimensions. Then, a feature selection process runs
in the D-space, with class prototypes are considered as features, and the best R2
prototypes are selected. This way, a CSR of N features and R2 prototypes might result in
separable WC and BC clusters of the class-specific matrix (5).
lated to the FD space, and constitute WC and BC samples of same dimensionality M . Feature
selection is done in the FD space, producing a CIR of L < M dimensionality. This CIR can be
used to represent samples from unseen classes, and might be used to define global proximity
measure with acceptable generalization accuracy.
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In the second step, whenever enough samples from a specific class exist, they are used to tune
the CIR and produces a CSR that fits that class. To this end, a class specific database (CSD)
containing R1 samples, besides some samples from the CID that represent the other classes,
are used for training. All samples are represented in the CIR space defined through the first
step, and they are translated to the FD though computing dissimilarities between all samples.
As the search space has a reduced dimensionality L, so training with few class-specific samples
becomes more tractable in this reduced space. Then, additional feature selection step runs in
this space, producing a class specific representation (CSR) of dimensionality N < L < M .
The two feature selection steps can be achieved by employing different feature selection meth-
ods in the FD space. However in this Thesis, this concept is realized by employing the boosting
feature selection (BFS) method (Tieu and Viola, 2004), for fast searching in high dimensional
spaces. Decision-stumps (DS) (Iba and Langley, 1992), that are single-split single-level clas-
sification trees, are trained through a boosting process (Schapire, 2002). Training of a DS is
equivalent to selection of a single feature that discriminates between two classes based on a
splitting threshold. If the BFS runs in the FD space, a DSi at a learning iteration i, locates
the best dissimilarity feature δfi, that splits the two classes around a splitting dissimilarity
threshold δi.
2.3.3 Adaptive dissimilarity measure
Selecting the most discriminant features in the FD space, produces representations with low
WC and high BC dissimilarities. However, some of the intrinsic fuzziness of the samples are
not canceled through this feature selection process. To illustrate this, see Figure 2.4 (left side).
Although the BC and WC clusters are separated, samples of each class are scattered in the
space, because of the intra-class variability and inter-class similarities. To alleviate this vari-
ability, we propose an adaptive dissimilarity measure. This measure is computed in the FD
space, and absorbs some of the intrinsic fuzziness. For a feature representation F = {fn}Nn=1,
the feature dissimilarity vector Δ = {δn}Nn=1 is learned in FD space, where δn discriminates
between the WC and the BC dissimilarities for a feature fn. Based on this modeled dissimilar-
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Figure 2.4 Illustration of the transformation from the feature-dissimilarity space (left) to
the dissimilarity space (right). All dissimilarity samples that belong to same query Qvj in
the FD space, are represented as a single vector DQvj in the D-space. Dimensions of this
vector are distance components to individual prototypes. In case that only the best
prototype is selected, employing a simple threshold  might be enough to discriminate
between WC and BC samples in the D-space.
ity, we replace the Euclidean distance measure (δQvjpurE ) (defined in Eq. 2.4), by the adaptive
dissimilarity measure:
δ
Qvjpur
A =
N∑
n=1
(δQvjpurn ), δ
Qvjpur
n =
{
0 if (δf
Qvjpur
n < δn)
1 otherwise
(2.5)
Employing this measure absorbs some of the intrinsic feature variability and increases its dis-
criminative power. For instance, according to Eq. 2.5, distances among the WC samples
δ
Qvjpur
A = 0, ∀v = u. Moreover, for most of the BC distances δQvjpurA = 2, ∀v = u.
2.3.4 Prototype selection in the dissimilarity space
The aforementioned steps might be utilized to produce class specific FRs or distance measures,
for designing traditional or distance-based classifiers in the feature space, respectively. Also,
designed dissimilarity matrices are expected to have well separated WC and BC cells, so simple
rules, e.g., KNN, might be directly applied to the matrix.
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However, the ultimate goal of the proposed approach is to generate a reliable DR space, in
which more complex classifiers can be designed. Efficiency of a DR depends on the dis-
criminative power of its generating prototypes. Accordingly, a prototype selection method is
proposed. In this Thesis we employed the vectorial representation to generate a dissimilarity
(D)-space, where distances to the prototypes are the space dimensions. A feature selection
process runs in the D-space, to locate the most discriminating dimensions.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the transformation between the FD and D spaces. In the left side, WC
and BC samples are represented in the FD space. It is obvious that different prototypes (differ-
ent columns in the dissimilarity matrix), produce different distance values, where significant
variability exists for the WC and the BC classes. Also, in this space, it is not clear which
prototype is the most informative. In the right side, samples are projected to a vectorial dissim-
ilarity class-specific D-space, where distances to the prototypes constitute its dimensions (for
simplicity only two prototypes are shown for class 1, however, practical D-spaces could be of
higher dimensions). Hence, each row in the dissimilarity matrix is presented as a vector in the
D space, and each column represents projections of all vectors on a specific prototype.
Consider, for a class u, the available set of R1 prototypes P = {pu1, pu2, ..., puR1}. The adap-
tive dissimilarity distance for a query Qvj is computed against every prototype pur ∈ P , ac-
cording to Eq.2.5. This operation produces a dissimilarity vector DQvj in the D-space, where
DQvj = {DQvjpu1 , DQvjpu2 , ..., DQvjpuR1}. (2.6)
It is clear that the D-space provides easier way to rank prototypes according to their discrimina-
tive power. For instance, for class 1, p12 is more discriminative than p11, as for all BC samples,
DQvjp12 = 2. While for Q21, DQ21p11 = 1 (because δf
Q21p11
1 < δ1). So, for this class, mea-
suring the dissimilarity relative to p12 results in more isolated clusters, and a smaller threshold,
e.g.  = 1, can discriminate between the WC and BC dissimilarities. The prototype selection
method can be realized by various feature selection techniques (with considering prototypes as
features), however, we realized it through employing the BFS approach (Tieu and Viola, 2004).
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2.4 Application to signature verification
2.4.1 Dissimilarity-based signature verification
Here, we employ the optimized DRs to design OLSV systems, where handwritten signature
images are used for authentication. Different than online SV systems, where signature dynam-
ics such as velocity, pressure, etc., are acquired during the signing process, the OLSV systems
rely on static features extracted from signature images, producing a harder pattern recognition
problem (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008).
Standard OLSV systems are designed in the FR space. The training samples should represent
a wide range of genuine signatures and possible forgeries, for all system users. For real world
applications, e.g., banking systems, the number of users could be very high and there is a high
risk of forgery. The enrolling signature samples, available for designing such systems, are
mostly few and no samples of forgeries are available. In addition, high-dimensional feature
representations are needed to capture the invariance of the signature images. With these limita-
tions, it is a challenge to design FRs, that absorb the intra-personal variabilities while detecting
both the forgeries and the inter-personal similarities. Also, feature-based OLSV systems are
writer-dependent, as they are designed for some specific writer(s), and they do not necessarily
generalize for unseen classes.
Recently, the DR concept is applied to the OLSV problem, to alleviate the limitations of the FR-
based design approach. Siteargur N. Srihari et al., (Srihari et al., 2004) developed generative
models from the WC and BC statistics, where the correlation between binary features is used
as a distance measure. The WC distribution is modeled based on either writer-specific samples
or all-writers samples, resulting in writer-dependent (WD) and writer-independent (WI) OLSV
systems, respectively.
Concurrently, Santos, Bertolini, and Sabourin et al., proposed similar DR based systems (C. San-
tos et al., 2004)-(Bertolini et al., 2010), where the Euclidean distance between graphometric
feature vectors is used as a distance measure. However, they developed discriminative WI
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classifiers that learn from from independent (population) database, and no samples from real
system users are incorporated in the design phase. The designed systems are tested with sig-
natures from users who are not seen during the design phase, and show acceptable accuracy.
The proved hypothesis in this work is: if a huge number of samples are used to build a global
DR-based classifier, it is statistically valid that the resulting model generalizes for users whose
samples are not included in the training set.
For the above systems, no representation optimization is applied, only fixed feature representa-
tion, and in turn fixed distance measure, is employed. Later, Batista et al., (Batista et al., 2010)
applied the dissimilarity learning concept to produce reliable WD-SV systems. A feature-based
one-class classifier is built by producing user-specific generative models using Hidden Markov
models (HMMs). These models are considered as prototypes, where the likehood that a query
signature belongs to the different models constitute a D-space, and a discriminative classifier
is designed in this space. This implementation implies optimized DRs, as the designed HMMs
are the DR constituents.
Recently, Rivard et al., (Rivard et al., 2013) extended the work in (Bertolini et al., 2010), and
achieved higher performance, when employing an embedded feature selection methodology
through BFS over huge number of multi-scale multi-type features. In this case, the DR is
optimized concurrently with building the classifier. This work is the base of our proposed
approach, where only the class-independent optimization stage is implemented, producing a
CIR. This CIR is embedded in a global classifier designed in the class-independent FD space.
Here, we extend Rivard approach, by employing the class-specific optimization stage shown in
Figure 2.3.
2.4.2 Applying the proposed approach
The user-specific training signature samples from the CSD, and some samples from the CID
dataset, are represented in the CIR feature space. Then, these FRs are translated to a class-
independent FD space, where a class-specific feature selection process runs. A D-space is
constituted by computing the adaptive dissimilarity measures for the different samples against
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the user prototypes. Finally, the best prototype is selected in the D-space, by running a BFS
process with the prototypes are considered as features. Compared to Rivard system, the pro-
posed SV implementation employ concise user-specific unweighted FR. Also, in this chapter,
we restricted our implementation for single dimensional D-spaces, where only the best proto-
type is incorporated in the verification decision. Accordingly, the SV system functionality is
given by:
SV (Qvj, pur∗) = sign(− δQvjpur∗A ). (2.7)
where Qvj is a query signature j of user v, pur∗ is the best prototype (with index r∗) selected
for user u,  is a dissimilarity threshold defined in the D-space, and δQvjpur∗A is the user-specific
adaptive dissimilarity measure defined by Eq. 2.5.
2.5 Application to bio-cryptography
2.5.1 Dissimilarity-based bio-cryptography
Bio-cryptography is another example where the proposed approach is beneficial. Bio-cryptographic
systems are introduced to replace the traditional usage of simple user passwords by biometric
traits like fingerprint, iris, face, signatures, etc., to secure the cryptographic keys within security
schemes like encryption and digital signatures (Uludag et al., 2004).
Robust bio-cryptographic systems operate in the key-binding mode where classical crypto-keys
are coupled with a biometric message. For key binding, some encoding schemes like Fuzzy
Commitment (Juels and Wattenberg, 1999) and Fuzzy Vault (FV) (Juels and Sudan, 2002) are
the most commonly employed. In the enrollment phase, a prototype biometric message en-
codes the secret key. In the authentication phase, a message is extracted from the query sample
to decode the key. If the query sample is genuine, the dissimilarity between the encoding and
decoding messages is limited, so this dissimilarity can be eliminated by the decoder. On the
other hand, if the query sample belongs to another person, or if it is a forged sample, the dis-
similarity between the two messages is too high to cancel. Accordingly, the secret key will be
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unlocked only to users who apply similar enough query samples. Practical decoding complex-
ity of such codes needs that employed biometric messages should be concise. It is a challenging
task to produce a concise and informative messages from the biometric signals, and to use sim-
ple classifiers like the bio-cryptographic decoders to differentiate between genuine and forged
samples. 1
In literature, the concept of dissimilarity representation is not directly employed to design
bio-cryptographic systems. However, some authors proposed methodologies to absorb the dis-
similarities between encoding and decoding biometric signals, so that they are within the error
correction capacity of the decoder. For instance, fingerprint-based fuzzy vaults are designed
by using some minutia points extracted in the spatial space to constitute the FV locking fea-
tures. Dissimilarity between locking and unlocking features is decreased by aligning query and
template fingerprints, and by applying an adaptive bounding box during matching the minutia
points (Nandakumar et al., 2007).
2.5.2 Applying the proposed approach
In this Thesis, we consider the FV key binding cryptographic scheme. In FVs, a locking
message F pur = {f purn }Nn=1 is extracted from a biometric enrolled signal pur of user u, and it
locks the user cryptographic key K. To conceal this locking messages from attacker, a set of
chaff (noise) points are mixed with the locking elements.
In the authentication phase, a user provides a biometric query signal Qvj , that produces an
unlocking message FQvj = {fQvjn }Nn=1. Each unlocking element fQvjn is matched against all of
the locking elements of F pur , and producing a matching set. The key K can be unlocked only
if the error of the matching set is beyond the FV error correction capability . 2 There are two
sources of matching errors: erasures and noise. In the erasures case, some unlocking elements
do not match their corresponding locking elements, so they are not added to the matching set.
1Details of how the crypto-key is encoded/decoded by means of biometrics is out of the scope of this chapter.
More details on these aspects are discussed in Chapter 4.
2Error correction capacity  of a FV bio-cryptographic systems relies on the sizes of both the cryptographic
key and the encoding messages. Also, for technical issues, the message elements {fi}Ni=1 are quantized in 8-bit
words before computing the dissimilarities. See Chapter 4. for detailed explanation.
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In the noise case, some unlocking elements match some of the chaff points, so they are added
as noise δ′ to the matching set. For efficient FV implementation, sum of these errors should
not exceed  for genuine query signals, while it exceeds it for impostors.
δ1
δ2
δn
δN
∑ ε
δ f Qv j pur∗1
FVδ
Qv jpur∗
A
δQv jpur∗1
∑
δ ′
δQv jpur∗2
δQv jpur∗n
δQv jpur∗N
δ f Qv j pur∗2
δ f Qv j pur∗n
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Figure 2.5 Proposed model of the FV functionality: every unlocking element fQvjn is
matched against all locking elements {f pur∗n }Nn=1, where it succeeds to locate the
corresponding element only if their dissimilarity is within the modeled dissimilarity
threshold δn. To correctly decode the FV, the overall dissimilarity between the locking
and unlocking messages δQvjpur∗A , besides the noise error δ
′ (resulting from false matching
with chaffs), should not exceed the error correction capacity  of the decoder.
Based on this FV description, we employ the proposed DR optimization approach, so the FV
functionality can be modeled as shown in Figure 2.5. A FV unlocking element fQvjn is matched
against all locking elements with a tolerance δn. So, a locking element is successfully located
when the corresponding unlocking elements is similar enough (has limited dissimilarity δn).
Accordingly, the dissimilarity results from the erasures error type is equivalent to δQvjpur∗A (see
equation 2.5), where r∗ is the prototype selected for key locking. Considering the extra noise
errors δ′ , the total error should not exceed the FV error correction capacity . Accordingly, the
proposed formulation of the FV functionality is:
FV (Qvj, pur∗) = sign(− (δQvjpur∗A + δ
′
)). (2.8)
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where FV = 1 implies that the locked cryptographic key is released (that should occur only
if u = v), and FV = 0 implies that the key cannot be released, Qvj is a query signature j of
user v, pur∗ is the best prototype (with index r∗) selected for user u,  is a FV error correction
capacity (and it is equivalent to the dissimilarity threshold defined in the D-space), and δQvjpur∗A
is the user-specific adaptive dissimilarity measure defined by Eq. 2.5.
A complete implementation of a FV system based on offline signature images has been ap-
peared in (Eskander et al., 2014a). However, here, the concept is consolidated with empha-
sizing on the DR-based formulation of the FV design problem. According to Eq. 2.7 and Eq.
2.8, It is obvious that, if no chaff points are incorrectly matched with unlocking elements, i.e.,
noise error δ′ = 0, then functionalities of both the cryptographic and classical SV systems
are similar. Hence, same design approach and steps can be followed to build both systems.
Moreover, we investigated the impact of selecting effective prototypes for FV encoding on the
system accuracy and complexity.
2.6 Experiments
Classification of handwritten signature images is a suitable example, where the power of pro-
posed approach can be investigated. The static signals extracted from such images involve
high variability between intra-personal signatures, and similarities between inter-personal sig-
natures. Also, it is easy to imitate the signature images by forgeries. Generally, such hard
classification problem is tackled though employing high dimensional representations and com-
plex classifiers (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008). Here, we test the optimized DRs for distinguishing
between genuine and forged signatures, where concise representations and the simplest classi-
fication rule (threshold) are employed.
2.6.1 Database
The Brazilian database is used for proof-of-concept simulations (Freitas et al., 2000). It con-
tains 7,920 samples of signatures that were digitized as 8-bit grayscale images over 400X1000
pixels at resolution of 300 dpi. This DB contains genuine signatures, simple and simulated
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forgeries. For simple forgery, the forger knows the writer’s name but not the signature mor-
phology, so he writes the name using his style of writing. A simulated forgery has access to a
sample of the signature, and he imitates its image. To generate random forgeries for a specific
user, where a forger is not supposed to know neither the name nor the signature morphology,
we consider genuine signatures of other users as forgeries.
The signatures were provided by 168 writers. For the last 108 writers, there are only 40 genuine
signatures per writer and no forgeries. We consider these signatures as the CID, and they are
employed for the class-independent optimization phase. For the first 60 writers, there are 40
genuine signatures, 10 simple forgeries and 10 simulated forgeries per writer. These signatures
are considered as CSD, and used for the class-specific optimization stage and for performance
evaluation.
2.6.2 Class-independent optimization
The processing steps included in the class-independent optimization stage are executed as
shown in the top part of Figure 2.3. This stage aims to produce a CIR of relatively low dimen-
sion L, from rich feature extractions of huge dimensionality M >> L. Same experimental
settings are applied, as that employed by Rivard et al., as this work is considered as the base
of our approach (Rivard et al., 2013). The relatively low dimensionality of the produced CIR,
besides it represents unseen users, it facilitates designing of further tuned CSRs of concise
representations, where limited CSDs are available.
2.6.2.1 Feature extraction
Extended-shadow-code (ESC) (Sabourin and Genest, 1994), and directional probability density
function (DPDF) (Drouhard et al., 1996) are employed. Features are extracted based on differ-
ent grid scales, hence a range of details are detected in the signature image. A set of 30 grid
scales is used for each feature type, producing 60 different single scale feature representations.
These representations are then fused to produce a FR of huge dimensionality, M = 30, 201
(Rivard et al., 2013).
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Table 2.1 The class-independent data set (CID): UCID =108 users x R1 = 40 genuine
signatures. Only some of unique dissimilarities are taken from the huge dissimilarity
matrix, and used to design the CIR.
Training set Validation set
(RT1 = 30 signatures/user) (R
V
1 = 10 signatures/users)
WC BC WC BC
distances among distances among 29 distances among the distances among
RT1 signatures from R
T
1 R
V
1 R
V
1 and 30
signatures and 15 signatures of and signatures selected
other users RT1 randomly from
other users
108x30x29/2 108x29x15 108x10x30 108x10x30
=46,980 samples =46,980 samples =32,400 samples =32,400 samples
2.6.2.2 Class-independent feature selection
The initial dissimilarity matrix (see matrix 1 in Figure 2.3), is constituted by translating the
FR, of M dimensionality, for UCID = 108 users of the CID and R = 40 prototypes per writer,
to a FD space of same dimensionality. To this end, dissimilarities among all signatures (108
writers × 40 signatures) constitute a dissimilarity matrix, as shown in Figure 2.1. As this
matrix is huge, not all of its cells are used to design the CIR. Also, to avoid overfitting the
CID data, some of the WC and BC samples are used for training and other set of samples are
used for validation. Table 2.1 illustrate the selection of these datasets, where all the data and
experimental settings are the same as found in (Rivard et al., 2013).
Finally, a BFS process is executed in the FD space, producing a CSR of reduced dimensionality
L = 555. It is possible to use this representation, and the corresponding learned dissimilarity
thresholds {δl}Ll=1, for designing a global (class-independent) adaptive dissimilarity measure
as defined in Eq. 2.5. However, in case of having enough data for a specific class, it is used to
tune the global model to a CSR and a class-specific dissimilarity measure, by employing the
following optimization stage.
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Table 2.2 The class-specific datasets (CSDs): a different CSD for each of the 60 users,
with 60 signatures each: 40 genuine+10 simple +10 simulated forgeries. 30 genuine
signatures are used as prototypes, so UCSD = 1×Rcs1 = 30 genuine signatures. The other
samples are used as queries for performance evaluation, so 30× 40 = 1200 dissimilarities
are used for testing.
Training set Testing set
(Rcs1 = 30 genuine signatures) (10 genuine signatures+
10 simple+10 simulated forgeries)
WC BC WC BC
distances among distances among distances among distances among 30
the Rcs1 29 signatures the 10 genuine forgeries (10 simple
signatures from Rcs1 signatures and +10 simulated
and 15 signatures Rcs1 +10 random selected
from all users of CID from other users) and Rcs1
30x29/2 29x108x15 10x30 30x30
=435 samples =46,980 sample =300 samples =900 samples
2.6.3 Class-specific optimization
The processing steps included in the class-specific optimization stage are executed as shown
in the lower part of Figure 2.3. This stage aims to produce a CSR of concise dimension N <
L << M , by tuning the CIR to the specific user. This representation is used to design a user-
specific dissimilarity measure. Also, a vectorial D-space is designed using the user prototypes,
where best prototypes can be selected.
2.6.3.1 Class-specific feature selection
The CSD, and some samples from CID, are used to generate a dissimilarity matrix (see matrix
3 in Figure2.3). Only Rcs1 = 30 signatures are considered as prototypes. The WC cells are
generated by considering unique dissimilarities among these prototypes, where dissimilarities
are computed in a CIR-FD space of dimensionality L = 555. To generate BC samples, dis-
similarities between Rcs1 and some signatures selected from all users of the CID are computed.
Details of the WC and BC training data is illustrated in Table 2.2.
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Then, a BFS process runs in this reduced CIR space, where it is found that only 40 boosting
iterations result in saturated performance. To unify the representation size for all users, we
selected the bestN = 20 features as a CSR. This representation, and the corresponding learned
dissimilarity thresholds {δn}Nn=1, are employed to design a class specific adaptive dissimilarity
measure as defined in Eq. 2.5. The dissimilarity cells are re-computed based on this class
specific solution and produced a dissimilarity matrix, where the WC and BC are more separable
(see matrix 4 in Figure 2.3).
2.6.3.2 Prototype selection in the D-space
Finally, the dissimilarity matrix is used to produce a D-space of dimensionality R1 = 30,
where each row is represented as a vector in this space. A BFS runs in this space to rank the
prototypes. Here, we chose only the best prototype to generate a single dimensional concise
DR, where R2 = 1 and N = 20 (see matrix 5 in Figure 2.3). This DR is used for performance
evaluation, where the testing dataset (illustrated in table 2.2), is used to generate a testing
dissimilarity matrix based on this representation.
2.6.4 Performance evaluation
The proposed appraoch is evaluated by investigating its power to generate well separated WC
and BC dissimilarities. A testing dissimilarity matrix is generated for each of the 60 users of
the CDs, as illustrated in Table 2.2. For each user, dissimilarities between the Rcs1 = 30 proto-
types are computed against 40 query samples. Of these: 10 genuine signatures, 10 simple, 10
simulated, and 10 random forgeries are employed and result in 300 WC and 900 BC samples.
To investigate the different processing steps of the proposed approach (shown in figure 2.3), the
impact of each step, on separating the WC and BC clusters. are decoupled through employing
the following experiments:
• without feature selection: N = 20 features are randomly selected from the M feature
extractions.
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• class-independent feature selection: the best N features, from L features of the CIR, are
used. This setting investigates to which extend does a CIR generalize to unseen users.
• class-specific feature selection: the CSR, of dimensionality N , is used. For this, and for
the above experiments, we tested the representation power of the features by employing
the following strict dissimilarity measure:
δ
Qvjpur
S =
N∑
n=1
(δQvjpurn ), δ
Qvjpur
n =
{
0 if (δf
Qvjpur
n = 0)
1 otherwise
(2.9)
this way, we decouple the impact of the adaptive dissimilarity measure, and we only test
the applicability of the CIR to adapt for specific users.
• class-specific feature selection with adaptive dissimilarity measure: the CSR is used,
where the adaptive dissimilarity measure (defined in Eq. 2.5) is employed. So, the impact
of absorbing feature variability, through employing the adaptive dissimilarity measure,
is tested in this experiment.
For all above cases, the testing dataset (shown in Table 2.2) is used to generate dissimilarity
matrices, according to the investigated representation. Then, separability of the WC and BC
clusters are measured by the Hellinger distance (Cha, 2007). Assuming normal distributions of
the WC and BC clusters. The squared Hellinger distance between them is give by:
H2(WC,BC) = 1−
√
2σ1σ2
σ21 + σ
2
2
e
− 1
4
(μ1−μ2)2
σ21+σ
2
2 . (2.10)
where, μ1, μ2 and σ1, σ2 are the mean and variance values for WC and BC, respectively.
To measure the clusters separability for the different types of forgeries, we compute Hrandom,
Hsimple and Hsimulated, where the parameters μ and σ of the BC cluster are computed each
time, based on the dissimilarities against samples of a specific type of forgeries. Also, we
report Hall, where the distribution parameters are computed according to dissimilarities of all
forgery types. For all cases, these measures are averaged over all users, e.g., Hˆ =
∑Ucs
u=1Hu
Ucs
.
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According to equations 2.7 and 2.8, accuracy of both classical and bio-cryptographic signature
verification systems, could be considered similar in case that the noise error δ′ is canceled. In
our experiments, we considered the case of zero noise error, so that both systems have same
recognition rates. 4 As the recognition accuracy relies on the dissimilarity ranges separability
and on the employed dissimilarity threshold  (see Eq. 2.7 and Eq. 2.8), we measure the
recognition errors for all of the dissimilarity scores and use them to generate ROC curves. A
ROC curve plots the false accept rate (FAR) against the genuine accept rate (GAR) for all
possible thresholds (all generated dissimilarity scores). FAR for a specific threshold is the ratio
of forgery samples with a dissimilarity score smaller than this threshold. GAR is the ratio of
genuine samples with a dissimilarity score smaller than the threshold.
In order to have a global assessment on the quality of the SV and bio-cryptographic systems,
that are built on the optimized DRs, we compute and average the area under the ROC curves
(AUC), for all users in the CSD subset. High AUC indicates more separation between the
dissimilarity score distributions for the genuine and impostor classes.
In order to measure actual recognition rates, we set the dissimilarity to  = 6, this value is
empirically selected to compensate between the FRR and FAR errors 3.
To assess the impact of the prototype selection step, we compare the recognition rates for cases
where prototype selection is employed or not. For both cases, we report the average error rate
(AERall), where
AERall = (FRR + FARrandom + FARsimple + FARsimulated)/4 (2.11)
4Here we considered the case when no chaff points are embedded, so impact of the noise error is neglected.
This scenario is achievable when we generate chaffs adaptively based on the learned feature dissimilarities. Proof
of concept of such adaptive chaff generation appeared in (Eskander et al., 2013b), where high number of chaffs
are embedded with minimal impact on the recognition rate. For more details see Appendix II.
3 = 6 is equivalent to encoding a crypto-key of 128 − bits by a biometric message of length N = 20, by
implementing the FV key-binding scheme (Juels and Sudan, 2002)
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False reject rate (FRR) is the ratio of genuine queries, that produce dissimilarity scores above
the threshold , FARrandom, FARsimple and FARsmulated are the ratio of random, simple, and
simulated forgeries, respectively, that produce dissimilarity scores less than .
Figure 2.6 Dissimilarity score distribution for a specific user.
Figure 2.7 Dissimilarity score distribution for different forgery types.
2.6.5 Results and discussion
Figure 2.6 illustrates the impact of each processing step on separating the WC and BC clusters,
for a specific user. It is obvious that, without feature selection, the distributions are overlapped.
Selecting FR based on CID, increases the separation. This validates our hypothesis that DRs
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optimized based on high dimensional FRs extracted from large number of classes, relatively,
generalize for unseen classes. Running class-specific feature selection, increased the separa-
bility. This validates our hypothesis that, the CIRs are adaptable for new classes. Employing
the adaptive distance measure, increased the stability of the genuine class. For instance, the
maximum dissimilarity score for the genuine class is decreased from 9 to 5. This validates our
hypothesis that, the proposed adaptive proximity measure absorb some of the intrinsic signal
variability. However, this impact differs for the different forgery types. For instance, in Figure
2.7, it is clear that while the random forgery class distribution is significantly separated, the
simulated forgery distribution still has significant class overlap.
Table 2.3 Average Hellinger distance over all Users for the different design scenarios.
FS stands for feature selection, and ADM stands for adaptive dissimilarity measure.
Design Without CI-FS CS-FS CS-FS
Aspect FS with ADM
Hˆrandom 0.2976 0.6093 0.6617 0.7398
Hˆsimple 0.2519 0.5531 0.6011 0.6951
Hˆsimulated 0.1466 0.4395 0.4786 0.5907
Hˆall 0.2496 0.5590 0.5923 0.6617
AUC 0.6577 0.7724 0.9328 0.9700
Table 2.3 shows the average performance, where the average Hellinger distance is computed
over the 60 Users, and for the different types of forgeries. It is obvious that each processing
step increased the distances between the WC and BC distributions, for all types of forgeries.
Average distance of the all forgeries distributions Hˆall is increased from 0.2496 to 0.6617.
Also, the average AUC is increased by about 47% (from 0.6577 to 0.9700).
The dissimilarity scores reported above are averaged for all prototypes in the subset Rcs1 .
However, class separation differs for the different prototypes (different columns in the dis-
similarity matrix). For instance, Figure 2.8 shows distributions of the best and worst pro-
totypes for a specific user. For the worst prototype, a dissimilarity threshold  = 4 results
in FRR = 10%, FARrandom = 10% and FARsimulated = 30%. For the best prototype,
FRR = 0%, FARrandom = 0% and FARsimulated = 20%.
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Figure 2.8 Dissimilarity score distributions for different prototypes.
Table 2.4 Impact of the prototype selection on average error rate over all users
Method Rivard This workWithout prototype With prototype
(Rivard et al., 2013) selection selection
FRR 14.36 5.25 4.83
FARrandom 0.02 2.74 0.6
FARsimple 0.35 3.49 1.5
FARsimulated 14.24 33.14 22.33
AER 7.24 11.15 7.32
The recognition rates for the SV (and zero noise error bio-cryptographic) systems are reported
in Table 2.4. It is shown that, although the employed representation is concise (only 20 fea-
tures), and the classifier is so simple (a threshold), the resulting AER is acceptable. This
performance is enhanced through employing the prototype selection step, as the AER is de-
creased by about 34% (from 11.15% to 7.32%). Compared to the state-of-the-art results on
same SV database, the baseline system by Rivard et al., have shown similar accuracy but with
employing 555 features (Rivard et al., 2013). So, applying our proposed DR optimization ap-
proach maintained the performance, while decreased the representation complexity by about
96% (from 555 to only 20 features). Moreover digitizing the feature values (as they are repre-
sented in 8-bits words for bio-cryptographic encoding), had no impact on the SV accuracy.
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Compared to our complete implementation of the FV bio-cryptographic systems (Eskander
et al., 2014a), the best reported recognition rate is 8.21%, where 15 FVs are decoded and
the majority vote rule is applied to accept/reject the released key. Here, we achieved similar
performance with decoding a single FV, but through selecting the best encoding prototype.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents an approach for optimizing dissimilarity representations (DRs), that are
built using high-dimensional feature representations. The proposed approach produces class-
independent DRs generalize well to unknown classes, that are not used for training. In addition,
these representations can be further tuned to new classes. This property permits designing
global system adaptable to specific classes. Also, the produced DRs are concise, in terms of
number of employed feature extractions and prototypes. This allow for designing systems that
have limitations on their computational complexity and that rely on high-dimensional FRs,
e.g., bio-cryptography systems. In addition, the proposed adaptive user-specific dissimilarity
measure and prototype selection methods enhanced the representation efficiency.
The proposed approach is applied to the OLSV problem. It is shown that concise representa-
tions produced separable clusters in the dissimilarity space. Accordingly, a simple threshold
provides a high level of accuracy with such hard pattern recognition problem, as that of com-
plex systems in the literature. Moreover, the bio-cryptography design problem is formulated as
a traditional classifier in the produced DR space, where designing such systems is tractable.
The proposed approach can also be employed as an intermediate tool for designing feature-
based classifiers, where the embedded feature representations or the dissimilarity measures
feed traditional or distance-based classifiers, respectively. Future work will investigate the
power of the proposed approach on other applications (e.g., face recognition, video surveil-
lance, image retrieval, etc). Also, comparing efficiency of the produced DRs to other local
distance design methods in the literature is of great interest.
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2.8 Discussion
A generic approach for learning DR spaces, that are built on top of a traditional FR spaces,
is proposed in this chapter. The two-step BFS methodology, employed for dimensionality re-
duction, provides a way to compromise advantageous of the WD and WI techniques. The first
BFS step locates a universal space in which the intra-personal and inter-personal proximities
are easily distinguished, so it serves as a WI classification space. Any pair of signatures from
new users that are unseen during the design phase can be classified, by computing their prox-
imity in this universal DR space, as being belonging to same writer or different writers. The
second BFS step adapts this space to specific users using their training samples. The new user-
specific DR space serves as a WD space that is more accurate, as it is tuned to the specific
user, and it is sparser as not all of the WI space dimensions are needed to distinguish a specific
user from other users. Through this methodology, we answered the first research question:
using a limited user-specific training set, how to generate a concise FR space that is stable for
the specific user, and its discriminating power generalizes for unseen users? (see the problem
statement in Chapter I).
The final DR space is constituted by employing an adaptive dissimilarity measure that mea-
sures proximities between the user-specific FRs of a query sample and some selected proto-
types. Designing this proximity measure in a DR space provides a way to model and absorb
the intrinsic variations of signature images. This answers the second research question: how to
design a proximity measure that alleviates the intrinsic variability of the offline signature im-
ages?. Projecting the proximity measures to a vectorial DR space, where proximities to differ-
ent prototypes are the space dimensions, provides a way to select most stable and discriminant
prototypes. This answers the third research question: how to select efficient prototypes that
produce the DR space?. Since the DR spaces are designed so that the WC and BC proximi-
ties constitute compact and isolated clusters, the decision boundary between these clusters is
simple. Therefore, simple classifiers might be sufficient for the OLSV task. This property also
facilitates design of FV systems, as the error correction codes can be formulated as threshold
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classifiers in the DR space. This answers the final research question: how to formulate the
OLSV and the FV systems as simple classifiers in the DR space?.
The proposed approach provides a general framework to design OLSV and bio-cryptography
systems, while details of each implementation and their performance should be more investi-
gated. In the following two chapters, detailed study of designing OLSV and FV systems, based
on the proposed DR learning appraoch, is presented. Concerning the OLSV problem, although
the OLSV systems designed in this chapter have shown acceptable trade-off between accuracy
and complexity as compared to complex systems in the literature, they are not secure as signa-
ture templates are stored for verification. Writer adaptation of the universal representation is
conducted in a reduced DR space, while executing this step in a reduced FR space might pro-
vide an alternative secure solution. This might override the curse-of-dimensionality problem,
yet the final WD classifier operates in a FR space and therefore no templates are needed for
verification. In addition, quality of representations that are adapted in both DR and FR spaces
should be compared. The following chapter is focused on these OLSV design issues.
CHAPTER 3
A HYBRID WRITER-INDEPENDENT—WRITER-DEPENDENT OFFLINE
SIGNATURE VERIFICATION SYSTEM
Standard offfline signature verification (OLSV) systems are writer-dependent (WD), where a
specific classifier is designed for each individual. It is inconvenient to ask a user to provide
enough number of signature samples to design his WD classifier. In practice, few samples
are collected and inaccurate classifiers maybe produced. To overcome this, writer-independent
(WI) systems are introduced. A global classifier is designed using a development database,
prior to enrolling users to the system. For these systems, signature templates are needed for ver-
ification, and the template databases can be compromised. Moreover, state-of-the-art WI and
WD systems provide enhanced accuracy through information fusion at either feature, score or
decision levels, but they increase computational complexity. In this chapter, a hybrid WI-WD
system is proposed, as a compromise of the two approaches. When a user is enrolled to the sys-
tem, a WI classifier is used to verify his queries. During operation, user samples are collected
and adapt the WI classifier to his signatures. Once adapted, the resulting WD classifier replaces
the WI classifier for this user. Simulations on the Brazilian and the GPDS signature databases
indicate that the proposed hybrid system provides comparative accuracy as complex WI and
WD systems, while decreases the classification complexity. The content of this chapter was
published at the 13th International conference on Frontiers in Handwriting Recognition (Es-
kander et al., 2012) and the IET-Biometrics Journal, Special issue on Handwriting Biometrics
(Eskander et al., 2013c).
3.1 Introduction
Signature verification systems (SV) are employed to authenticate individuals based on their
handwritten signatures. There are two modes of operation for SV systems: online and offline.
For online systems, users use special devices like special pens and tablets to acquire signature
trajectory dynamics such as velocity, pressure, etc. On the other hand, offline SV (OLSV)
systems employ digitized signature images for authentication. Only static information can be
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acquired from the signature images, producing less informative signals, and hence, a harder
pattern recognition task. (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008),(Batista et al., 2007).
Standard OLSV systems are writer-dependent (WD), where an individual classifier is designed
for each user using his enrollment samples (Justino et al., 2001). During verification, only
query signature samples are processed by the classifier. Hence, WD systems are secure as
no templates are stored for verification. Accuracy of these systems require that users provide
enough number of samples to train their classifiers. Hence, the WD approach implies a trade-
off between accuracy and user convenience.
A more user-convenient approach is to design a writer-independent (WI) OLSV system. A
single global classifier is designed using an independent (development) database prior to en-
rolling real users to the system. During verification, both query signature samples and at least
one signature template are required to produce the classification decision. Hence, users can
start using the system with providing a single signature sample. However, such systems are not
secure as signature templates are needed for verification. The stored templates can be stolen,
deleted or modified. Moreover, these systems do not model the individual signatures, but
rather a universal model that should generalize on current and future users. Accordingly, the
produced models are complex and ensemble methods are applied for enhanced performance at
the expense of significantly increased complexity (Bertolini et al., 2010), (Rivard et al., 2013).
This chapter proposes a solution to compromise between the pros and cons of the WI and
WD systems. A hybrid system is proposed where switching between the two approaches is
possible. A universal WI classifier is designed with a development database. This enables
starting system operation, even if users provide a single signature sample in the enrollment
phase. Through operation, signature samples are collected and stored with the user profile.
Once enough samples are collected for a specific user, they are used to adapt the universal
classifier to this user. From this time on, the resulting WD classifier is used to verify signatures
for the specific user. While the universal classifier compares the query samples to the stored
user signature templates, the user-specific classifier only uses the query sample to produce the
classification decision. Applying this scenario facilitates starting the system without asking the
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users to provide high number of enrolling samples. Then, switching to a more secure and less
complex operational mode is possible whenever specific number of user samples exist.
To design the WI stage, pairwise dissimilarities are computed between feature representations
of intra-personal and inter-personal samples from the development dataset. Then, boosting
feature selection (BFS) (Tieu and Viola, 2004) is employed in a dissimilarity representation
space (Rivard et al., 2013). To design the WD stage, the resulting global classifier is adapted to
each user based on his stored samples. The features embedded in the WI classifier constitutes a
universal signature representation that can represent all users. So, subsets of this representation
are discriminant for the different users. Accordingly, we tune the universal representation to
a user by selecting the subset of feature representation that discriminates him from the others.
To this end, stored user samples are represented in the universal feature space. These repre-
sentations are used to train a WD classifier, by employing another BFS process that produces
a more compact and secure classification system.
The proposed system is previously presented in (Eskander et al., 2012). In this chapter, the ro-
bustness of the system is further investigated by conducted simulations using the public GPDS
signature databases (Vargas et al., 2007), besides the Brazilian database (Freitas et al., 2000).
The next section provides an overview of state-of-the-art pure WI and WD OLSV systems.
Section 3.3 describes the proposed WI-WD hybrid approach. Section 3.4 describes the ex-
perimental methodology applied in this chapter. The experimental results are presented and
discussed in Section 3.5.
3.2 Pure WD and WI signature verification systems
The design of WD systems relies on modeling user signatures in a feature representation
space. Accuracy of the resulting models is limited by the available samples for training. En-
hanced recognition rates of WD systems is recently achieved by training multi-classifier sys-
tems (Batista et al., 2010), (Batista et al., 2012). On the other hand, WI systems do not produce
models for the individual signatures, but rather a universal model that is valid for all users. In
practice, it is impossible to locate a feature representation space in which signatures of all cur-
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rent and future users share the same distribution. The dissimilarity concept, where samples that
belong to same class are similar, while samples that come from different classes are dissimilar,
provides a solution.
The concept of dissimilarity-based classification has been proposed by Elzbieta Pekalska and
Robert P.W. Duin., (Pekalska and Duin, 2002). For this approach, the proximity between
objects is modeled rather than modeling the objects themselves. Objects belong to a specific
class have a shared degree of commonality that could be captured by a dissimilarity value. The
dissimilarity measures can be derived in many ways, e.g. from raw (sensor) measurements,
histograms, strings or graphs. However, it can also be build on top of a feature representation
(Duin et al., 2010).
In the SV context, the WI approach is realized using a dissimilarity (distance) measure, to
compare samples (query and reference samples) as belonging to either the same or different
user. As most of work on OLSV is feature-based, where many techniques of feature extraction
are already proposed (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008), the employed dissimilarity representations
are built on top of a feature representation.
First implementation of the dissimilarity concept to the author identification domain was pre-
sented by Cha and Srihari (Cha, 2001). Simultaneous works applied the dissimilarity learning
concept on the OLSV problem by Siteargur N. Srihari et al., (Srihari et al., 2004), and Santos
and Sabourin et al., (C. Santos et al., 2004). While the first group used the correlation between
binary features as a distance measure, the second group employed the Euclidean distance be-
tween graphometric feature vectors. In both implementations, the concept of WI-SV system
was introduced. Instead of building a single WD classifier for each user using his enrolling
signatures, a single global classifier is designed by learning the dissimilarities between signa-
tures of all users. In (C. Santos et al., 2004), a neural network is trained to find the optimal
boundary that splits the genuine and forgery classes in the dissimilarity representation space.
Later, Oliveira et al. (Oliveira et al., 2007), and Bertolini et al. (Bertolini et al., 2010) ap-
plied the same concept, where they generated different dissimilarity spaces based on different
feature representations. A set of SVM classifiers is trained to model the decision boundaries
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for the different subspaces. Finally, each SVM is used to produce a partial classification de-
cision, while the final decision relies on the fusion of these partial decisions in the Receiver
Operating Curve (ROC) space. Kumar et al. (Kumar et al., 2012) proposed a WI-SV based on
surroundedness features.
More recently, Rivard et al. (Rivard et al., 2013) extended the system in (Bertolini et al., 2010)
to perform multiple feature extraction and selection. In this work, information fusion is also
performed at the feature level. Multiple features are extracted based on multiple size grids.
Fusion of these features and projecting them in a dissimilarity space results in dissimilarity
representation of high dimensionality. This complex representation is then simplified by ap-
plying the boosting feature selection approach (BFS) (Tieu and Viola, 2004). By applying the
multi-feature approach with BFS, it was possible to design WI systems with higher perfor-
mance than the earlier implementations. Moreover, the complex dissimilarity representation
(possibly tens of thousands of features) is condensed to a compact universal representation of
few hundreds in dimensionality. This representation can classify samples from unknown users,
whose signatures had no share in the training process. The accuracy of this WI system could
be enhanced through combining multiple decisions based on multiple templates.
Pure WI are insecure due to the need to store reference signatures for verification, however, they
are user-convenient as they do not need user samples for training. On the other hand, pure WD
are secure but user-inconvenient. Both techniques can produce SV systems with acceptable
accuracy, but they are complex due to the fusion of responses from multiple classifiers. The
work proposed in this chapter merge the two techniques to overcome the limitations of the
pure approaches. To this end, a WI system is designed as in (Rivard et al., 2013), to start
system operation with only one enrolling sample. Then, the universal representation embedded
in the WI classifier is adapted to each specific user, whenever enough genuine samples are
collected. This adaptation step aims to reduce the classification complexity (number of features
and number of classifications fused for a decision), and avoiding the need of using reference
signatures for verification.
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3.3 A Hybrid WI-WD signature verification system
3.3.1 Theoretical basis
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Figure 3.1 Illustration of feature selection in the original feature space (left) and in the
feature-dissimilarity space (right).
It is not easy to achieve high generalization accuracy for the OLSV systems, due to the high
intra-personal variability and inter-personal similarity of signature images. One approach to
tackle this problem, is to select the most stable and discriminant features from a large pool of
feature extractions. To illustrate this approach, see Figure 3.1 (left side). In this illustrative
example, signatures of three different writers are represented in the feature space. Assume
the candidate pool of features is F = {fn}Mn=1. For simplicity, only two features f1 and f2
are shown in this figure, while the dimensionality of this space is M , which might be a high
number for typical representations. For good generalization performance, within-class (intra-
personal) distances should be small, while between-class (inter-personal) distances should be
large. For instance, assume that writer 1 has two prototypes (templates) p1 and p2. Good
generalization implies that, feature representation of any query Q1 of this writer should be
close to his prototypes, while queries of other writers as Q2 and Q3 should be far from them.
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The proposed approach relies on selecting a condensed feature representation of dimensionality
N , from a very high dimensional space of dimensionality M , so that distances between intra-
personal signature representations are minimized and the inter-personal distances are maxi-
mized. Consider the Euclidean distance, so that distance between a signature sample Qj and a
prototype pr is δQjpr :
δQjpr =
√√√√ M∑
n=1
(δf
Qjpr
n )2 (3.1)
where δfQjprn = ‖fQjn − f prn ‖.
Hence, the overall distance between two signatures is an accumulation of the individual dis-
tances between every two corresponding features of the signature representations. To increase
the separation between the intra-personal and inter-personal distance ranges, we select fea-
tures that decrease the intra-personal distances and that increase the inter-personal distances.
In this illustrative example, it is obvious that features f1 and f2 are discriminative. Distances
among intra-personal signatures (like δQ1p1) are generally smaller than the distances among
inter-personal signatures (like δQ2p1). However, in this space it is not clear which feature is
more discriminative. With representations of high dimensionality, high number of users, un-
known forgeries and a small number of training samples, it is not feasible to select the best
features in the feature space F .
Accordingly, we project this representation on a feature-dissimilarity space FD, as shown
in the right side of Figure 3.1. In this space, distance between each corresponding features,
for each pair of signatures, is computed and used as a new set of features {δfn}Mn=1. So,
dimensionality of the F and FD spaces is the same. A distance δQjpr between a query Qj and
a prototype pr is mapped from F to FD as a point dQjpr :
dQjpr = {δfQjprn }Mn=1 (3.2)
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where, δQjpr is represented by the distance from the origin point to dQjpr . Here, the impact of
every individual feature on the signature dissimilarities is clear. It is obvious that f2 is more
discriminative than f1. For all genuine query samples like Q1, δf
Q1pr
2 < δ2 and for all forgery
query samples like Q2 and Q3, δf
Qjpr
2 > δ2. On the other hand, f1 is less discriminant. For
the forgery query Q2, δf
Q2p1
1 < δ1, same as that for the genuine sample Q1. Accordingly, it is
easier to rank and select features in the FD space, as the impact of the individual features on
the overall dissimilarity is clear in this space. Moreover, while signatures of users are modeled
in the F space, the proximity between user signatures are modeled in the FD space. This
property maps the multi-class problem, with few training samples per class, to a two-class
problem, with more training samples per class. The constituted classes are: the genuine class
and the forgery class. Samples of the genuine class result from comparing two signatures of
the same person. The forgery class samples result from comparing two signatures of different
persons.
Employing the aforementioned feature selection in the FD space, increases the separation be-
tween the genuine and forgery classes, and hence decreases the generalization error. Moreover,
Rivard et al., (Rivard et al., 2013) have shown that, classifiers that are designed through fea-
ture selection in such dissimilarity representation spaces, can generalize for even users whose
signature templates are not used during the design phase. Accordingly, if a classifier is trained
with samples from a specific signature database, the same classifier can be used to detect sig-
natures from another database with good accuracy. This observation leads to the concept of
WI-SV systems, where an independent (development) database is used to design a classifier,
and then signatures of real system users are detected by this global classifier. Good generaliza-
tion performance could be achieved, when the development database consists in a large enough
number of users. As the resulting classifier can classify samples from unknown users, whose
signatures had no share in the training process, so the embedded condensed representation of
dimensionality L < M is considered as a population-based representation.
However, such WI-SV systems have some drawbacks. First, in order to model the proximity of
samples that belong to a large population, the dimensionality L of the population-based feature
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representation is high, and that produces complex classifiers. Second, the dissimilarity feature
representation relies on signature prototypes (templates). Storing user templates in a database
might cause security vulnerabilities, as stored signatures can be stolen or edited.
In this chapter, the drawbacks of a WI-SV system are alleviated through adapting it to specific
users. The adaptation approach relies on two main hypothesis:
• for each specific user, the population-based representation of dimensionality L contains
a feature subset of dimensionality N < L, where this more concise representation dis-
criminates the specific user from the other users. The logic behind this hypothesis is that:
although the global representation could represent the specific user, not all of the repre-
sentation dimensions are mandatory for discriminating the user. Also, the importance of
representation dimensions differs for the different users. So, re-ordering the features for
each user and selecting the most important subset, produces a more compact and maybe
more discriminant representation space.
• features that are discriminant when represented in the FD space are discriminant when
represented in the F space. For instance, if δfn is discriminant in FD, then this implies
that fn is discriminant in F . This is because that, translation between F and FD spaces
can be considered as a direct mapping, where this mapping does not impact the Euclidean
distances between the signature representations. This property facilitates the design of
the user-specific classifier in the feature space, so no signature templates are needed
for verification, and hence a more secure WD-SV could be designed. To this end, the
population-based representation obtained in the WI-SV design phase, is translated back
to a feature space of the same dimensionality L. Then, user-specific feature selection
and classifier design processes are employed in the feature space, to produce a more
condensed user-specific space of dimensionality N < L < M . As the population-based
representation is much condensed than the original feature space, so the few training
samples available for real system users, can be used to search for the most discriminant
space dimensions.
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3.3.2 System overview
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Figure 3.2 Hybrid WI-WD SV system
Figure 3.2 shows a block diagram of the proposed hybrid WI-WD system in training and ver-
ification modes. First, a WI-SV sub-system is designed as proposed by Rivard et al. (Rivard
et al., 2013). Query samples of recently enrolled users are verified by this sub-system. After
collecting a specific number of reference signatures of a user, they are used to adapt this global
sub-system to the specific user. To this end, features embedded in the designed WI-SV are
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considered as a universal (population-based) representation. The user and forgery samples are
translated into this universal space and used to train a WD-SV sub-system. From this time on,
signatures of the specific user are verified by his WD-SV sub-system.
3.3.3 WI training
A feature level fusion is performed, by employing a multi-type multi-scale feature extractions.
In literature, many types of features could be extracted from offline signature images (Impe-
dovo and Pirlo, 2008). Any combination of these features may be concatenated into a single
high-dimensional representation, and used for the proposed framework. However, we focused
on using feature extracted using extended-shadow-code (ESC) (Sabourin and Genest, 1994),
and directional probability density Function (DPDF) (Drouhard et al., 1996). Features are ex-
tracted based on different grid scales, hence a range of details are detected in the signature
image. These features have shown complementary functionality: while ESC detects the dis-
tribution of the signature in the spatial space, DPDF detects the orientation of the signature
strokes. For more details on the employed the multi-feature extraction technique, see (Rivard
et al., 2013).
A development signature database is used to train the WI-SV classifier. To this end, the multi-
feature representationsMG andMF are extracted from some genuine signature samples SG and
forgery signature samples SF respectively, where M = {mn}Mn=1, and M is the dimensionality
of the multi-feature representation. To project these samples into a dissimilarity representa-
tion space, dichotomy transformation is applied. For instance, for two samples Mi,Mj , the
dissimilarity feature is:
DMij = ‖Mi −Mj‖ = {Δmn}Mn=1. (3.3)
where Δmn = ‖min − mjn‖, and DM is the dissimilarity representation built on top of the
multi-feature representation M .
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It is worth noting that both the multi-feature and dissimilarity representations have the same
dimensionality M . Also, a sample DMij is labeled as a within-class or as a between-class
instance, when it results from two genuine signatures of the same user, or from two signatures
of two different users, respectively.
To build the WI-SV system, the BFS approach is applied (Tieu and Viola, 2004). This method
applies Gentle AdaBoost algorithm (Schapire, 2002) to learn an optimal decision boundary
between the within-class and the between-class dissimilarity samples, by boosting Decision
Stump (DS) weak learners (Iba and Langley, 1992). At a boosting iteration n, a DS is de-
signed by locating the best dimension dn in the dissimilarity representation space that splits
the training samples based on a splitting threshold δn. The DS either has positive or negative
polarity, depending on the direction of splitting the classes. At a boosting iteration n, a DSn is
formulated as:
DSn(dn) =
{
pleftn if (dn < δn)
prightn otherwise
(3.4)
pleftn , p
right
n represent the confidence of decisions taken by this DS, when the feature value lies
to the left or to the right of the splitting threshold, respectively. Accordingly, each DS shares
in the final classification decision based on its expected accuracy. The boosting process runs
for Twi boosting iterations, and the final decision boundary is defined by:
Hwi =
Twi∑
n=1
DSwin . (3.5)
whereDSwin is theDS designed at boosting iteration n based on the development data, and T
wi
is the number of boosting iteration in the WI training process. Refer to (Rivard et al., 2013) for
more detailed algorithms of the WI-SV design process.
This WI-SV sub-system is used to verify user signatures, before switching to the WD mode
(the WI verification mode is represented by dotted arrows in Figure 3.2, and illustrated in
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Section 3.3.5). However, after collecting enough number of genuine user samples, they are
used to adapt the WI-SV sub-system to the user samples. To this end, the WI-SV is used for
dimensionality reduction through WI feature selection. The feature representation embedded
in a WI classifier is extracted and stored as a population-based representation P = {pn}Ln=1 of
dimensionality L < M , by which signatures of all users are represented. This step reduces
the representation dimensionality, and allows for the design of compact user-specific (WD)
classifiers.
3.3.4 WD training
Although the universal representation P contains discriminant features for all users, not all
dimensions of this space are needed to discriminate specific users from other populations.
Moreover, the dissimilarity thresholds selected in the WI system are not optimal for each user.
In this design step, selection of discriminant features for each specific user is achieved, while
selecting the best splitting threshold in each dimension.
While the WI training phase should be performed in the dissimilarity space (as it is impossible
to locate a feature representation space in which signatures of all current and future users share
the same distribution), the WD training phase, on the other hand, could be performed in either
the dissimilarity or the original feature space. Operating the OLSV system in the feature space
is more secure, as no signature references need to be stored for verification. Accordingly, the
WD training phase is implemented in the feature space.
To this end, the population-based representation (P ) of dimensionality L is used for feature
extraction. For each enrolled user, R signature samples are collected. Both the enrolling
samples SE = {SEr }Rr=1 and some samples SF are selected from the development database
(to represent the random forgery class), are represented in the P feature space as PG and PF
respectively. Finally, a similar BFS process is applied, by using this WD data to model the
decision boundary Hwd that splits the genuine and forgery classes, where
70
Hwd =
Twd∑
n=1
DSwdn . (3.6)
where DSwdn is the decision stump designed at boosting iteration n based on the WD training
data, and Twd is the number of boosting iteration in the WD training process.
3.3.5 Signature verification
The WI-SV can be used whenever no user samples are available to train a WD classifier.
Switching between WI and WD approaches may depend on the availability of sufficient user
samples for training.
3.3.5.1 WI-SV mode
This operational mode is illustrated by the dotted arrows in Figure 3.2. A questioned signature
SQ and a single enrollment sample SEr are represented in population representation space (P )
of dimensionality L < M as PQ = {pQn}Ln=1 and PE = {pEn}Ln=1, respectively. Then, it is
classified by the WI-SV system, where
WI − SV (DPQE) = sign(
Twi∑
n=1
DSwin (D
P
QE)). (3.7)
where DPQE is the dissimilarity representation of the query sample S
Q built on top of the
population-based feature representation P :
DPQE = ‖PQ − PE‖ = {Δpn}Ln=1. (3.8)
where Δpn = ‖pQn − pEn‖.
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3.3.5.2 WD-SV mode
To authenticate a specific user in this operational mode, the corresponding WD-SV classifier is
used. First, the feature representation embedded in the WD-SV is extracted and considered as
a user-based representation (U ) of dimensionality N < L < M . Then, the query image SQ is
represented in this concise representation space as UQ = {uQn}Nn=1, and then fed the classifier
for recognition, where
WD − SV (UQ) = sign(
Twd∑
n=1
DSwdn (UQ)). (3.9)
3.4 Experimental methodology
Performance of the proposed hybrid WI-WD OLSV system is investigated by considering its
two modes of operation:
• WI-SV mode—in this mode, the query signature samples are verified by applying Eq.3.7.
The objective of investigating this operational mode is to measure the minimum accuracy
of the system. In this case, it is assumed that only single signature sample is obtained in
the enrollment phase and used for the verification task.
• WD-SV mode—in this mode, the query signature samples are verified by applying
Eq.3.9. The objective of testing this operational mode is to determine a reasonable num-
ber of user samples that produce reliable user-specific classifiers. To this end, perfor-
mance of the WD classifiers designed with different number of samples is investigated.
Suitable switching point between the WI and WD modes is identified by the number of
training samples that produce WD classifiers with higher accuracy than the global WI
classifier.
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3.4.1 Signature databases
Two different off-line signature databases are used for proof-of-concept simulations: the Brazil-
ian SV database (Freitas et al., 2000), and the GPDS database (Vargas et al., 2007). While the
Brazilian SV database is composed of random, simple and simulated forgeries, the GPDS
database is composed of random and simulated forgeries. Random forgeries occur when the
query signature presented to the system is mislabeled to another user. Also, forgers produce
random forgeries when they do not know neither the signer’s name nor the signature morphol-
ogy. For simple forgeries, the forger knows the writer’s name but not the signature morphology.
He can only produce a simple forgery using his style of writing. Finally, simulated forgeries
imitate the signatures as they have access to a genuine signatures sample.
3.4.1.1 Brazilian database
The Brazilian signatures database contains signatures of 168 users, that were digitized as 8-bit
grayscale images over 400×1000 pixels, at resolution of 300 dpi. It is split into two parts. The
first part contains signatures of the first 60 users. For each user, there are 40 genuine samples,
10 simple, and 10 simulated forgeries. A subset of this part is used for WD training, so it is
referenced in this chapter asBwd. The remaining of this part is used for performance evaluation
(see Table3.3). The second part contains signatures of the last 108 users. For each user, there
are only 40 genuine signatures. This part is used for WI training, so it is referenced in this
chapter as Bwi (see Table3.1).
3.4.1.2 GPDS database
The GPDS database contains signatures of 300 users, that were digitized as 8-bit greyscale at
resolution of 300 dpi. This database contains images of different sizes (that vary from 51× 82
pixels to 402× 649 pixels). All users have 24 genuine signatures and 30 simulated forgeries. It
is split into two parts. The first part contains signatures of the first 160 users. A subset of this
part is used for the WD training, so it is referenced in this chapter asGwd. The remaining of this
part is used for performance evaluation (see Table 3.4). The second part contains signatures of
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the last 140 users. This part is used for the WI training, so it is referenced in this chapter as
Gwi (see Table 3.2).
3.4.2 Feature extraction
A set of 30 grid scales is used for both of the ESC and DPDF feature types, producing 60
different single scale feature representations. These representations are then fused to produce
a multi-feature representation M of huge dimensionality (M = 30, 201) (Rivard et al., 2013).
3.4.3 WI training
Table 3.1 The Brazilian Development Database (Bwi): 108 users x 40 genuine
signatures each
Training set Validation set
(30 signatures/user) (10 signatures/users)
Within-Class Between-Class Within-Class Between-Class
distances among distances among distances among the distances among
the 30 29 signatures/user 10 signatures/user the 10 signatures/user
signatures/user and 15 signatures and the 30 signatures and 30 signatures
other users of the training set selected randomly
from other users
108x30x29/2 108x29x15 108x10x30 108x10x30
=46,980 samples =46,980 samples =32,400 samples =32,400 samples
Table 3.2 The GPDS Development Database (Gwi): 140 users x 24 genuine signatures
each
Training set Validation set
(14 signatures/user) (10 signatures/users)
Within-Class Between-Class Within-Class Between-Class
distances among distances among 13 distances among distances among
the 14 signatures/user and 7 the 10 signatures/user the 10 signatures/user
signatures/user signatures of and the 14 signatures and 14 signatures
other users of the training set selected randomly
from other users
140x14x13/2 140x13x7 140x10x14 140x10x14
=12,740 samples =12,740 samples =19,600 samples =19,600 samples
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Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 describes the development dataset used in the WI training stage, for the
Brazilian and the GPDS databases, respectively. For the Brazilian database, a total of 93, 960
samples are used for training, and 64, 800 are used as holdout validation set to avoid overfitting.
For the GPDS database, a total of 25, 480 samples are used for training, and 39, 200 are used
for holdout validation.
Multi-feature representations of signature images of both the training and validation sets is
produced. Then, these representations are fed to the BFS process. The BFS algorithm is set
for 1000 max boosting iterations, and 100 early stopping criterion. For the Brazilian database,
the constituted WI-SV classifier contained 679 decision stumps, with them only 555 distinct
features are used. (i.e., Twi = 679, L = 555). For the GPDS database, the WI-SV classifier
contained 998 decision stumps, with them only 697 distinct features are used. (i.e., Twi = 998,
L = 697).
3.4.4 WD training
Table 3.3 The Brazilian WD Database (Bwd): 60 users x 60 signatures each: 40
genuine+10 simple forgery +10 simulated forgery
Training set Testing set
(30 signatures/user) (30 signatures+ 10 random forgeries/user)
Genuine-Class Forgery-Class Genuine-Class Forgery-Class
Signature Signatures of remaining 10 10 simple+10
subsets the training set genuine signatures simulated +10
of different of the Bwi /user random forgery
sizes dataset selected randomly from
other users in Bwd
5,7,9,11,13,15,30 108x30 60x10 60x30
samples =3240 samples =600 samples =1,800 samples
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 describe the data sets used to build the WD classifiers and for perfor-
mance evaluation, for the Brazilian and the GPDS respectively. To investigate the impact of
training samples quantity on the recognition performance (and hence determining a reasonable
switching point between the WI and WD modes), different number of samples are used to train
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Table 3.4 The GPDS WD Database (Gwd): 160 users x 54 signatures each: 24 genuine
+30 simulated forgery
Training set Testing set
(14 signatures/user) (40 signatures+ 10 random forgeries/user)
Genuine-Class Forgery-Class Genuine-Class Forgery-Class
Signature Signatures of remaining 10 genuine 30 simulated
subsets the training set signatures +10 random forgery
of different/user of the Gwi /user selected randomly
sizes dataset from other users in Gwd
4,8,12,14 140x14 160x10 160x40
samples =1960 samples =1600 samples =6400 samples
the WD classifier. The forgery class is represented by genuine signatures from the development
database. Genuine and forgery samples are represented in the population (P ) space and used
for training (dimensionality of P is L = 555 in case of the Brazilian database, and L = 697
in case of the GPDS database). Then, these representations are fed to the BFS process. For
the WD training, fixed number of boosting iteration Twd is used for early stopping. For both
databases, we observed saturation in performance around 100 boosting iterations, so the boost-
ing iterations was set to a fixed number (here, the performance is reported for two cases where,
Twd = 20, and 100).
3.4.5 Performance measures
The testing sets are illustrated in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. For the Brazilian database, 40 test samples
per user are employed. Of them, 10 genuine, 10 random, 10 simple, and 10 simulated forgeries,
for a total of 2400 questioned signatures are employed for system evaluation. For the GPDS
database, 50 test samples per user are employed. Of them, 10 genuine, 10 random, and 30
simulated forgeries, for a total of 8000 questioned signatures.
The area under ROC curve (AUC) and the average error rate (AER) are used to evaluate the
accuracy of classifiers in this chapter. For AUC computations, the questioned signatures SQ
of the test set are processed by a classifier. Its outputs are then sorted, and used as a set of
classifier thresholds. Then, the GAR (genuine accept rate) and FAR (false accept rate) are
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computed for each specific threshold. Finally, the ROC curve is plotted using the generated
GAR and FAR values, and the AUC is computed1. AUC classifiers are averaged over all
users of the testing dataset. The Average Error Rate (AER) is computed as follows:
AER = (FRR + FARrandom + FARsimple + FARsimulated)/4. (3.10)
where FRR is the False Rejection Rate, and FARrandom, FARsimple, and FARsimulated are
the False Accept Rates when verifying random, simple, and simulated forgeries, respectively.
(for the GPDS only random and simulated forgeries are considered).
Computational complexity of the designed classifiers is evaluated by the total number of fea-
ture values (TFV ) that are extracted and processed to produce the final classification decision
(Bunke and Kandel, 2002), where
TFV =
n∑
i=1
mixi. (3.11)
n is the number of partial classification decisions that cooperate to produce the final decision,
mi is the number of features per sample processed by a classifier i, and xi is the number of
signature samples processed by a classifier i.
3.5 Simulation results
Simulations reported in this section address two main objectives:
• feasibility of using the proposed system in its both verification modes: practical switch-
ing point between the two modes is identified. Also, robustness and computational com-
plexity of the system are investigated.
• comparing the proposed hybrid system with other pure WI and WD systems in the liter-
ature.
1AUC values are used here only as quality indicators for the constituted classifiers. During the WD training
phase, we do not take any design selections (like early stopping, decision threshold, etc), based on the ROC curves
and their AUC values. Such decisions are only taken based on the development dataset in the WI design phase.
77
3.5.1 Performance of the WI and WD verification modes
The AUC and AER are computed for both the WI-SV and some WD-SV classifiers designed
with different number of training samples and boosting iterations. Based on these measures, we
observe a suitable point to switch between the two modes. This point is globally determined
for all system users, and identified by the number of training samples that produce a WD
classifier outperforms the baseline WI-SV classifier. Robustness of the system is investigated
by comparing the verification performance for both the Brazilian and the GPDS experimental
databases. Finally, computational complexity and the computer processing times are compared
for the two verification modes.
3.5.1.1 Brazilian database
Figure 3.3 Average AUC of ROC curves for the WI and WD classifiers for the Brazilian
database. The points represent the average AUC over the 60 users, and the vertical bars
represent the range between the maximum and minimum AUCs for the 60 users.
Figure 3.3 shows the AUC of the WI-SV classifier and some WD-SV classifiers, designed
with different number of boosting iterations and with different training set sizes. It is shown
that with only 5 training samples, and only 20 boosting iterations, the average AUC of the
WD classifier is 0.923. The classifier performance increases when increasing both training set
size and boosting iterations (the average and minimum values of AUC are increasing). A WD
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classifier with 13 training samples has same AUC as the WI classifier2. WD classifiers trained
with more samples outperforms the WI classifier .
Figure 3.4 AER for the WI and WD classifiers for the Brazilian database. For 100
boosting iterations, the secure WD classifier trained with 20 training samples has same
performance (AER=7.24%) as that of insecure WI classifier (tested with a single template
(R = 1)). WD classifiers trained with more samples outperforms the WI classifier.
Figure 3.5 FRR and FAR for the WD-SV mode for the Brazilian database.
Figure 3.4 shows the aAER for the different classifiers. Same trend is noticed as that of Figure
3.3. However, higher number training samples (20) is needed to produce a WD-SV with smaller
2For the WI-SV system, the ROC curve is computed for a single WI classifier tested with a single signature
template (R=1). Here, no techniques for decision fusion is applied to generate enhanced ROC curves.
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AER than that of the baseline WI-SV. The reason of this difference in determining the optimal
switching point is because we do not tune the decision thresholds of the classifiers. So, some
accurate classifiers may produce high AER when the decision threshold is not optimized. For
100 boosting iterations, the secure WD classifier trained with 20 training samples has same
performance (AER=7.24%) as that of insecure WI classifier (tested with a single template
(R = 1)). Also, a WD classifier trained with 30 training samples has same performance
(AER=5.38%) as that of insecure WI classifier (tested with 15 templates (R = 15)).
Figure 3.5 shows the FRR and FAR for different level of forgeries, when WD-SV classifica-
tion mode is employed. It is clear that, although the FRR decreases with using more training
samples and boosting iterations, the FARsimulated increases. However, the FARsimple and
FARrandom are neglected when compared to the other error rates.
3.5.1.2 GPDS database
Figure 3.6 Average AUC of ROC curves for the WI and WD classifiers for the GPDS
database. Classifiers performance increase when increasing both training set size and
boosting iterations. The WD classifier with only 8 training samples has same AUC as the
WI classifier. WD classifiers trained with more samples outperforms the WI classifier.
Figure 3.6 shows the a AUC of the WI-SV classifier and WD-SV classifiers for the GPDS
database. Robustness of the proposed system is clear as similar performance trend is shown
as that of the Brazilian database. With both databases, classifier performance increases when
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increasing both training set size and boosting iterations (the average and minimum values of
AUC are increasing). However, for the GPDS database, the system has shown lower perfor-
mance.
Figure 3.7 ROC curves for the WI and WD modes for different training sizes (user 1).
Figure 3.8 ROC curves for the WI and WD modes for different training sizes (user 2).
Although a global training size can be determined, and it results in a better accuracy than that
of the original WI-SV system, the best training size differs for the different users. For instance,
Figure 3.7 shows the ROC curves for a specific user, where eight training samples produce
WD-SV systems with higher performance than that for the WI-SV system. Figure 3.8 shows
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the ROC curves for another user where only four training samples could produce WD-SV
systems with higher performance than that for the WI-SV system, as the performance of the
WI classifier is very weak for this specific user. Future work is needed to investigate possibility
of employing user-specific training size.
Moreover, the classification decisions of both the WI and WD classifiers can be fused in the
ROC space, and might produce better performance. For instance, a recently fusion method
called IBC, proposed by Khreich et al. (Khreich et al., 2010), could be employed to fuse
decisions from multiple ROC curves. Such fusion of both modes might be beneficial for the
starting operational period (before the switching point to the WD is reached). So, future work
will investigate fusing the two classifiers during this operational period.
Figure 3.9 AER for WD-SV verification mode, for the GPDS database. The WD
classifier with 8 training samples has same AER as the WI classifier (tested with a single
template (R = 1)). WD classifiers trained with more samples outperforms the WI
classifier.
Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 show the AER and FRR/FAR for the different classifiers, respec-
tively. Different than the Brazilian database, signatures of the GDPS seem to be less stable
as overfitting occur with only 20 boosting iterations. In Figure 3.10, it is clear that the FRR
increases after 20 boosting iterations, while the FARsimulated decreases. Also, although the av-
erage AER is acceptable (about 12.5% with 14 training samples and 100 boosting iterations),
some users have shown inaccurate performance (maximum AER is about 42%).
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Figure 3.10 FRR and FAR for the WD-SV mode for the GPDS database.
The explanation of the lower performance of the system, when tested on the GPDS database,
than that of the Brazilian database is: while the signature images of the Brazilian database have
fixed size, the GPDS database includes images with various sizes. Hence, the population-based
feature representation (P ) that is designed based on the development dataset, may not gener-
alize to some users in the WD dataset, whose signature sizes differ significantly. Accordingly,
the proposed system is expected to produce high classification accuracy when employed in
real-world SV applications, where signature samples have fixed size as they come from a same
type of document, i.e., checks from a specific bank.
3.5.1.3 Computational complexity
To compare the computational complexity of the two modes of verification, we investigated the
complexity of a WI-SV and a WD-SV with similar accuracy. For instance, for the Brazilian
database, the WI-SV when tested with fifteen template (R = 15) is compared to the WD-SV
when trained with 30 samples, as both have similar accuracy. For the WI-SV system, the clas-
sifier produces the classification decision based on processing of 555 features extracted from
a query sample and a template. Hence, when 15 templates are used (1 query + 15 templates=
16 signature images are processed), the TFV is 8880 (see Eq.3.11). On the other hand, the
WD-SV system frequently produces decisions based on a single classification operation. Only
a query sample is used for feature extraction, where about 40 features are processed by the
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classifier. Hence, the TFV is about 40. Accordingly, adaptation of this WI system to differ-
ent users reduces the computational complexity by about 99.5%. While similar accuracy is
achieved by employing either the WI-SV or the WD-SV systems, the later is lighter and more
secure.
We observed consistent computer simulations outcomes. The total verification processing time
is dominated by the representation extraction process. While the classifiers compute the classi-
fication decision in about 10−5 s, the extraction time for population-based representation P and
the user-based representation U , for a single image, are 0.25 s and 0.02 s, respectively. Hence,
the representation extraction time for WI-SV verification mode is about 4 s (for 16 images),
and it is about 0.02 s for the WD-SV mode. Accordingly, adaptation of the WI-SV to specific
users reduced the verification time by about 99.5%.
3.5.2 Comparisons with systems in the literature
The proposed systems is compared with pure WI systems on the Brazilian database (C. Santos
et al., 2004),(Bertolini et al., 2010), (Rivard et al., 2013), and on the GPDS database (Kumar
et al., 2012). Also it is compared with pure WD systems on the Brazilian database (Justino
et al., 2001),(Batista et al., 2010),(Batista et al., 2012) and on the GPDS database (MA et al.,
2005),(Vargas et al., 2008),(Solar et al., 2008),(Batista et al., 2012).
3.5.2.1 Brazilian database
Table 3.5 compares the proposed WI-WD system to some pure WI and WD systems that are
tested on the Brazilian database. All systems are investigated using the same data set and
similar testing protocol, and results are reported in terms of AER. The first 3 systems are
WI systems, while the last 3 are WD systems. The WI systems do not use user signature
templates for training, however, an independent (development) signature database is used. It is
clear that system 2 outperforms system 1 as it applied information fusion on the decision level,
instead of the single classifier in system 1. Also, system 3, that applied information fusion on
both the feature and decision levels, outperforms system 2 (both systems applied majority vote
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of decisions based on 15 templates). The proposed system, when employed in the WI mode
and with using a single template for verification, showed comparable performance of the pure
WI-SV systems.
When employed in the more secure WD mode, our system showed similar performance as sys-
tem 3 (the baseline system of our work), while only single classification decision is executed,
instead of fusing 15 classification decisions in the baseline system. Comparing with the WD
systems, system 6 has best performance among the other WD systems. Although this system
executes a complex dynamic selection of classifiers, the proposed system showed similar ac-
curacy with a single classification operation. For the Brazilian database, the actual accuracy of
our system ranges between 5.38% and 7.24%, based on the point of switching between the WI
and WD operational modes.
3.5.2.2 GPDS database
Table 3.6 compares the proposed system to some pure WI and WD systems that are tested on
the GPDS database. Only the first system is a WI system, while the other systems are WD.
Although the WI system presented in (Kumar et al., 2012) does not use signature templates of
real system users, it used forgery signatures (from the development dataset) in training. For
our system, we did not use forgery signatures for training. For systems 2,3, and 4, genuine and
forgery samples (of the real system users) are used for training and/or for selecting optimal
decision thresholds. This scenario may bias the reported system accuracy, since forgeries are
not available during the design of a real-world SV system. System 5 applied similar experi-
mental protocol to ours, where no forgeries are considered available for training. This system
showed comparable performance as that of the aforementioned WD system, despite that it did
not use forgeries for training. So, system 5 outperforms the earlier systems, however, it ap-
plies complex generative-discriminative system with dynamic selection of classifiers. Also, for
systems 1,2 and 5 (see second row), the ERR (Equal Error Rate) is reported. In this case the
decision threshold is selected to produce equal values for FRR and FARsimulated. Our system
showed AER comparable to that of system 5, where the threshold selection is employed based
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on an independent (development) database. For the GPDS database, the actual accuracy of our
system ranges between 13.96% and 17.82%, based on the point of switching between the WI
and WD operational modes.
3.6 Conclusions and future work
A solution to compromise between pure writer-dependent (WD) and writer-independent (WI)
offline signature verification (OLSV) systems is proposed. A universal WI classifier is designed
with a development database, to enable starting system operation with few signature templates.
Switching to a more secure, less complex, and more accurate WD operational mode is possible
whenever enough samples are collected for a specific user. Adaptation of the WI classifiers
to specific users is achieved through tuning the universal signature representation to each user,
while training his WD classifier.
Simulation results on two real-world offline signature databases confirm the feasibility and
robustness of the proposed approach. The initial universal (WI) verification mode showed
comparable performance to that of state of the art offline SV systems. The final user-specific
WD verification mode showed enhanced accuracy with decreased computational complexity.
Only a single compact classifier produced similar level of accuracy (AER of about 5.38%
and 13.96% for the Brazilian and the GPDS databases, respectively) as complex WI and WD
systems in literature. In addition, the produced WD classifiers are more secure than the baseline
WI classifiers, eliminating the need to store user templates for verification.
Future work will investigate the ability to enhance the system accuracy by employing other
features, and learn from independent forgeries, during the WI training. Also, user adaptation
of classifier parameters (like decision thresholds, image size normalization, and training size),
will be investigated. Fusion of both WI and WD system modes will be investigated, in order
to enhance the performance during the initial operational period of the system. In this chap-
ter, the user samples are assumed to be collected offline. A more practical scenario, where
authenticated samples are used to train the WD classifiers online, will be investigated.
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3.7 Discussion
The proposed DR optimization approach is modified in the chapter, so the final WD classifier
operates in a FR space where no templates are needed for verification. The first BFS runs in a
high-dimensional DR space using signature samples of an independent development database.
The resulting representation has a reduced dimensionality, and it is more discriminant than
the original representation. As the resulting representation demonstrated better generalization
for the exploitation database, with users are not seen during the design phase, so it is consid-
ered universal (population) representation. Designing a WD classifier by limited number of
user-specific training set, is more tractable in this reduced space. Different than the OLSV
implementation that is reported in Chapter II, here we use the first BFS only for dimensionality
reduction, then we return back to a reduced FR space where the final WD classifier designed.
It is demonstrated that running the user-specific BFS in the FR space results in more accurate
classifiers. Compared to the DR-based OLSV accuracy reported in Chapter II, OLSV systems
designed in the reduced universal FR space have shown better accuracy (AER is reduced form
7.32% to 5.38%). In this context, the proposed DR learning approach can be employed as
a tool for feature selection, where designing classifiers in the reduced dimensional spaces is
more tractable (see appendix I)
The designed OLSV systems might enforce authenticity of transactions, however confidential-
ity and integrity security aspects needs a bio-cryptographic implementation based on the offline
signature images. In the following chapter, the proposed DR learning approach is employed for
designing signature-based FV systems, where implementation details and performance analy-
sis are investigated.
CHAPTER 4
A BIO-CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM BASED ON OFFLINE SIGNATURE IMAGES
In bio-cryptography, biometric traits are replacing traditional passwords for secure exchange of
cryptographic keys. The Fuzzy Vault (FV) scheme has been successfully employed to design
bio-cryptographic systems as it can absorb a wide range of variation in biometric traits. Despite
the intensity of research on FV based on physiological traits like fingerprints, iris, face, etc.,
there is no conclusive research on behavioral traits such as offline handwritten signature im-
ages, that have high inter-personal similarity and intra-personal variability. In this chapter, a FV
system based on the offline signature images is proposed. A two-step boosting feature selec-
tion (BFS) technique is proposed for selecting a compact and discriminant user-specific feature
representation from a large number of feature extractions. The first step seeks dimensionality
reduction through learning a population-based representation, that discriminates between dif-
ferent users in the population. The second step filters this representation to produce a compact
user-based representation that discriminates the specific user from the population. This last
representation is used to generate the FV locking/unlocking points. Representation variability
is modeled by employing the BFS in a dissimilarity representation space, and it is consid-
ered for matching the unlocking and locking points during FV decoding. Proof of concept
simulations involving 72000 signature matchings (corresponding to both genuine and forged
query signatures from the Brazilian Signature Database) have shown FV recognition accuracy
of about 97% and system entropy of about 45-bits. The content of this chapter was published at
the IEEE Workshop on Computational Intelligence and Identity Management (Eskander et al.,
2011), the International workshop on Emerging Aspects in Handwritten Signature Processing
(Eskander et al., 2013b), and Information Sciences (Eskander et al., 2014a).
4.1 Introduction
The concept of bio-cryptography for enhanced security exploits the benefits of biometrics and
cryptography in a single construction, while alleviating their vulnerabilities. Biometric sys-
tems authenticate users based on their physiological traits like fingerprints, iris, face, etc., or
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behavioral traits like voice, gait, handwritings, etc (Jain et al., 2006). Although they guarantee
user authenticity, biometric systems are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks such as: vulnera-
bility of biometrics databases, irrevocability of compromised traits and overriding the classifier
decision (Uludag, 2006).
On the other hand, cryptographic schemes like encryption and digital signature facilitate con-
fidentiality and integrity of information, but they do not guarantee user authenticity. Known
as the key management problem, cryptography keys are vulnerable to theft when secured by
weak passwords or when stored as plain tokens (Menezes et al., 1996).
Bio-cryptography has been mainly introduced to alleviate the key management problem in
cryptography by using biometric traits to secure the private keys (Uludag et al., 2004). How-
ever, it can also be considered as a counter measure against aforementioned attacks on biomet-
ric systems. Bio-cryptographic systems provide template protection as no explicit reference
traits are used for verification, only secured versions are used. Hence, they facilitate revoca-
bility as if the biometric template is compromised, different representation can be extracted,
and it generates a new template. Moreover, a bio-cryptographic system can be considered as a
biometric classifier with a trusted classifier output. Instead of producing a simple classification
label, which can be overridden in classical classifiers, bio-crypto systems produce cryptogra-
phy keys through a protected mechanism.
There are three main bio-cryptography schemes namely, key-release, key-generation and key-
binding (Nandakumar et al., 2007). In key-release systems, both biometric and cryptography
keys are stored separately, and the crypto-key is released to genuine users based on classi-
cal biometric authentication. This technique does not guarantee template security. In key-
generation systems, crypto-keys are generated directly from the biometric traits. It is not easy
to generate strong, random, and invariant cryptographic keys from the correlated and unsta-
ble biometric traits. In key-binding systems, classical crypto-keys are coupled with biometric
keys. They cannot be decoupled without applying a genuine sample of the biometric trait. Re-
liability and security of key-binding techniques surpasses other cryptography schemes, as they
protect the biometric templates and produce typical cryptographic keys. However, they involve
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a design challenge to absorb the fuzziness of biometric signals resulting from intra-personal
variability (IPV) and inter-personal similarity (IPS). This leads to the false rejection of autho-
rized users and acceptance of unauthorized users, respectively. This chapter will focus on a
key-binding scheme known as Fuzzy Vault (FV) that efficiently deals with the fuzzy nature of
biometric signals (Juels and Sudan, 2002). 1
The FV construction locks the cryptography key by means of a specific number of locking fea-
tures extracted from the biometric template. To unlock the vault (and retrieve the crypto-key),
unlocking features are extracted from the biometric query sample. A user can authenticate
himself (and retrieve his crypto-key) if the unlocking features extracted from his query sample,
overlap sufficiently with his locking features. Due to the fuzzy nature of biometrics, overlap
between a genuine sample and its reference template may be insufficient to unlock a FV. More-
over, some impostor samples might show sufficient overlap with the biometric template, and
hence unlock the FV to unauthorized individuals.
All reliable FV implementations in literature are based on physiological biometric traits, e.g.,
fingerprint (Clancy et al., 2003)-(Nandakumar et al., 2007), face (Wang and Plataniotis, 2007)-
(Nyang and Lee, 2007), 3D face (Franssen et al., 2008), iris (Lee et al., 2008)-(Meenakshi and
Padmavathi, 2010), retina (Meenakshi and Padmavathi, 2010), and palmprint (Kumar and Ku-
mar, 2009). No conclusive research was done using the handwritten signatures. In this chapter,
we present a complete implementation of the FV scheme based on the offline handwritten sig-
nature images. This implementation may enforce security of documents, e.g., bank checks, by
means of the embedded signature images.
Handwritten signatures are behavioral biometrics employed in a wide range of forensic and fi-
nancial applications. Automation of user verification based on his signatures is realized through
signature verification systems (SV). There are two modes of operation for such systems: on-
line and offline. In online systems, signatures are captured while the person signs using devices
1The FV (Juels and Sudan, 2002) and its antecedent fuzzy commitment scheme (Juels and Wattenberg, 1999)
may be viewed as an error-tolerant form of Shamir secret sharing (Shamir, 1979). A query biometric sample
shall carry enough number of secret shares in order to retrieve the secret encoded in a FV. To restore some of the
corrupted shares in noisy biometric samples, a FV employs an error-correction decoder.
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that acquire the dynamic characteristics of the signatures like the pressure, velocity, etc. On
the other hand, offline systems capture the signature images from the paper after the signing
process. As the physical presence of persons is not mandatory in case of the offline signature
verification systems, it can be applied in a broader range of applications than the online sys-
tems. However, the static features extracted from the signature images may incorporate a lower
level of stability and discrimination to design accurate automatic systems, and to enable fully
automation of critical processes as found in financial transactions. For a comprehensive review
on the developments on this field see (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008), and (Batista et al., 2007).
Despite of the intensive research in signature verification, the contributions to bio-cryptosystems
based on this variable behavioral biometric are limited and concerned mostly with online sys-
tems. In particular, Vielhauer et al. (Vielhauer et al., 2002), Hoque et al. (Hoque et al., 2008),
and Yip et al. (Yip et al., 2006) generated biometric keys from the on-line signatures. In con-
trast with bio-cryptography, cancelable biometrics schemes are proposed to enforce “template
protection" while no cryptography keys are secured (Ratha et al., 2001). Examples of this
approach in on-line signatures are found in (Freire et al., 2008), and (Maiorana et al., 2010).
Some authors have studied the design of FV systems based on handwritten signatures (Freire-
Santos et al., 2006), (Freire-Santos et al., 2007). While it is found that FV systems using online
signatures have acceptable performance, the authors observed that features extracted from the
offline signature images integrate too much similarity between inter-personal samples (high
IPS) and too much variance between the intra-personal samples (high IPV), to design a reliable
FV system (Freire-Santos et al., 2007).
In this chapter, the concept of dissimilarity representation (Pekalska and Duin, 2002) is em-
ployed to produce signature representations with low IPS and IPV. The dissimilarity approach
is mainly introduced to differentiate between classes with modeling the proximity between
class objects, instead of modeling the objects themselves. We propose that the dissimilarity
approach can be employed to design reliable FV systems, where error correction decoders are
used. If the dissimilarity between the locking and the unlocking FV points is less than a spe-
cific threshold, the decoder succeeds to unlock the bio-cryptographic key. So, functionality of
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these decoders can be considered as two-class simple thresholding classifiers that operate in
the dissimilarity space.
In literature, the concept of dissimilarity representation is not directly employed to design
bio-cryptographic systems. However, some authors proposed methodologies to absorb the dis-
similarities between encoding and decoding biometric signals, so that they are within the error
correction capacity of the decoder. For instance, Fingerprint-based fuzzy vaults are designed
by using some minutia points extracted in the spatial space to constitute the FV locking fea-
tures. Dissimilarity between locking and unlocking features is decreased by aligning query
and template fingerprints (Nandakumar et al., 2007), and by applying an adaptive bounding
box during matching the minutia points (Jain et al., 1997).
In our proposed method, the IPS is alleviated by proposing a dissimilarity-based two-step fea-
ture selection technique. Feature representations are extracted from the signature images and
they are projected on a dissimilarity-representation space, which we call a "feature-dissimilarity"
space, where pairwise feature distances are computed. Then, features are selected in this space
to produce concise and discriminant user-specific representations, from a huge number of can-
didate features. The proposed technique employs the boosting feature selection (BFS) ap-
proach (Tieu and Viola, 2004), for fast searching in the high dimensional feature-dissimilarity
space. In the first step, a recent method by Rivard et al. (Rivard et al., 2013) is employed for
dimensionality reduction. This method uses signature samples of a large population to learn
a relatively low-dimensional feature representation, from a huge number of candidate features
extracted based on multi-feature types and different extraction scales. The feature representa-
tion selected at this step is a population-based presentation (PR), as it aims for discriminating
between different users in the population. In the second step, the PR is filtered for a user-based
representation (UR) that discriminates the specific user from the population. This UR is used
to lock/unlock the FV.
The IPV is alleviated by introducing the adaptive matching window (AMW) method. Inspired
by the fingerprint alignment approach proposed by Nandakumar et al., (Nandakumar et al.,
2007) and the adaptive bounding box approach proposed by Jain et al., (Jain et al., 1997), we
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model and store the representation dissimilarities during FV encoding. This information is used
for adaptively matching the unlocking and locking points during FV decoding. Modeling of the
representation dissimilarity is achieved through employing the BFS in the feature-dissimilarity
space.
A preliminary study on some of the ideas that are proposed in this chapter has been appeared
in Eskander et al., (Eskander et al., 2011), where only the two-step feature selection method is
applied. In this chapter, we further investigate the impact of the different steps of this method on
the feature representation quality. Also, we introduce the AMW method. This step significantly
increases the genuine accept rate (GAR), compared to the system represented in (Eskander
et al., 2011). Finally, we present a complete description of the bio-cryptographic system, with
investigating the impact of the system parameters on its performance.
Proof-of-concept simulations are performed using the Brazilian signature DB (Freitas et al.,
2000). The power of the proposed feature representation technique is tested by analyzing the
separation between feature representations of the genuine and forgery classes. The importance
of each step of the proposed technique is investigated, through measuring its impact on in-
creasing the separation between the two classes. The FV recognition performance is tested
by decoding FVs with genuine and signature samples of different level of forgeries (random,
simple and simulated forgeries). The trade-off between the system security and its recognition
performance is investigated. Also, the proposed cryptographic system is compared to other
classical signature verification systems. Finally, applying the decision fusion concept is tested
for enhanced recognition performance of the proposed system.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides some background
on FVs as applied to offline signature images. Section 4.3 describes the proposed method for
feature representation. Section 4.4 illustrates the proposed FV system based on the offline sig-
natures, along with analyzing its security. The experimental results and the system performance
are presented and discussed in section 4.5.
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4.2 Fuzzy Vaults with offline signatures
4.2.1 Fuzzy Vault
A FV scheme locks a secret message K by means of a user identifier T . In case that a FV
is used as a bio-cryptography construction, the secret message K is a cryptographic key and
the user identifier T is a biometric template. A FV scheme consists of two processes: 1) FV
encoding, and 2) FV decoding.
4.2.1.1 FV encoding
Ploynomial
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Projection
Feature
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Feature
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Chaff
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Merge
K p
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(A, p(A))
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VT=(A˜= (A
⋃
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FT = { f Ti }ti=1
A= {ai}ti=1
Figure 4.1 Block diagram of the FV encoding process
To encode a FV, features are extracted from a biometric template T and then they are used to
lock the cryptography keyK in a vault VT . Figure 4.1 illustrates the processing steps to encode
a FV. First, a feature representation F T = {fTi }ti=1 is extracted from T . The t elements of
F T are then quantized in l-bit strings, to constitute a locking set A = {ai}ti=1, where ai is the
quantized value of the feature fTi .
Second, the set A locks the secret key K in a polynomial space as follows: K encodes a
polynomial p then A is projected on p. One way to encode a polynomial p with a secret K, is
to splitK into equal parts and then use them as polynomial coefficients. For instance,K is split
into k + 1 strings of length l-bit and constitutes a coefficient vector C = {c0, c1, c2, ...., ck}. A
96
Chaff Filter
Feature
Extraction
Feature
Encoding
Polynomial
Reconstruction
Key
Extraction
p′ K
′
FQ = { f Qi }ti=1
B= {bi}ti=1
Q
VT=(A˜= (A
⋃
Aˆ),P˜= (p(A)
⋃
Pˆ))
(A¯, P¯) = ((B
⋂
A˜), p← (B⋂ A˜))
Figure 4.2 Block diagram of the FV decoding process
polynomial p of degree k is encoded using C, where p(x) = ckxk+ ck−1xk−1+ .....+ c1x+ c0.
To lock the polynomial p, and thereby K, by means of the locking set A, the polynomial
is evaluated for all points in A = {ai}ti=1 and constitutes the set p(A) = {p(ai)}ti=1 where
p(ai) = ckai
k + ck−1aik−1 + ..... + c1ai + c0. It is important to note that all computations
are done in a finite Galois field GF (2l) (Berlekamp and Elwyn, 1968), so that both ai and
p(ai) ∈ [0, 2l] 2.
The points (A, p(A)) constitute the genuine vault points. To conceal these points from attack-
ers, chaff (noise) points (Aˆ, Pˆ ) are generated, where Aˆ = {aˆii}rii=t+1, aˆii ∈ GF (2l), aˆii =
ai ∨ ii ∈ [t + 1, r], i ∈ [1, t], and Pˆ = {pˆii}rii=t+1, pˆii ∈ GF (2l), pˆii = p(aˆii) ∨ ii ∈ [t + 1, r].
Finally, both the genuine point set (A, p(A)), and the chaff point set (Aˆ, Pˆ ) are merged to con-
stitute the vault points (A˜, P˜ ), where A˜ = A
⋃
Aˆ, and P˜ = p(A)
⋃
Pˆ . The vault VT is stored
as a user template which consists in the vault points (A˜, P˜ ), and the vault parameters (k, t).
2FV decoding relies on error-correction codes. Computations of these codes are based on finite fields that are
called Galois fields. Hence, all of the FV items must be represented in a finite field of the same representation
size.
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4.2.1.2 FV decoding
To learn K from the vault VT , the genuine set (A, p(A)) should be firstly isolated by filtering
the chaff points (Aˆ, Pˆ ) out of the vault set (A˜, P˜ ). Then any subset of only k+1 genuine points
in (A, p(A)), could be used to reconstruct the polynomial p of degree k. 3
Figure 4.2 illustrates the processing steps to decode a FV. A feature representation FQ =
{fQj }tj=1 is extracted from a biometric query sample Q. The t elements of FQ are then quan-
tized in l-bit strings, to constitute an unlocking set B = {bj}tj=1, where bj is the quantized
value of the feature fQj . Then, the chaff points are filtered by matching items of B against all
items in A˜. This process results in a matching set (A¯, P¯ ) = ((B
⋂
A˜), p ← (B⋂ A˜)), where
p ← (B⋂ A˜) represents the projection of the matching features on the polynomial space.
In the ideal case, all of the chaff points are filtered out and all of the genuine points are isolated.
This case occurs when the query sample Q typically matches the template T . In such case,
each feature encoded in B locates the corresponding genuine feature encoded in A, hence
(B
⋂
A˜) = A, where A˜ = (A
⋃
Aˆ). In this case, the matching set (A¯, P¯ ) = (A, p(A)). On
the other hand, due to the fuzzy nature of biometrics, some elements of B differ from their
corresponding elements in A, so that (A¯, P¯ ) = (A, p(A)). More specifically, during the chaff
filtering process, two types of errors might occur, namely erasures and noise. For both error
types, an element bj differs from its corresponding element ai. However, for the erasures case,
bj does not match with any of A˜, so it does not add any point to the matching set. For the noise
case, an element bj might equate a chaff element aˆi, so that it adds a noise point (aˆ, pˆ) to the
matching set.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the chaff filtering process. In this illustrative example, a polynomial of
degree k = 7 is locked in a FV with a locking set A = {ai}20i=1 of length t = 20. In the
decoding phase, the chaff points are filtered out by an unlocking set B = {bj}20j=1. Each
unlocking element bj is matched against all items in the vault. If the query Q and the template
T are identical, each unlocking element bj equates its corresponding locking element aj , and
3Polynomial reconstruction algorithms like Lagrange interpolation needs only k + 1 points on a curve to
reconstruct a polynomial of k degree. For instance, only two points are needed to identify a line.
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hence adds the genuine point (aj, p(aj)) to the matching set. In this example, there are 14
matching points added to the unlocking list. Of them, 10 genuine points and 4 noise points.
While, the other 10 genuine points are not added to the matching set since they did not match
with their corresponding unlocking elements.
b1 = a1
1
pˆii = p ← b3
O = p ← b2
2
b3 = aˆiib2 = a2
3
p(a1) = p ← b1
Figure 4.3 Illustration of the chaff filtering Process: 20 genuine points are encoded in
the FV, by projecting them on the polynomial space p. Only 10 of them could be isolated
and added to the matching set. For instance, point 1 (a1, p(a1) is isolated by means of the
unlocking element b1, where b1 = a1. While, the other 10 genuine points could not be
isolated by means of the corresponding unlocking elements. For instance, point 2
(a2, p(a2) could not be isolated from chaffs as a2 did not match with the corresponding
unlocking element b2. Also, there are 4 chaff points are added to the unlocking list and
considered as noise. For instance, point 3 (aˆii, pˆii) is incorrectly added to the matching set
because b3 matches with aˆii
After filtering the chaff points and isolating a matching set (A¯, P¯ ) of length t′ (in the above
example, t′ = 14), the polynomial reconstruction process uses the matching set to retrieve
the encoded polynomial. This process succeeds only if the matching set contains at least k+ 1
genuine points. However, even if enough genuine points exists, it is not possible to differentiate
the genuine points from the noise points. To overcome this, two approaches could be applied
namely, exhaustive search and error correction. In exhaustive search approach, N =
(
t′
k+1
)
subsets of length k + 1 are constituted from the t′ points of the unlocking list (A¯, P¯ ). Each
subset is then used to reconstruct a polynomial of degree k. To locate the right polynomial,
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some error detection methods could be applied to check the correctness of the reconstructed
polynomial. For instance, CRC codes are computed and compared for both the original and
constructed polynomial coefficients (Nandakumar et al., 2007). Also, hash functions could be
employed to encrypt both the original and the reconstructed keys, then comparison is done in
the encrypted space (Nagar et al., 2011).
For the error correction approach, an error correction decoding like Reed-Solomon (R-S) de-
coding could be employed (Berlekamp and Elwyn, 1968). The idea is to consider the genuine
points (A,P ) as a code word of length t that encodes a secret message of length k + 1, where
there are t− k− 1 redundancy elements. During the decoding process, some noise is added to
this code producing a corrupted version of it. The R-S codes can correct some of these errors 4
and recover the original code, and thereby the encoded secret.
4.2.2 Encoding Fuzzy Vaults with signature images
The aforementioned description of the FV scheme applies for any biometric trait like finger-
print, iris, face, signatures, etc. However, generation of the locking/unlocking sets from the
template/query samples depends on the specific biometric traits. Figure 4.4 illustrates a way
to generate the locking/unlocking sets from the signature images. In this example, extended
shadow codes features (Sabourin and Genest, 1994) are extracted from signature images, and
used for generating feature representations F T = {fTi }20i=1 and FQ = {fQi }20i=1 from a signature
template T and a signature query sample Q, respectively. These features are used to encode
the locking set A = {ai}20i=1 and the unlocking set B = {bi}20i=1. In this example, only half of
the unlocking elements match with the corresponding elements in the locking set.
We define here a feature encoding space as a two dimensional space consisting of the feature
index i and the feature value fi. Matching the template and the query samples is done in this
feature encoding space, then the matching set is projected on the polynomial space to filter
the chaff points and isolate the genuine FV points. Figures 4.5, 4.6 illustrate the steps to
4For Berlekamp-Massey algorithm (Berlekamp and Elwyn, 1968), codes of t elements with t− k − 1 redun-
dancy elements can recover up to (t − k − 1)/2 errors. So, the minimum number of correct elements needed to
recover a message of length k + 1 is (t+ k + 1)/2.
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FT = {fTi }ti=1
A = {ai}ti=1
B = {bj}tj=1
FQ = {fQj }tj=1
Figure 4.4 Illustration of FV encoding with signature images: the extended shadow
code (ESC) (Sabourin and Genest, 1994) features consist in the superposition of bar mask
array over the binary image of a handwritten signature. Each bar is assumed to be a light
detector related to a spatially constrained area of the 2D signal. A shadow projection is
defined as the simultaneous projection of each black pixel into its closest horizontal,
vertical and diagonal bars. A projected shadow turns on a set of bits distributed uniformly
along the bars. After all the pixels of a signature are projected, the number of on bits in
each bar is counted and normalized to the range of [0,1] to constitute the ESC feature
value. The ESC feature vectors F T = {fTi }ti=1 and FQ = {fQj }tj=1 are extracted from the
template signature T and the query sample Q, respectively. The FV locking set A and the
unlocking set B are represented in two-tuples, where A = {ai}ti=1 = {(i, fTi )}ti=1 and
B = {bj}tj=1 = {(j, fTj )}tj=1. A locking element ai matches an unlocking element bj only
if they have identical indexes and feature values, i.e., when i = j and fTi = f
Q
j .
perform this chaff filtering process. First, each unlocking element bj is matched in the feature
encoding space against all the elements of {ai}ti=1 (as shown in Figure 4.5). Features encode
the locking/unlocking FV points must be stable, so they have equal values when extracted
from the template and other genuine query samples. Also, the features must be discriminant,
so when extracted from query samples of other users or forgeries, they have different values
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Figure 4.5 Chaff filtering in the feature encoding space: every unlocking point bj is
matched with all of the vault locking points {ai}ti=1, and this step produces the matching
points A¯ = ({ai}ti=1)
⋃{aˆii}rii=t+1⋂{bj}tj=1. An unlocking point bj succeeds to isolate
its corresponding locking point aj only if their feature values are equal, i.e., fTj = f
Q
j .
Also, it might happen that the unlocking point b equates a chaff point aˆ and adds it as
noise to the matching points.
(a, p(a))
(b, p ← b)
(aˆ, pˆ)
ai
p(ai)
Figure 4.6 Chaff filtering in the polynomial space: only the locking points that are
isolated from the chaffs are projected on the polynomial space p, to isolate the matching
set (A¯, P¯ ). Due to IPV, some of genuine FV points might not be included in this set.
Also, due to IPS, impostor samples might isolate some genuine FV points. Moreover, due
to the similarity between some of FV unlocking and chaff points, some chaff points may
be incorrectly added to the matching set.
than that extracted from the template. It might happen that an unlocking element b matches
a chaff element aˆ. To avoid such incorrect matches, it is required to generate the chaff points
with enough separation from the locking points. Only the matching elements are projected on
the polynomial space, and isolates the corresponding genuine points (as shown in Figure 4.6).
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It is clear that, a successful FV decoding relies mainly on the amount of overlap between the
locking and unlocking sets. Accordingly, to design a reliable FV system, the feature representa-
tion of the signature samples should be selected properly, so that two signature representations
of the same user have sufficient similarities, while two signature representations of different
users should sufficiently differ. In order to consolidate the design aspects of signature repre-
sentations that are suitable for the FV scheme, we propose the following definitions:
• Similarity score (SS): is the number of FV locking points that equate their corresponding
points in the unlocking set. As two points ai and bj are equal only if both of their indexes
and feature values are equal, i.e., i = j and fTi = f
Q
j . So, the SS
Q between a template
sample T and the query sample Q, can be defined as: the number of features that have
the same values when extracted from the template T and the query Q. Hence:
SSQ =
t∑
i=1
(Si), where Si =
{
1 if (fQi = f
T
i )
0 if (fQi = fTi )
(4.1)
• Decoding threshold (DΘ): is the minimum number of genuine FV points found in the
matching set (A¯, P¯ ), that are needed to decode the FV, and to retrieve the cryptography
key K. This threshold depends on the algorithm used to decode the FV, and on the
FV parameters (k, t). For instance, for Berlekamp-Massey algorithm (Berlekamp and
Elwyn, 1968), a FV with t locking points that encode a polynomial of k degree, has a
decoding threshold:
DΘ = (t+ k + 1)/2 (4.2)
Based on the above definitions, a signature representation that encodes/decodes a FV system
should satisfy the following condition:
SSQ
{≥ DΘ if Q is a genuine sample
< DΘ if Q is a forgery sample (4.3)
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The above condition implies that the similarity score distributions for the genuine and forgery
classes should be separated around the DΘ. Accordingly, functionality of the FV decoder is
formulated as a two-class simple thresholding classifier that operates in a dissimilarity space.
For physiological biometrics, like fingerprints, it easy to achieve this condition. For instance,
the minutia representation of a specific finger is naturally fixed, and representations of two
fingers differs sufficiently. In such biometrics, the acquisition process may produce distorted
representations of the trait. Some preprocessing steps could be employed to recover the original
representation. For instance, fingerprints could be aligned, using helper data, prior to feature
extraction (Nandakumar et al., 2007). On the other hand, signatures are behavioral biomet-
rics that have intrinsic variations (high IPV). Also, signatures of different persons may have
similarities (high IPS), and more critical, they can be easily imitated by forgeries. It is not
easy to identify a representation space with well separated similarity score distributions. We
tackle this challenging design issue by proposing a feature selection technique that relies on
the dissimilarity representation (Cha, 2001).
4.3 Selection of a user-specific signature representation
4.3.1 Feature selection in the feature dissimilarity space
To illustrate the idea behind our proposed feature selection approach, see Figure 4.7. In this
example, three signature images are represented: T is the template signature, Q1 is a genuine
query sample and Q2 is a forgery query sample. In the left side, signatures are represented
in the FV feature encoding space. For simplicity, only two features (f1 and f2) are shown,
while the full representation consists of t dimensions. On the right side, signatures are rep-
resented in the feature dissimilarity space. In this space, a feature is replaced by its distance
from a reference value. For instance, f1 and f2 are replaced by their dissimilarity represen-
tations δf1, δf2, where δf1 = |fQ1 − fT1 |, and δf2 = |fQ2 − fT2 |. Accordingly, while a point
in the feature encoding space represents a signature image, a point in the feature dissimilarity
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δ f1
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w2 = 2δ2
i
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f T1
f T2
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f Q12
f Q21
f Q22
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dQ2
FV Feature Encoding Space Feature-Dissimilarity Space
1 2
Figure 4.7 Illustration of feature selection in the feature dissimilarity space and in the
feature encoding space. In this example, δf1 and δf2 are discriminant features. For
instance, for all genuine query samples like Q1, δf
Q1
i < δi and for all forgery query
samples like Q2, δf
Q2
i > δi. Unfolding these discriminant dissimilarity features to the
original feature encoding space produces discriminant features in the encoding feature
space, where the distance between two feature instances is used to determine their
similarity. For instance, a genuine feature (like fQ1i ) lies close to the template feature f
T
i ,
so they are similar, where closeness here implies that both features reside in a matching
window wi = 2δi. Features extracted from a forgery image (like f
Q2
i ) do not resemble the
template feature fTi , as they reside outside the matching window wi.
space represents the dissimilarity between two different signature images. The point dQ1 rep-
resents the dissimilarity between the genuine signature Q1 and the template T , and a point dQ2
represents the dissimilarity between the forgery signature Q2 and the template T , where dQ1=
(δfQ11 , δf
Q1
2 , ....., δf
Q1
t ), and dQ2= (δf
Q2
1 , δf
Q2
2 , ....., δf
Q2
t ).
According to the definition of similarity score stated in Eq.4.1, both features f1 and f2 are not
discriminant as SSQ1 = SSQ2 = 0. However, the dissimilarity representation of these features
is discriminant as the thresholds δ1 and δ2 perfectly split the genuine and forgery classes. For
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instance, for the genuine query samples likeQ1, δf
Q1
i < δi. Also, for the forgery query samples
like Q2, δf
Q2
i > δi. Based on this idea, the similarity score in Eq.4.1 can be reformulated as:
SSQ =
t∑
i=1
(Si), where Si =
{
1 if (δfQi < δi)
0 otherwise
(4.4)
The selected features are used to encode the FV locking/unlocking sets. In the decoding phase,
if the unlocking element is close enough to its corresponding locking element, they are consid-
ered matching and they isolate the corresponding FV genuine point. For instance, fQ11 is close
to fT1 so they are matching. On the other hand, f
Q2
1 is not close to f
T
1 so they are not match-
ing. Closeness between two instances of a feature i is determined by its modeled variability
threshold δi.
4.3.2 A two-step BFS technique with dissimilarity representation
The aforementioned concept could be realized by applying different feature selection algo-
rithms, however, we focus here on employing the boosting feature selection (BFS) approach
proposed by Viola et al. (Tieu and Viola, 2004). This approach employs decision-stumps (DS)
(Iba and Langley, 1992) as weak learners. 5 At each learning iteration, a DS locates the
best representation dimension that splits the two classes around a splitting threshold. If the
BFS runs in the feature dissimilarity space, a DSi at a learning iteration i, locates the best dis-
similarity representation dimension δfi that splits the two classes around a splitting variability
threshold δi, so that:
DSi =
{
1 if (δfi < δi)
0 otherwise
(4.5)
5A decision-stump (DS) is a single-split single-level classification tree. Training of a DS is equivalent to
selection of a single feature that discriminate between two classes based on a splitting threshold.
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It is obvious that the functionality of a DS, when employed in the feature dissimilarity space,
simulates the similarity measure defined in Eq. 4.4. This explains why we employed decision
stumps as weak learners in the proposed BFS approach.
The learning (boosting) process continues by computing the classification error and weights the
samples based on the current error. The misclassified samples get higher weights for the next
boosting iteration, giving chance to find a dimension that discriminates the hard samples. After
t iterations, a setDS is constructed whereDS = {DSi}ti=1. The learning process is successful
if the constructed set is discriminant (i.e., if it results in well separated class representations
like that are shown Fig 4.7). In this case, the condition for producing a discriminant FV (stated
in Eq. 4.3) can be achieved, where the similarity score SSQ is computed according to Eq.4.4.
This feature selection task is challenging as we need to select very few number of features
to encode the FV locking/unlocking sets (t should be small, e.g., 20 features). Our proposed
solution for that is to enlarge the search space by generating a huge number of features from
the signature images. The signatures are represented in a very high dimensional space and
that gives a room to find a small number of dimensions that can split the classes and satisfies
Eq.4.3. However, learning in such high dimensional space needs a large number of training
samples from both the genuine and forgery classes. In practice, the available positive samples
collected when a user is enrolled are few. Also, it is not practical to have forged samples for
real system users. To overcome the limitations on the available learning samples, we propose a
two-step BFS technique. The first step is population-based feature selection (P-FS) that seeks
dimensionality reduction. The second step, is user-based feature selection (U-FS) that seeks
to select a user-specific feature representation F = {fi}ti=1, along with learning its variability
Δ = {δi}ti=1. The variability vector is used to match FV points during the decoding phase (as
will be described in section 4.4).
Figure 4.8 shows a block diagram of the proposed approach for feature representation selection.
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Figure 4.8 Overall block diagram of the proposed approach including population and
user-based feature selection
4.3.2.1 Population-based feature selection
This step is developed based on a recent approach for designing of writer-independent signature
verification systems (WI-SV) proposed by Rivard et al. (Rivard et al., 2013). In WI-SV, a single
signature verification classifier is used to authenticate all system users. As these systems are
capable to discriminate between genuine and forgery signatures of any user, even who did not
108
share in the learning process, so they consist in features that represent the whole population.
Accordingly, we extract the features embedded in these classifiers and use them as universal
“population-based” feature representations (PR).
Figure 4.8 shows the details of this step. A development signature DB, with signatures of
none real system users, is used to learn the population-based representation (PR). To this end,
multi-feature representations MG and MF of high dimensionality are extracted from some
genuine signature samples SG and forgery signature samples SF respectively, where M =
(m1,m2, ...,mM) and M is the dimensionality of the multi-feature representation. To project
these samples into the feature dissimilarity space, dichotomy transformation (Cha, 2001) is
applied. For instance, for two samples Mu,Mv the dissimilarity feature is
DRuv = |Mu −Mv| = (Δm1,Δm2, ...,ΔmM), where Δ(md) = |mud −mvd| . (4.6)
It is worth noting that both the multi-feature and dissimilarity representations have the same
dimensionality M . Also, a sample DRuv is labeled as a genuine or a forgery instance, when it
results from two genuine signatures of the same user, or from two signatures of two different
users, respectively.
To learn the PR representation, Gentle AdaBoost algorithm (Schapire, 2002) is employed. At
a boosting iteration i, a DSwii is designed by locating the best dimension δfi in the dissimi-
larity space that splits the training samples based on a splitting threshold δi, as mentioned in
Eq. 4.5. This process runs for Twi boosting iterations and produces a set of writer-independent
decision stumps DSwi = {DSwii }Twii=1 that splits the genuine and forgery classes. The distinct
features embedded in DSwi are extracted and stored as a population-based representation (PR)
of dimensionality L < M , by which signatures of all users are represented. This methodology
could design a reliable PR of relatively low dimensionality (few hundred features), that are se-
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lected from a feature representation of huge dimensionality (few thousand of features) (Rivard
et al., 2013).
4.3.2.2 User-based feature selection
Recently, Eskander et al. (Eskander et al., 2012) extended the work in (Rivard et al., 2013) to
design writer-dependent signature verification (WD-SV) systems. In that work, an additional
user-specific feature selection step is employed in order to filter a population-based feature
representation into a low dimensionality user-specific representation (few tens features). The
approach proposed in this chapter extends this work to learn a user-specific representation UR
satisfies Eq.4.3, where the similarity score SSQ is computed according to Eq.4.4. The produced
UR is used to encode the FV locking/unlocking sets.
Although the universal PR contains discriminant features for all users, not all dimensions of
this space are needed to discriminate specific users from other populations. Moreover, the dis-
similarity thresholds selected in the writer-independent set of stumps DSwi are not optimal
for the different users. In this design step, selection of discriminant features for each specific
user is achieved, while selecting the best splitting threshold in each dimension. The PR of
dimensionality L is used for feature extraction. For each enrolled user, sample signatures are
collected. Both the enrolling samples SE and some samples SF are selected from the develop-
ment DB (to represent the random forgery class), and are represented in the PR feature space
as PG and P F respectively. Then dichotomy transform is applied to transform the features into
the feature dissimilarity space. The produced dissimilarity representationDRP is then used for
feature selection. The same BFS process runs for t boosting iterations and learns a set of writer-
dependent decision stumps DSwd = {DSwdi }ti=1, that splits the genuine and forgery classes.
The feature representation embedded in DSwd are stored as a user-based representation (UR)
of dimensionality t < L < M .
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As will be described in the next section, the indexes of selected feature FI = {fIi}ti=1 are used
to extract feature representation F = {fi}ti=1. Then, a FV point ai is constituted by represent
fIi and fi in binary strings of l/2-bits length, and then both parts are concatenated in a l-bits
string. Accordingly, the indexes vector FI can not be encoded directly as a part of the FV
locking/unlocking sets, as its range may be of few thousands and needs large number of bits
when encoded (could not fit in l/2-bits representation). To overcome this, the feature indexes
vector FI = {fI}ti=1 is mapped to another vector of virtual indexes V I = {vI}ti=1, where a vIi
can be represented in a l/2-bit string. Finally, the vectors FI ,V I , and Δ = {δi}ti=1 constitutes
the user representation matrix UR, that takes part in both of the proposed FV encoding and
decoding processes (as will be described in the next section).
4.4 A Fuzzy Vault system for offline signatures
User
Representation
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(Section. III)
FV Encoding
Decryption
FV Decoding
EUR
Enrollement Authentication
UR
Encryption
{Ts}Ss=1
Ts (FI,VI) UR= (FI,VI,Δ)
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K′
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Fuzzy Vault
Encrypted User
Representation
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Figure 4.9 Block diagram of the proposed FV system for offline signature images.
The proposed system consists of two main sub-systems: enrollment and authentication (see
Figure 4.9). In the enrollment phase, some signature templates {Ts}Ss=1 are collected from the
enrolling user. These templates are used for the user representation selection, as described in
Section 4.3. The user representation selection process results in a user representations matrix
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UR = (FI, V I,Δ), where FI = {fIi}ti=1 is the vector of indexes of the selected features,
V I = {vIi}ti=1 is a vector of indexes mapping represented in l/2-bits, and Δ = {δi}ti=1 is
the vector of expected variabilities associated with the selected features. This matrix is user
specific and contains important information needed for the authentication phase. Accordingly,
UR is encrypted by means of a user password 6 PW and then stored as a part of user Bio-
Cryptography Template (BCT ). Then, the user parameters FI and V I are used to lock the
user cryptography key K by means of a single signature template Ts in a fuzzy vault FV .
In the authentication phase, the user password PW is used to decrypt the matrix UR. Then, the
vectors FI, V I and Δ are used to decode the FV by means of the user query signature sample
Q. Finally, the user cryptographic key K is finally restored.
4.4.1 Enrollment process
The enrollment sub-system uses the user templates {Ts}Ss=1, the password PW , and the cryp-
tography key K to generate a bio-cryptography template (BCT) that consists of the fuzzy vault
FV and the encrypted user representation matrix EUR. The user representation selection
module generates the UR matrix as described in the Section 4.3.
The FV Encoding module (illustrated in Figure 4.10) describes the following processing steps:
a. the virtual indexes V I = {vIi}ti=1 are quantized in l/2-bits and produces a vector XT =
{xTi }ti=1.
6In literature, a password is used to harden the FV system by encrypting the biometric features and the FV
(K.Nandakumar et al., 2007). While, in the proposed system, we use the password in a different way: it encrypts
the user representation model UR that is stored with the FV. In the authentication phase, a user has to apply the
correct password to restore his feature representation model. Then, he must apply a genuine signature sample
from which features are extracted based on UR, and they are used to produce the FV unlocking set.
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Figure 4.10 Block diagram of the proposed FV encoding process. The bold lines
highlight the modules where specific modifications apply to the standard encoding
process illustrated in Figure 2.1. A pre-selected user-specific feature model FI is used for
feature extraction and it is mapped to virtual indexes V I . FV locking points are generated
by concatenating the feature values to their indexes. Chaff points are generated in a way
that guarantee FV security even when the user feature model is compromised.
b. the user feature indexes FI = {fi}ti=1 are used to extract feature representation F T =
{fTi }ti=1 from the signature template Ts. This representation is then quantized in l/2-bits
and produces a vector Y T = {yTi }ti=1.
c. The features are encoded to produce the locking set A = {ai}ti=1, where A = XT ||Y T .
Hence, the locking elements are represented in a field GF (2l).
d. the cryptography key K of size KS where:
KS = l(k + 1)− bits (4.7)
is split into k+1 parts of l-bits each, that constitutes a coefficient vectorC = {c0, c1, c2, ...., ck}.
A polynomial p of degree k is encoded using C, where p(x) = ckxk + ck−1ck−1 + .....+
c1x+ c0.
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e. the polynomial is evaluated for all points in A = {ai}ti=1 and constitutes the set p(A) =
{p(ai)}ti=1 where p(ai) = ckaik + ck−1aik−1 + .....+ c1ai + c0.
x
y Ω
Ω
Figure 4.11 Illustration of the chaff generation process: two groups of chaff points are
generated. Chaffs of group 1 (G1) have same indexes like that of the genuine points.
Chaff and genuine points are equally spaced by a distance Ω. Chaffs of group 2 (G2) are
generated on different indexes. In case of compromising the genuine indexes, and filtering
G2 out, G1 still conceal the genuine points from attackers.
f. chaff (noise) points (Aˆ = {aˆii}rii=t+1, Pˆ = {pˆii)}rii=t+1) are generated, where aˆii ∈
GF (2l), aˆii = ai ∨ ii ∈ [t + 1, r], i ∈ [1, t], and pˆii ∈ GF (2l), pˆii = p(aˆii) ∨ ii ∈
[t + 1, r]. The proposed chaff generation method is illustrated in Figure 4.11. A chaff
point aˆii = xii||yii is composed of two parts: the index part xii and the value part yii. Two
groups of chaff points are generated. Chaffs ofG1 have their indexes equal to the indexes
of the genuine points. The chaff points and the genuine point that have the same index
part are all equally spaced by a distance Ω, eliminating the possibility to differentiate
between the chaffs and the genuine point. Chaffs of G2 have their index part differ than
that of the genuine points 7. As the number of chaffs in G1 is limited by the parameters
t and Ω, so to inject higher quantity of chaffs we define α as a chaff groups ratio, where:
7The user password protects the UR that stores his feature representation model. If the attacker compromised
the password, the indexes of the genuine points are known to him. In such case, chaffs of G2 are filtered out while
G1 could not be filtered without applying good features that are extracted from a genuine signature image. So,
G1 secures the genuine points even if the user password is compromised.
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α = g2/g1 (4.8)
where g1 and g2 are the amount of chaff features belong to G1 and G2, respectively. G2
chaffs are generated with αt indexes different than the t genuine indexes 8. Hence, the
FV size r is given by:
r = t(α + 1)/Ω (4.9)
So, the total number of chaffs z is given by:
z = t(α + 1− Ω)/Ω (4.10)
g. the genuine set (A, p(A)), and the chaff set (Aˆ, Pˆ ) are merged to constitute the fuzzy
vault FV = (A˜, P˜ ), where A˜ = A
⋃
Aˆ, A = {ai}ti=1, Aˆ = {aˆi}ri=t+1 and P˜ =
p(A)
⋃
Pˆ , p(A) = {p(ai)}ti=1, Pˆ = {pˆi}ri=t+1.
4.4.2 Authentication process
The authentication sub-system uses the user query sample Q and the password PW , to decode
the fuzzy vault FV and restore the user cryptography keyK. First the password PW is used to
decrypt the UR matrix. Then the vectors FI, V I , and Δ are used to decode the FV by means
of the query sample Q.
The FV decoding module (illustrated in Figure 4.12) describes the following processing steps:
a. the virtual indexes V I = {vIi}ti=1 are quantized in l/2-bits and produces a vector XQ =
{xQi }ti=1.
8The total number of indexes that should be mapped in V I is (α+1)t indexes. As these indexes are represented
in l/2-bits, so (α+ 1)t < 2l/2, i.e., α < ((2l/2)/t)− 1. E.g., for l = 16-bits, t = 20, α ≤ 11.
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Figure 4.12 Proposed FV Decoding. The bold lines highlight the modules where
specific modifications apply to the standard decoding process illustrated in Figure 4.2. A
pre-selected user-specific feature model FI is used for feature extraction and it is mapped
to virtual indexes V I . FV unlocking points are generated by concatenating the feature
values to their indexes. Chaff points are filtered by matching FV points with the
unlocking points based on expected feature variability Δ. Finally, the matching set (A¯, P¯ )
is used to reconstruct the polynomial p′ and its coefficients constitute the crypto-key K ′ .
b. the user feature indexes FI = {fi}ti=1 are used to extract feature representation FQ =
{fQi }ti=1 from the query sample Q. This representation is then quantized in l/2-bits and
produces a vector Y Q = {yQi }ti=1.
c. The features are encoded to produce the unlocking setB = {bi}ti=1, whereB = XQ||Y Q.
Hence, the unlocking elements are represented in a field GF (2l).
d. the unlocking set B is used to filter the chaff points from the FV. An adaptive matching
window (AMW) method is applied to match unlocking and locking points. Items of
B are matched against all items in A˜. This process results in a matching set (A¯, P¯ ) =
((B
⋂
A˜), p ← (B⋂ A˜)), where p ← (B⋂ A˜) represents the projection of the matching
features on the polynomial space. The proposed chaff filtering with adaptive matching
window (AMW) method is illustrated in Figure 4.13. If the feature indexes are correct 9
, then all elements of XQ will have corresponding elements in XT . So, all of chaffs of
9That occurs if the applied password is genuine, so the UR is decrypted properly and the right indexes are
restored.
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G2 will be filtered out (see the left figure). Then, each of the remaining FV points will be
compared to corresponding points extracted from the query sample. The AMW method
is applied: for every feature i, a matching window wi is adapted to the feature modeled
variability δi, where wi = 2δi. A FV point ai is considered matching with an unlocking
point bi, if they reside in the same matching window. I.e., |ai − bi| ≤ wi. 10
XQ Y
Q
1
2
3
wi = 2δi
x x
yy
Figure 4.13 Proposed Chaff Filtering with AMW: in the left side, the XQ part of
unlocking set B filters G2 chaffs. G2 is filtered only when applying correct feature
indexes. In the right side, chaffs of G1 are filtered by matching the remaining FV points
with the unlocking points extracted from the query sample. Only the Y Q part of B is
needed at this step. For each index i, an adaptive matching window wi = 2δi is applied.
For instance, point 1 is not isolated as the point that extracted from the query sample
(shown in red color) resides out of the matching window attached to the genuine FV
point. On the other hand, the genuine FV point and the query point have exact values for
point 2 and they reside in the same matching window for point 3.
e. the matching set (A¯, P¯ ) is used to reconstruct a polynomial p′ of degree k by applying
the R-S decoding algorithm (Berlekamp and Elwyn, 1968).
f. the coefficients of p′ are assembled to constitute the secret cryptography key K ′.
10As ai = xTi ||yTi , bi = xQi ||yQi and xTi = xQi , then the above matching condition implies that |yTi −yQi | ≤ wi.
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4.4.3 Security analysis
The security of the proposed FV system is analyzed in terms of the brute-force attack. Assume
an attacker could compromise the FV without possessing neither valid password nor genuine
signature sample. In this case, the attacker tries to separate enough number of genuine points
(k + 1) from the chaff points.
To this end, the r points of the FV are searched for a correct k+1 points needed to reconstruct
the polynomial P and retrieve the secret key K. According to the proposed FV encoding
scheme, not all of the FV points must be searched, as among the (α + 1)t feature indexes
used to generate FV genuine and chaff points, only t of them are genuine indexes. Therefore,
attacker must first locate the genuine indexes and then search the points with these indexes.
However, locating only k + 1 genuine indexes is enough to filter the k + 1 points needed for
polynomial reconstruction. The number of FV points with the same index is 1/Ω 11 . Along
them there is only one genuine point and the other points are chaffs. Hence, the overall security
(brute-force search space for an attacker) is given by:
security ∼=
(
(α + 1)t
k + 1
)
(1/Ω)k+1. (4.11)
• Example: consider a FV of encoding size (t = 20), a polynomial degree k = 7 (for
encoding a secret key K of length of 128-bits), a chaff separation parameters Ω = 0.2,
and chaff groups ratio α = 1. So, the search space is∼= ( 2tk+1)(1/Ω)k+1 = (408 )×58 ∼= 245.
So, the entropy of a FV system with such parameters is equivalent to 45 bits.
An attacker may decide to guess the password and use it to decryptEUR (to locate the genuine
indexes and filter G2). Then, he searches the remaining points to filter G1 and isolate the
matching set (A¯, B¯). In such case, the search space is narrowed to 58 ∼= 218. However, an eight
11The parameter Ω should be properly selected so that 1/Ω is an integer
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character password has entropy of 18-30 bits (Burr et al., 2006). So, the overall system entropy
is about 36-48 bits. Accordingly, in all cases, the proposed bio-cryptographic system provides
higher security against brute-force attackes than that of the password-protected cryptography
systems.
According to Eq. 4.11, entropy of the system can be increased through using different values
of the parameters: t, α, Ω, and k. While, according to Eq. 4.9 there is a trade-off between
FV security and its size. Also, there is trade-off between system security and its recognition
accuracy (according to the experiments presented in the following section).
4.5 Experimental results
Feasibility of the proposed system is investigated through adopting two sets of experiments.
The first set aims to investigate the ability of the proposed feature representation approach to
produce a high quality feature representation. To this end, the impact of each step of feature
representation extraction process (as illustrated in section 4.3.) is investigated. In the second
set of experiments, the FV recognition performance is investigated. FVs are encoded and de-
coded (as illustrated in section 4.4) using the extracted feature representation, and then the FV
recognition rates are computed. As there is no FV based on offline signature images found in
the litarature, so we compare our system to the state of the art classical offline signature veri-
fication systems SV 12 . As our systems relies on two authentication measures (user password
and the signature image), and in order to be fair when comparing the system performance to
other systems in the literature, we assume in all the experiments (unless the reverse is clearly
stated) that the password is compromised by the attacker. In such case, the system performance
depends only on the signature query sample (Rathgeb and Uhl, 2010).
12The BFS technique proposed in this chapter extends the methodologies used to design the WI-SV system
(Rivard et al., 2013) and the WD-SV system (Eskander et al., 2012). Therefore, we considered these systems as
baseline to our system.
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4.5.1 Experimental methodology
4.5.1.1 Database
The Brazilian database (Freitas et al., 2000) is used for proof-of-concept simulations. It con-
tains 7,920 samples of signatures that were digitized as 8-bit grayscale images over 400X1000
pixels at resolution of 300 dpi. This DB contains three types of signature forgery: random,
simple and simulated. For random forgery, the forger does not know neither the signers´ name
nor the signature morphology. It can also happen when a genuine signature presented to the
system is mislabeled to another user. For simple forgery, the forger knows the writers´ name but
not the signature morphology. He can only produce a simple forgery using a style of writing
of his liking. For the simulated forgery, the forger has access to a sample of the signature. He
can therefore imitate the genuine signature.
The signatures were provided by 168 writers and are organized as follows: the first 60 writers
have 40 genuine signatures, 10 simple forgeries and 10 simulated forgeries per writer, and the
other 108 have only 40 genuine signatures per writer. The experimental database is split into
two sets: the population-based dataset (P ) composed of the last 108 writers. The user-based
dataset (U ) composed of the first 60 writers. Set P is used for the population-based feature
selection process. Set U is split into two subsets: the reference subset (R) contains the first
30 genuine signatures, and the questioned subset (Q) contains the rest 10 genuine samples, 10
simple and 10 simulated forgeries. The subset R is used for the user-based feature selection
process and both subsets of U are used for evaluating the system performance.
4.5.1.2 Feature extraction
Many different techniques are available to extract features in offline signature images (Impe-
dovo and Pirlo, 2008). Any combination of these features may be concatenated into a single
high-dimensional representation, and used for the proposed framework. However, we focused
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on using feature extracted using extended-shadow-code (ESC) (Sabourin and Genest, 1994),
and directional probability density function (DPDF) (Drouhard et al., 1996). Features are ex-
tracted based on different grid scales, hence a range of details are detected in the signature
image. These features have shown complementary functionality: while ESC detects the spa-
tial information, the DPDF detects the directional information from signature images (Rivard
et al., 2013). A set of 30 grid scales is used for each feature type, producing 60 different
single scale feature representations. These representations are then fused to produce a feature
representation of huge dimensionality (M = 30, 201) (Rivard et al., 2013).
4.5.1.3 Feature selection
The two-step process for selection of feature representation is implemented as illustrated in
section 4.3. First, population-based dataset (P ) is used for the population-based feature selec-
tion phase. We followed the same experimental settings as in the baseline system in (Rivard
et al., 2013). This phase produced a universal (PR) representation of dimensionality L = 555.
Second, the user-based dataset (U ) is used for the user-based feature selection phase. For each
user in U , the signatures in the reference subset R are used to represent the genuine class and
some signatures from the population-based data set P are used to represent the forgery class.
Then, signatures of both classes are represented in the PR space of L dimensionality. Finally,
the user-based feature selection step runs for t boosting iterations to learn the most user-specific
discriminant features FI , along with their expected variability Δ.
4.5.1.4 FV parameter values
Unless different values are explicitly stated, the FV parameters are set according to Table 4.1.
Size of the cryptographic keyKS and chaff separation distance Ω have direct impact on the FV
security and its memory requirements (see Equations 4.11 and 4.9, respectively). We changed
the values of these parameters through some experiments, to test their impact on the system
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Table 4.1 FV parameter values
Parameter Default Value
Size of the cryptographic key, KS 128-bits
Chaff separation distance, Ω 0.2
No. of genuine points in the FV, t 20
Chaff group ratio, α 1
Quantization size of the FV points, l 16-bits
Decision threshold, DΘ 14
Degree of the encoding polynomial, k 7
No. of FV points, r 200
No. of chaff points in the FV, z 180
accuracy. In practical applications, values of these parameters are determined to compromise
between accuracy, security and memory complexity. The user-based BFS process showed
saturation with 100 boosting iterations. However, we found that, generally, the first twenty
features are the most discriminant features. Accordingly, the number of genuine FV points
t is set to 20. Also, the chaff group ratio α had no impact on the performance. For a good
compromise between security and complexity, we set α = 1. Finally, the quantization size of
the FV points l is set to 16-bits, so that all operations are done in a Galois field (GF (216). This
field enables encoding of strong cryptographic keys, e.g., 128-bit keys. The parameters DΘ,
k, r and z are not set directly, but they are computed according to Equations 4.2, 4.7, 4.9 and
4.10, respectively.
4.5.1.5 Performance measures
To investigate the quality of feature representation, similarity scores are computed 13 , and used
to generate a ROC curve for each user in the dataset U . A ROC curve plots the False Accept
Rate (FAR) against the Genuine Accept Rate (GAR) for all possible matching thresholds (all
13The power of the proposed technique for feature representation relies on two concepts: the first is the se-
lection of a concise user-specific representation through a two-step BFS process, and the second is to learn the
representation variability and use it for matching FV points adaptively. To investigate the impact of each of these
concepts separately, we compute the similarity scores SSQ twice: first according to Eq.4.1 to investigate the first
concept, and second according to Eq.4.4 to investigate the second concept.
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generated scores). FAR for a specific threshold is the ratio of forgery query samples that have
a number of matching encoded features exceeds this threshold. GAR is the ratio of genuine
query samples that have a number of matching features greater than the threshold.
In order to have a global assessment on the quality of feature representation over all users in
U , we compute and average the area under the ROC curve (AUC) for all users. High AUC in-
dicates more separation between the similarity score distributions of the genuine and forgeries
classes.
To assess the FV recognition performance, the average error rate (AERall) is computed, where
AERall = (FRR + FARrandom + FARsimple + FARsimulated)/4 (4.12)
False Reject Rate (FRR) is the ratio of genuine queries that failed to decode the FV,FARrandom,
FARsimple and FARsimulated are the ratio of random, simple, and simulated forgeries respec-
tively that succeed to compromise the system and decode the FV.
In literature, recognition performance of bio-cryptographic systems are mostly tested using
forgery samples that are belonging to other users. This case is equivalent to testing our system
against random forgeries only. Accordingly, for having a fair comparison with other systems,
we also test the resistance of the system against each type of forgeries separately. To this end,
the following performance measures are also reported:
AERrandom = (FRR + FARrandom)/2 (4.13)
AERsimple = (FRR + FARsimple)/2 (4.14)
AERsimulated = (FRR + FARsimulated)/2 (4.15)
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4.5.2 Results on quality of feature representation
The user-based dataset U is used to evaluate the approach proposed in Section 4.3 for feature
representation selection. To this end, for each user, the 30 signatures in the reference set
R are matched with the 40 signatures in the query set Q. This experiment results in 1200
matchings per user, of them 300 with genuine samples, and 900 with forgery samples (300
random, 300 simple, and 300 simulated forgeries). The t user-based features are extracted
from each sample and used for producing FV encoded features. For encoding, both the feature
index and the feature values are quantized in l/2-bits and then concatenated to produce a l-
bit encoded feature. The encoded features produced from the reference signatures constitutes
a FV locking set and concealed with chaff points. The encoded features produced from the
query signatures constitutes the FV unlocking set. Matching the points of both the reference
and query samples produces a similarity score (ranging from 0 to t). Point matching is either
done based on Eq.4.1 or based on Eq.4.4. In the later case, a matching window is adapted to
the modeled feature variability (mwi = 2δi), where two points are considered similar if they
reside in the corresponding matching window.
To clarify the aforementioned experimentation, we investigate the result of such matching for
the first user in the dataset U . Table 4.2 shows a template signature of this user along with a
genuine and a simulated forgery query samples. Figure 4.14 shows the matching process in
the feature encoding space. In this illustrative example, the feasibility of using the proposed
feature representation technique is clear. The feature representation is discriminant as while
the simulated forgery queryQ2 resembles the genuine sampleQ1, their similarity scores differs
much. For instance, SSQ1 = 18 and SS
Q
2 = 7. For this example, setting the FV parameters
so that DΘ ∈ [8, 18] results in acceptance of the genuine sample and rejection of the forgery
sample. Also, the impact of applying the AMW approach is clear. For the genuine query Q1,
the number of features that have exact values for both the template and query images is 11
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features (i.e., when employing Eq. 4.1). While, this value is increased to 18 features when
employing the AMW approach (i.e., when employing Eq. 4.4).
Table 4.2 Signature samples of the first user in dataset U
Template T Genuine Query Q1 Simulated Forgery Query Q2
x
y
Figure 4.14 Illustration of chaff filtering in feature encoding space for the first user in
the dataset U : out of the t = 20 encoded FV points, only 11 from the genuine unlocking
points have exact value as their corresponding locking points (according to Eq.4.1,
SSQ1 = 11). Applying the AMW method increased the similarity score (according to
Eq.4.4, SSQ1 = 18). For the simulated forgery sample, SS
Q
2 = 7.
The aforementioned example is a result of only two matchings (one with a genuine sample
and another with a simulated forgery sample). However, the employed experimental protocol
consists in 1200 matchings per user. In order to have a global assessment for all matchings for
this specific user, the similarity score distribution is computed for all the matchings. Also, to
investigate the impact of applying each step of the feature representation extraction process,
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four scenarios of feature representation are implemented to generate and match the FV locking
and unlocking points. In the scenarios, different feature vectors are encoded in a field GF (2l)
as follows:
a. random features: t features are randomly selected from the D features of the multi-
feature representation M .
b. population-based features: the most discriminant t features of PR representation (of
dimension L) are used.
c. user-based features: the t features embedded in the user-specific feature indexes vector
UR are used. For this and the above scenarios, Eq.4.1 is applied to compute the similarity
scores.
d. user-based features with adaptive matching window: the feature vector is the same as of
the above scenario, while the AMW is employed when computing the similarity scores
(i.e., Eq. 4.4 is applied).
Figure 4.15 shows the similarity score distribution for all of scenarios. It is clear that, for
this user, each step of the proposed approach for feature selection enhanced the quality of the
feature representation. Accordingly, using the extracted feature representation for FV locking
and unlocking is expected to produce high recognition rates. However, the actual recognition
rate depends on the selected score threshold that split the genuine and forgery classes. For
instance, in the last scenario of Fig 4.15, setting the FV decoding threshold DΘ = 14 results
in FRR = 0 with small FAR. On the other hand, when DΘ = 15 the FAR = 0 with small
FRR.
In order to investigate the expected recognition rates for the different thresholds, the similarity
scores are used to generate ROC curves. Figure 4.16 shows the ROC curve for the first user in
the dataset U .
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Dθ = 14 Dθ = 15 Dθ = 16
DΘ = 11
(SSQ)
Figure 4.15 Similarity score distribution for the first user in dataset U : feasibility of the
proposed BFS is clear. Each step of the proposed technique increases the separation
between the similarity distributions of the genuine and forgery classes. Applying the
AMW method, even it did not impact the class separation for this specific user, it
increased the range of similarity scores. Increasing this range made it possible to select
feasible decoding thresholds. For instance, without adapting the matching window, a
good compromise between FRR and FAR is to set DΘ = 11 (see the 3rd scenario). In
this case, k = 1, and KS = 32-bits, which is not feasible (see Eq.4.2 and Eq.4.7,
respectively). On the other hand, when AMW is employed, a good threshold setting is
DΘ = 14 (see the 4th scenario). In this case, k = 7 and KS = 128-bits, which is a
feasible setting.
Table 4.3 Average AUC over the 60 users in the dataset U for the different design
scenarios
Design Without Population-based User-based User-based
Aspect Feature Feature Feature Feature selection
Selection Selection Selection with AMW
Average AUC 0.6577 0.7724 0.9328 0.9700
The above analysis is shown only for the first user in the experimental dataset U . However, the
impact of each step of the proposed feature selection approach differs for the different users.
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DΘ= 16
DΘ= 15 DΘ= 14
AUC  0.60
AUC  0.87
AUC  0.99
Figure 4.16 ROC Curve for the first user in the dataset U : each of the BFS steps
increased the AUC. For the classical classifiers, the operating point could be set directly
by setting the classifier threshold. However, for the FV systems, the operating point are
equivalent the decoding threshold DΘ. Considering a FV with parameters as shown in
Table 4.1, the three operating points showed in Figure 4.15 and in Figure 4.16
(DΘ = 14, 15, 16) are realized by employing encoding polynomials with degree k = 7, 9
and 11, respectively (see Eq.4.2).
Figure 4.17 AUC for the 60 Users in the dataset U : impact of each step of the proposed
BFS technique differs for the different users. While, generally, the representation quality
is enhanced with each step.
In order to have a global quantitative assessment, we compute the area under the ROC curve
(AUC) for all users and for all scenarios. High AUC indicates more separation between the
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Figure 4.18 Trade-off between FV security and recognition measures.
similarity score distributions of the genuine and forgeries classes. Table 4.3 shows the average
AUC for all users for the different design aspects. Figure 4.17 shows the AUC values for all
users for the different design scenarios. It is obvious that, generally, each step in the proposed
approach enhances the representation quality. However, the impact of each step depends on
the nature of the template and the forgery signatures. Generally, the produced feature repre-
sentation is discriminant, as for 54 out of 60 investigated users, the AUC > 95. Only two
users have AUC < 90: user 23 with AUC  85 and user 25 with AUC  75. Future work
will investigate the performance for the different individuals based on the Biometric Menagerie
concept (Yager and Dunstone, 2010), and user-specific design issues maybe proposed to guar-
antee acceptable performance for any user.
Table 4.4 FV performance for different key sizes
KS 128-bits 160-bits 192-bits
k 7 9 11
DΘ 14 15 16
FRR 11.53 14.05 20.68
FARrandom 2.05 1.5 0.93
FARsimple 2.39 1.93 1.41
FARsimulated 24.38 20.07 15.14
AERall 10.08 9.38 9.54
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Table 4.5 Impact of chaff quantity on the FV performance
Chaff separation (Ω) Without chaff 0.2 0.10 0.05 0.025
No. of FV points (r) 20 200 400 800 1600
No. of chaff points (z) 0 180 380 780 1580
Security 0-bits 45-bits 52-bits 60-bits 68-bits
FRR 5.25 11.53 28.94 55.53 75.81
FARrandom 2.74 2.05 1.06 0.58 0.31
FARsimple 3.49 2.39 1.58 0.88 0.49
FARsimulated 33.14 24.38 15.63 8.15 3.42
AERall 11.15 10.08 11.80 16.28 20.00
AERrandom 3.99 6.79 15 28.05 38.06
AERsimple 4.37 6.96 15.26 28.20 38.15
AERsimulated 19.19 17.95 22.28 31.84 39.61
Figure 4.19 Trade-off between FV security and average recognition error rates.
4.5.3 Results on performance of the FV system
In the following experiments, the performance of the FV system proposed in Section 4.4 is
investigated. To this end, FV systems are encoded using the extracted UR feature represen-
tations. The FV parameters was set according to Tabel 4.1, however, some parameters are
changed through the experiments to test their impact on the system security and recognition
performance.
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To test the impact of the crypto-key size (KS) on the FV recognition performance, we encode
FVs with keys of different sizes as shown in Table 4.4. The parametersDΘ and k are computed
according to Eq.4.2 and Eq.4.7, respectively. Changing the key sizeKS have shown a trade-off
between the genuine recognition and the false acceptance rates. While, encoding larger (more
secure) cryptographic keys decreases the FAR, it increases the FRR.
To test the impact of quantity of chaff points on the FV recognition performance, we investigate
different values of the chaff separation parameter Ω as shown in Table 4.5. The FV size r,
the chaff size z and system security are computed according to Eq.4.9, Eq.4.10 and Eq.4.11,
respectively. It is obvious that the chaff quantity, and hence, the FV size increases when smaller
values of the parameter Ω are used. While, there is a trade-off between the system security and
its recognition performance.
Figures 4.18, 4.19 illustrate the impact of the quantity of chaffs on both the security and the
recognition quality. As shown in Figure 4.18, injecting more chaffs increases the FV security
and its resistance to the false acceptance, while the genuine acceptance rate is degraded. It is
important to note that impact of chaff quantity differ for the different type of forgeries. While
the FAR for both random and simple forgeries is not much decreased, the system resistance to
incorrectly accept simulates forgeries is much decreased. Figure 4.19 shows that the Average
Error Rates (AER), that are computed according to Eq.4.12- Eq.4.15, are increasing with
increasing chaff quantity. So, there is a trade-off between system security and its recognition
performance. Also, It is obvious that the performance is better when only the random forgeries
are considered (AERrandom  6.8% with 45-bits security).
Through all of the above experiments, we assumed that the user password is compromised.
However, to report the actual performance of the system we have to consider the case when an
attacker neither possesses a correct password nor a genuine signature sample. In this case, he
can not decrypt the UR model and hence he randomly guess the feature indexes XQ. Table 4.6
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Table 4.6 Impact of using a user password as a second authentication measure
Measure Compromised Password Secured Password
FRR 11.53 11.53
FARrandom 2.05 0
FARsimple 2.39 0
FARsimulated 24.28 0
AERall 10.08 2.88
shows the recognition performance in such case. No impostor query was incorrectly accepted
and the overall AER is significantly decreased (the recognition accuracy is about 97% ).
As there is no FV based on offline signature images found in the literature, so we compare
our system to the state of the art classical offline signature verification systems SV. Tabel 4.7
compares the performance of the proposed FV system with the baseline WI-SV (Rivard et al.,
2013) and WD-SV (Eskander et al., 2012) systems. The majority vote concept is tested to fuse
decisions of multiple FVs (each FV encoded by features extracted from a single sample). En-
sembles of 1,3,5,7,9,11,13 and 15 FVs are tried. It is shown that using multiple FVs enhanced
the performance.
To be fair when comparing the proposed two-factor authentication system, that uses a signature
and a password, with the classical SV systems, we assume here that the password is compro-
mised by the attacker. In this case, the proposed FV has shown less recognition performance
than both of the classical SV systems. However, if the password is secure, the proposed FV
system outperforms the other systems, as the AERall = 2.88. Moreover, the FV system is the
only system that can be employed to enforce authenticity of the cryptography schemes like en-
cryption and digital signatures. Also, the classification label of both of the classical SV system
can be bypassed (Uludag, 2006), however, it is trusted with the FV system as it results from a
protected decoding process. The confidentiality of the signature templates is not achieved with
the WI-SV systems, while it is perfectly achieved with the WD-SV as no signature references
are needed for the classification decision. The template security of the FV system depends on
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Table 4.8 Comparison of the baseline SV Systems and the proposed FV system
System Recognition Cryptography Template Trusted Computational
rate applicability security label complexity
WI-SV high no no no medium
(Rivard et al., 2013)
WD-SV high no yes no low
(Rivard et al., 2013)
Proposed FV medium yes yes yes high
the amount of chaff points. Concerning the computational complexity (for the authentication
mode), the WD-SV is the most light system as it relies on concise feature representation and a
single classification step. On the other hand, the WI-SV system used large amount of features
and fused multiple classification labels for enhanced recognition performance. The FV system,
although uses a concise feature representation, sufficient amount of chaff points must be added
for its security. Also, the FV system employs polynomial decoders that significantly increase
its computational complexity. Table 4.8 summarizes the aforementioned comparison between
the proposed FV and the baseline systems.
4.5.4 Computational complexity
The proposed system consists of two processes: 1) enrollment, and 2) authentication (see Fig-
ure 4.9). For the complexity of the enrollment process, the user-representation selection mod-
ule, and more specifically, the two-step BFS (see Figure 4.8), is the most time consuming
module. According to Rivard et al. (Rivard et al., 2013), the time complexity of the BFS
algorithm is O(DST ), where D is the dimensionality of the initially extracted multi-feature
representation, S is the number of training samples, and T is the number of boosting itera-
tions. This analysis indicates high computational growth rate for high dimensional problems,
like that for the population-based BFS step. However, the computational growth rate is much
slower for the user-based BFS, where dimensionality of the representation is significantly re-
duced through the first step. Moreover, smaller number of user-specific training samples and
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less boosting iterations are required for producing a concise user-specific representation that
encodes the FV.
On a Linux based server of 24 GB memory size and 8 cores CPU of speed 2.27GHz, the
computational times for the different subprocesses are as follows: the population-based BFS
takes about 2 days, however, this step is done only once for the whole system. To enroll a
new user to the system, the following subprocesses are executed: multi-feature extraction (14
s /image), user-based BFS (120 s /user), and FV encoding (1 s/ FV). So, for a relatively large
number of training images, e.g., 30 images/user, a user enrollment toke about 541 s (9 min).
Accordingly, the enrollment phase of the proposed method is relatively complex due to the
employed representation selection process. The authentication process implies a much less
computational complexity. On the same processing environment, the total authentication time
is about 14.25 s (14 s for feature extraction + 0.25 sec for FV decoding). This is comparable
with state-of-the-art systems. For instance, a Fingerprint FV proposed by Nandakumar et al.
(Nandakumar et al., 2007), with decoding time of about (8 s).
4.6 Conclusions and future work
In this chapter a FV system based on offline signature images is proposed. A new two-step
boosting feature selection method is proposed, and used to select good features while learning
their variations for each specific user. It is shown that selecting features based on simulated
signatures could represent the actual system users. While, running another user-specific feature
selection process enhanced the quality of feature representation. Also, adapting the features
matching window based on their expected variations results in better FV performance. A user
password is used as a second authentication measure to enhance FV system accuracy. To
enhance the FV recognition performance, a simple ensemble of FVs is produced by applying
the majority vote decision fusion concept.
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The proposed FV implementation can be applied to alleviate the key management problem
within cryptographic schemes like encryption and digital signature. Moreover, it can be em-
ployed as a secure signature verification (SV) scheme. In this case, it provides template protec-
tion, as the signature templates are stored in an encrypted form within the FV template. Also,
this SV scheme produces trusted classification decisions, as the cryptographic key is decoded
through a protected mechanism. With the default system parameters (see Table 4.1), brute-
force attempts to extract either the signature template or the cryptographic key from the FV
require up to 245 trials. Moreover, the proposed scheme facilitates signature revocability, as
if the user signature is compromised, different set of features can be extracted from the same
signature and produce a new FV template.
Future work shall investigate enhancing different modules of the proposed system. At the
feature extraction level, fusion of more different types of features may enhance the feature
representation. For the feature selection module, it might be useful to represent knowledge
about the simulated forgeries by using such samples in the population-based and/or user-based
feature selection phases. For the FV Encoding/Decoding module, some of the FV parameters
may be adapted for each user, and the chaff points may be generated adaptively based on the
expected feature variations. More advanced ensemble methods may be applied to fuse outputs
of single FVs in either score or decision levels. This also motivates designing parallel pro-
cessing based FV decoders to reduce the decoding complexity. Although applied on offline
signatures, the proposed system is generic so can be investigated on other biometrics. Appli-
cation to multi-modal can also be investigated on either feature, score and decision levels of
fusion.
4.7 Discussion
The proposed FV implementation based on the offline signature images demonstrated reliable
performance. However, a trade-off between FV accuracy and security has been shown. Embed-
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ding of high number of chaffs increases its entropy against brute-force attack, while it impacts
the recognition accuracy as chaffs interfere with genuine encoding points. In Appendix II, an
adaptive chaff generation method is proposed, where the feature variability modeled in the DR
space controls the chaff generation process. This way, higher chaff embedding does not im-
pact much the accuracy. The proposed implementation can be employed to design handwritten
signature based encryption and digital signature schemes. In Appendix III, a realization of dig-
ital signatures with offline handwritten signatures is proposed. Through this method, integrity
of documents can be achieved, while users continually employing the traditional handwritten
signatures.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
In this Thesis methods to design offline signature verification (OLSV) and bio-cryptography
systems based on the offline signature images are investigated. The main objective of the re-
search conducted was to develop systems that enable automating paper-based processes, while
migrating to electronic systems is transparent to users. For instance, a user does not need
to carry a smart card to authenticate his transactions, to access his confidential information,
or to sign his transactions digitally. A user, instead, continues to sign the traditional docu-
ments by hand and to use the existing paper-based forms, that are scanned and integrated in the
electronic systems. The offline signature images are authenticated through employing OLSV
systems, and also it could be used to enforce confidentiality and integrity through employing
the offline signature-based bio-cryptographic technique.
Limitations of the feature representation (FR) design approaches are alleviating by employing
the dissimilarity representation (DR) approach, where dissimilarities among signature images
constitute the classification space. We proposed a FR-based DR approach, where the DR is
built on top of a traditional FR. An optimization approach is proposed that produces a concise
and discriminant DR from huge number of feature extractions and prototypes. The OLSV
classifiers and the bio-cryptographic FV scheme are formulated as a thresholding classifiers
in the optimized DR space. Complete implementations of these systems are presented, and
simulation results have demonstrated their viability. Validating the proposed DR approach on
the offline signature biometrics motivates future investigations of similar techniques for other
biometric and pattern recognition problems.
In the first contribution (Chapter II) class-independent DRs are produced by running a boosting
feature selection (BFS) algorithm in a DR space, which we called feature-dissimilarity (FD)
space where distances between individual features are the space constituents. This FD space
is tuned to specific classes using their training data producing sparser and more discriminant
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class-specific FD space. For selecting efficient prototypes for each class, the produced FD
space is translated to another DR space which we call dissimilarity (D) space, where distances
of a signature representation to the different prototypes are the space constituents. In this
space, BFS algorithm is employed to locate the best class specific prototypes. The proposed
approach can be employed to develop simple classifiers in the DR space as it results in DRs that
are concise, in terms of number of employed feature extractions and prototypes. In addition,
designing the DR space through a universal BFS step that is followed by a class-specific BFS
step, provides a way to adapt universal classifiers to specific classes. Moreover, the proposed
approach can be employed as a feature selection and/or distance function designing tool, where
the final classifiers are designed based on the resulting FR space and/or the distance functions.
We employed this approach to design classical and bio-cryptographic systems for signature
verification through formulating these problems as thresholding classifiers in the resulting DR
space. This led to the next two contributions.
The second contribution (Chapter III) focused on the OLSV design problem, where a solu-
tion to compromise between pure writer-dependent (WD) and writer-independent (WI) OLSV
systems is proposed. The class-independent optimization phase is employed to design WI-
SV classifiers, and they are adapted to specific writers through employing a modified version
of the class-specific optimization phase. This modification provides designing the final WD
classifiers in a reduced FR space, where training is more tractable. Accordingly, no signature
templates are stored for verification for enhanced security. It was demonstrated that running
the class-specific design phase in the universal FR space produces more accurate representa-
tions. This hybrid WI-WD OLSV system enables starting system operation with few signature
templates. Switching to a more secure, less complex, and more accurate WD operational mode
is possible whenever enough samples are collected for a specific user.
The third contribution (chapter IV) focused on implementing the Fuzzy Vault (FV) scheme
based on the offline signature images. The proposed DR optimization approach is employed to
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select discriminant features from the signature images that lock/unlock the cryptographic keys
within the FVs. Variations of the encoding features are learned in the DR space, and adapt the
matching windows during the decoding phase for better recognition accuracy. A simple en-
semble of FVs is produced by applying the majority vote decision fusion concept and provided
enhanced accuracy. It is important to point out that the proposed FV implementation can be
employed as a secure OLSV scheme, besides being used to operate encryption and digital sig-
natures methods based on the handwritten signatures. In the first case, the FV implementation
provides template protection, trusted classification decisions, and signature recoverability.
Future research directions:
The following directions are proposed for future research:
The proposed optimization approach might be applied on other applications (e.g., face recog-
nition, video surveillance, image retrieval, etc). Also, efficiency of the produced DRs should
be compared to other distance function learning methods.
In this Thesis class-specific samples are assumed to be collected offline and then they are used
for the class-specific optimization phase. Online adaptation of the universal representation
might be more practical and facilitates development of adaptive systems. This needs producing
an online variant of the BFS algorithm.
Different modules of the DR optimization approach might be enhanced. At the feature extrac-
tion level, fusion of more different types of features may enhance the feature representation.
For feature selection, feature selection methods other than the BFS algorithm can be investi-
gated.
Adaptation of the class-specific learning phase to the different classes, e.g., applying class-
specific signal normalization, training size, etc., might produce more accurate representations.
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For instance, for the OLSV application, signature images of the exploitation (class-specific)
dataset might need size normalization to match the development dataset signature images.
Concerning the application of the DR optimization approach to the offline signatures, the class-
independent learning phase can incorporate simulated forgery samples for training, as these
samples might be available in the development database. This way, the resulting universal
representation might involve features with higher ability in discriminating simulated forgeries
from genuine signatures. In addition, fusion of WI and WD SV modes might enhance the
performance during the initial operational period of the OLSV hybrid system.
For the FV implementation, some of the FV parameters may be adapted for each user. For
instance, user-specific thresholds can be learned in the DR space, and used to adapt the crypto-
graphic key size. More advanced ensemble methods may be applied to fuse outputs of single
FVs in either score or decision levels. Although applied for the offfline signatures, the proposed
system is generic so can be investigated for other biometrics. Application to multi-modal can
also be investigated with either feature, score and decision levels of fusion.
ANNEX I
SCENARIOS FOR DISSIMILARITY REPRESENTATION-BASED HANDWRITTEN
SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
In this appendix, we explore different scenarios for employing the DR approach for replacing
and/or enhancing the standard SV systems. A general framework for designing FR/DR based
systems is proposed, that might guide the signature processing research direction to new areas.
We argue that the DR approach can be applied in different scenarios, in order to design more
robust classifiers. It can enable the design of a new family of classification systems, such as
global and hybrid global/user-specific classifiers. Also, the DR approach can be employed,
as an intermediate design tool, for enhanced performance of standard feature-based systems.
Content of this appendix was published in the International workshop on Automated Forensic
Handwriting Analysis (Eskander et al., 2013a).
In Chapter 2, a FR-based DR scheme is introduced, where the DR is build on top of a feature
representation (see Figure 2.1). This DR is optimized through applying a two-step learning
phases in the dissimilarity space (see Figure 2.2). In this appendix we generalize the DR op-
timization approach so different tasks for feature selection, prototype selection, and classifiers
design, can be done in different spaces, whenever translation between spaces is possible. This
strategy permits applying a massive number of pattern recognition techniques, with multiple
combinations of space transitions. We propose that new techniques for pattern recognition
might be developed based on this strategy. In this context, the DR approach is employed either
as a tool for enhancing the standard FR-based systems (for feature/prototype selection), or to
design reliable dissimilarity-based classification systems (when classifiers are designed in a
DR space).
Figure I-1 illustrates a general framework for designing classification systems based on the
DR approach. The standard approach is to extract feature representations from the training
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samples, and design classifiers in the feature space (path A in the Figure). However, the DR
approach can be employed in different scenarios for either build new family of classifiers in
DR-based spaces, or to enhance the performance of standard feature-based classifiers. More
specifically, dissimilarities can be computed on top of a feature representation, and are used
to constitute different types dissimilarity representations (DR), e.g., dissimilarity matrix, D-
space, or FD-space (path B). The resulting representation could be constituted on top of a huge
number of feature extractions, and based on large number of prototypes. The intra-personal
(black cells) and inter-personal (white cells) dissimilarities, should be discriminative enough in
order to design a DR-based classifier (path C). In case that the DR is not enough informative,
feature selection and/or prototype selection can be applied for enhanced representation. For
instance, feature selection can be employed in a FD-space (path D). In literature, there are
many methodologies of feature selection that can be applied to select the most discriminative
and stable features. The resulting DR is constituted on top of a sparser feature representation,
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however, redundancy in prototypes may exist (block 2). A classifier can be then designed
in the resulting space (path E), or a prototype selection step is done (path F) producing a
more compact representation (block 4). Surely, classifiers designed in the sparse and compact
representation, are lighter and more accurate (path G). Also, order of the feature/prototype
selection processes can be reversed (see the bottom part of the Figure). It is obvious that, it is
more logical to run the feature selection process in the FD-space, however, the D-space is more
suitable for prototype selection task. The classifier design process can be implemented based
on different DR (dissimilarity matrix, D-space, or FD-space).
Besides that the DR approach can be employed to design dissimilarity-based classifiers, it can
be considered as an intermediate tool for building reliable feature-based classifiers. Good fea-
tures and/or prototypes can be selected in a dissimilarity-based space, then the representation is
translated back to a sparser and more informative feature space (dotted paths, like path H-I). On
contrary, FR-based classifiers can be designed and they are considered as an intermediate tool,
to design reliable DR-based classifiers. In such case, multi-classifier systems can be designed,
where FR-based classifiers are used to produce the dissimilarity measures, that are needed to
build the DR (path P).
1. Current Implementations to Offline Signature Systems
Here we list and categorize some of these implementations, and relate them to the proposed
framework for DR-based classification shown in Figure I-1.
1.1 Writer-Dependent Systems
The Writer-Dependent (WD) approach seeks to build a single classifier for each user based
on his enrolling signatures. The DR concept is first introduced to design WD-SV systems,
by Siteargur N. Srihari et al., Srihari et al. (2004). Correlation between high dimensional
(1024-bits) binary feature vectors, is employed as a dissimilarity measure. For a specific user,
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distances among every pair of his training samples, are determined to represent the intra-class
samples. Also, distances between samples of the specific user and some forgeries are computed
to represent the inter-class samples. The authors tried different classification strategies: one-
class, two-class, discriminative, and generative classifiers. This implementation is a realization
of the path B-C in Figure I-1, where classifiers are designed based on the statistics of the
dissimilarity matrix.
Later, Batista et al., Batista et al. (2010) applied the dissimilarity learning concept to pro-
duce reliable WD-SV systems. A feature-based one-class classifier is built by producing user-
specific generative models using Hidden Markov models (HMMs). To increase the system
accuracy, a two-class discriminative model is build in DR space. The HMMs models are con-
sidered as prototypes, and samples are projected to a D-space by considering the likehood to
each HMM generative model as a similarity measure. SVM classifies are then designed in the
produced D-space. This implementation is a realization of the path APC in Figure I-1. Also,
the authors employed the AdaBoost method for classifier design in the D-space. This later im-
plementation achieves prototype selection, while building the classifier, which is a realization
of the path APQR in the Figure.
1.2 Writer-Independent Systems
Instead of building a single writer-dependent (WD) classifier for each user using his enrolling
signatures, a single writer-independent (WI) classifier is designed by learning the dissimilar-
ities between signatures of all users. This concept is impossible to realize by means of the
standard FR approach. However, it is possible to model the class distributions of intra-class
and inter-class dissimilarities, by employing the DR approach. A single "global" classifier can
be designed to model, or to discriminate between, these classes. If a huge number of samples
are used to build the global DR-based classifier, it is statistically valid that the resulting model
generalizes for users whose samples are not included in the training set.
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The WI concept is proposed by Siteargur N. Srihari et al., Srihari et al. (2004), and Santos
and Sabourin et al., C. Santos et al. (2004). While the first group used the correlation between
binary features as a distance measure, the second group employed the Euclidean distance be-
tween graphometric feature vectors. This implementation is a realization of the path BC in
Figure I-1, where the classifiers are designed in the FD-space. Improved implementation of
this concept is proposed where different dissimilarity spaces are generated based on different
feature representations, and classification decisions taken in each space are fused to produce
the final decision Oliveira et al. (2007), Bertolini et al. (2010). This scenario can be considered
as generation of different instances for path BC, and fusion is done in the score or decision
levels.
More recently, Rivard et al., Rivard et al. (2013) extended the idea to perform multiple feature
extraction and selection. In this work, information fusion is also performed at the feature level.
Multiple graphometric features are extracted based on multiple size grids. Then, the features
are fused and pairwise distances between corresponding features are computed to constitute
a high dimensional feature-dissimilarity space, where each dimension represents dissimilarity
of a single feature. This complex representation is then simplified by applying the boosting
feature selection approach (BFS) Tieu and Viola (2004). A sparser and more discriminative
FD-space is produced by applying BFS with multi-feature extraction. This scenario can be
considered as realization of path BDE in Figure I-1. As the resulting WI classifier recognizes
all users, even the users who are enrolled after the design phase, so the feature representation
embedded in the WI classifier is considered as a global "population-based" representation.
1.3 Adaptation of Writer-Independent Systems
Recently, some work is done to combine advantages of both WI and WD approaches. In Chap-
ter 3, we extends on the system in Rivard et al. (2013) by adapting the population-based rep-
resentation to each specific user, with the aim of reducing the classification complexity. While
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the first WI stage is designed in a FD-space, the following WD stage is designed in a standard
feature space. Accordingly, the final WD classifier is FR-based classifier, that avoids storing
reference signatures for enhanced security. Simulation results on two real-world offline signa-
ture databases (the Brazilian DB and GPDS public DB) confirm the feasibility and robustness
of the proposed approach. Only a single compact classifier produced similar level of accuracy
(Average Error Rate of about 5.38% and 13.96% for the Brazilian and the GPDS databases,
respectively) as complex WI and WD systems in literature. This scenario is a realization of
path BDHI in Figure I-1.
2. Research Directions
The aforementioned implementations represent a subset of large number of possible FR/DR
combinations. Future research may investigate the unvisited scenarios of the proposed frame-
work. For instance, combinations of global/user-specific, generative/discriminative, one-class/two-
class systems can be designed. Also, all of the tasks for feature selection, prototype selection,
classifier design, etc., can be employed in either feature space, dissimilarity matrix, FD-space,
and D-space. Selection of the working space for each step, should depend on the specific re-
quirements and constraints of the design problem and on the application itself. For example,
in Chapter 3, features are selected in a FD-space as that provides a way to select reliable fea-
ture representations. Then, the classifiers are designed in a standard feature space, to avoid
the need for storing signature templates for verification. Besides the large number of possi-
ble combinations and translations between the different spaces, there is also a wide range of
pattern recognition techniques and tools that can be tested with the proposed framework. This
includes different methods for feature extraction and selection, prototype selection, classifiers,
etc.
From the application perspective, the proposed framework can be utilized for other applica-
tions, rather than the standard SV systems. For example, the Signature Identification (SI)
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systems that identify a producer of a signature sample, can be designed based on the DR-
approach. Prototypes of all system users can be considered to build a classification D-space.
Another example of systems, that imply a challenging design problem, is the signature-based
bio-cryptographic systems. In these systems, cryptographic keys of encryption and digital sig-
natures, are secured by means of handwritten signatures. It is a challenging to select informa-
tive features, signature prototype, and system parameters, for encoding reliable signature-based
bio-cryptographic systems, based on the standard FR approach. In Chapter 4 we discussed a
methodology to design such systems, by means of the DR approach. Features are selected in
the FD-space and prototypes are selected in the D-space. Some of the system parameters such
as length of the cryptographic key, are optimized in the different spaces.
In conclusion, the proposed DR learning framework imparts additional flexibility to the pattern
recognition (PR) area. Combinations of transitions between different feature and dissimilarity
spaces are suggested. Some of the existing implementations to the SV problem, are surveyed
and related to the proposed framework. There are, however, a wide range of methodologies and
applications that might benefit from the proposed approach, that opens a door for new research
directions.

ANNEX II
ADAPTIVE CHAFF GENERATION FOR ENHANCED FV SECURITY
In this appendix, a method to generating chaff points adaptively based on the predicted feature
variability is proposed. The method aimed at embedding high number of chaffs for higher en-
tropy against brute-force attack, without impacting much the FV recognition accuracy. Results
reported in this appendix was published in the International workshop on Emerging Aspects in
Handwritten Signature Processing (Eskander et al., 2013b).
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Figure-A II-1 Illustration of the standard locking/unlocking process.
In chapter IV, it is shown that matching FV decoding and encoding points adaptively based
on the learned feature variability enhances the FV recognition performance. Here, we apply
similar methodology but for generation of the chaff points. Dissimilarity thresholds vector
Δ = {δi}ti=1, is used during the FV locking phase, for adaptive chaff generation, where δi is
the estimated variability for a feature fi. The chaff points are generated so that they have equal
separation space Ω. This separation space is computed for each feature fi, so that Ωi = 3× δi.
By this method, it is less likely that an unlocking element fQi equates a chaff element fii.
For instance, with the tradition FV scheme (see Figure II-1), point fQ3 collides with the chaff
fii, and that results in missing this point in the matching set and that might degrade the FV
150
f Q1 = f
T
1
2
‖ f Q2 − f T2 ‖< δ2
3
p( f T1 ) = p← f Q1
p( f )
f
mw2 = 2δ2
p( f T2 ) = p← f Q2
p( f T3 ) = p← f Q3
‖ f Q3 − f T3 ‖< δ3
mw3 = 2δ3
Ω3 = 3δ3
1
Figure-A II-2 Illustration of proposed adaptive chaff generation method.
recognition performance. On the other hand, with employing the adaptive chaff generation
method (see Figure II-2), point fQ3 could be filtered and added to the matching set because it
did not collide with the chaff fii, as the chaff is generated outside the matching window w3.
Tableau-A II-1 Impact of Chaff Quantity on the FV Performance
Chaff separation (Ω) Without Fixed separation Adaptive separationchaff 0.2 0.10 0.05 0.025 2δ 3δ
No. of FV points (r) 20 200 400 800 1600 1768 1528
No. of chaff points (z) 0 180 380 780 1580 1748 1508
Security 0-bits 45-bits 52-bits 60-bits 68-bits 69-bits 68-bits
FRR 5.25 11.53 28.94 55.53 75.81 7.03 6.13
FARrandom 2.74 2.05 1.06 0.58 0.31 2.40 2.31
FARsimple 3.49 2.39 1.58 0.88 0.49 2.89 3.26
FARsimulated 33.14 24.38 15.63 8.15 3.42 29.77 31.06
AERall 11.15 10.08 11.80 16.28 20.00 10.52 10.69
Table II-1 shows the impact of adaptive chaff generation method. It is clear that the FRR is low
when no chaff points are generated, while this implementation is not secure. The traditional
chaff generation method, is to generate chaff points with fixed separation space between them.
In such case, there is a trade-off between security and robustness. For instance, with small
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separation, e.g., 0.025, there are 40 FV points generated with the same index (1 genuine + 39
chaff points). In this case, a high number of chaffs (1580) is generated, while system entropy
is 68-bits and FRR = 75%. On the other hand, by applying the adaptive chaff generation
method, high number of chaffs could be generated (1508), with minimal impact on the system
robustness (FRR = 6%).

ANNEX III
TOWARDS AUTOMATED TRANSACTIONS BASED ON THE OFFLINE
HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURES
Automating business transactions over the Internet relies on digital signatures, a replacement of
conventional handwritten signatures in paper-based processes. Although they guarantee data
integrity and authenticity, digital signatures are not as convenient to users as the manuscript
ones. In this appendix, a methodology is proposed to produce digital signatures using off-line
hand-written signatures. This methodology facilitate the automation of business processes,
where users continually employ their handwritten signatures for authentication. Users are iso-
lated from the details related to the generation of digital signatures, yet benefit from enhanced
security. First, signature templates from a user are captured and employed to lock his private
key in a fuzzy vault. Then, when the user signs a document by hand, his handwritten signature
image is employed to unlock his private key. The unlocked key produces a digital signature that
is attached to the digitized document. The verification of the digital signature by a recipient
implies authenticity of the manuscript signature and integrity of the signed document. Ex-
perimental results on the Brazilian off-line signature database (that includes various forgeries)
confirms the viability of the proposed approach. Private keys of 1024-bits were unlocked by
signature images with Average Error Rate of about 7.8%. The content of this appendix was
published in the 9th International conference on Machine Learning and Data Mining (Eskander
et al., 2013d).
1. Introduction
Nowadays, online financial transactions and business agreements are replacing the conven-
tional paper-based processes. One important aspect to accomplish a transaction is to guarantee
authenticity of its parties. For the paper-based processes, handwritten signature is the most
universally accepted method of authentication. However, identity of the signer is another im-
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portant aspect to prove, especially for critical agreements and transactions. Various means are
applied to check a signer identity in the paper-based processes. For instance, a signer shows
his identity card where a signature is done in front of a legal officer and/or a witness co-signs
with the main signer. For the online processes, these conventional methods are not applicable.
Instead, the digital signatures can replace the handwritten signatures to authenticate involved
parties. The public key infrastructure (PKI) technology is employed for realizing the digital
signature concept (Rivest et al., 1978). Two asymmetric keys are generated: a private (signing)
key is given for a signer, and a public (verification) key is published to the other parties. To
sign a document, the user private key is employed to encrypt some message and attach it to
the document. Any party involved in this process can verify the authenticity of the received
document. To this end, the recipient extracts the encrypted message from the document, de-
crypts it by means of the sender’s public key, and compares the result with the corresponding
plain message. The document is considered authentic, if the two messages are identical. This
approach also provides a measure of integrity, as identical messages imply that the document is
not tempered while being transfered. On the other hand, integrity of the paper-based processes
is hard to proof as document contents can be changed after being signed.
Despite of the enhanced security of the digital signature compared to the handwritten signa-
tures, it has some practical drawbacks. First, digital signatures employ long private keys that is
hard to memorize. This problem is alleviated through storing the key in a secure place, e.g., a
smart card, and a user retrieves his key by entering a simple password. This scenario, although
guarantee authenticity of the digital signature, it does not prove the identity of the signer. Any
person, who gets access to the smart card and knows the password, can produce a valid digital
signature. Moreover, the security level of the process is degraded, as whatever strong is the
signing key, the actual security is determined by the password length. This is known as the
cryptographic key management problem. Second, the additional security measures used for
digital signatures, like smart cards and passwords, are not as convenient to users as the tradi-
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tional manuscript signatures. Moreover, some electronic processes employ paper-based steps
that rely on handwritten signatures. For instance, remote bank check deposits imply signing a
paper-based check, scan it and submit it remotely to the bank system. Such applications need
some integration between the traditional way of authentication and the new technology, which
is not offered by the card-password scenario.
In literature, the cryptographic key management problem is alleviated by introducing the bio-
cryptography concept (Uludag et al., 2004). Biometrics, that are physical or behavioral human
characteristics, are used to control the access to the cryptographic keys. Hence, authenticity
of the signer is proved by his traits, instead of something he knows like a password that can
be stolen or forgotten. The published bio-cryptographic implementations mostly employed
physical biometrics, like fingerprint (Nandakumar et al., 2007), iris (Lee et al., 2008), etc.
However, few bio-cryptographic implementations are proposed based on the handwritten sig-
natures. These systems concerned mostly with online systems, where signatures are acquired
using special pens and tablets, e.g., (Freire-Santos et al., 2006). These bio-cryptographic im-
plementations, although alleviates the key management problem of digital signatures, they
cannot be integrated in applications where the traditional manuscript signatures are employed.
This appendix proposes a digital signature framework based on the offline handwritten signa-
ture images. Recently, we introduced a method to secure the cryptographic keys by means of
the signature images (Eskander et al., 2011). Here, this method is employed for digital sig-
nature key management. To this end, the fuzzy vault (FV) scheme is implemented (Juels and
Sudan, 2002), where signature representations are selected through a boosting feature selection
(BFS) process (Tieu and Viola, 2004). We show that the proposed method can be employed to
manage large keys, e.g., 1024-bits keys, as that involved in the RSA signature schemes (Rivest
et al., 1978).
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The rest of this appendix is organized as follows. The next section reviews the biometric-based
digital signature schemes in the literature. The proposed manuscript signature-based digital
signature framework is illustrated in section 3. The experimental methodology is illustrated in
section 4. The experimental results are presented and discussed in section 5.
2. Biometrics-based digital signatures
In literature, some of the aforementioned bio-cryptographic implementations are employed to
design biometric-based digital signatures. The employed bio-cryptographic schemes are cate-
gorized into three main types: 1) key-release, 2) key-generation, and 3) key-binding schemes.
In key-release systems, the biometric templates and cryptography keys are stored separately,
and the crypto-key is released to genuine users based on classical biometric authentication. To
secure both of the key and the template, tamper-resistant storage is needed. In key-generation
systems, crypto-keys are generated directly from the biometric traits. This technique is secure,
as there is no need to store neither the key nor the biometric template. A drawback of the key-
generation approach is that it is hard to generate robust and random keys from unstable and
correlating biometric signals. It is also not easy to integrate these biometric-based keys with
standard cryptographic algorithms like RSA. Moreover, as private keys are gerenated directly
from the biometric signals, these keys are not revocable (if either the key or the biometric signal
is compromised, no new key can be generated). In key-binding systems, classical crypto-keys
generated by standard cryptographic keys, e.g., RSA, are coupled with biometric keys. They
cannot be decoupled without applying a genuine sample of the biometric trait. Accordingly,
reliability and security of key-binding techniques surpasses other cryptography schemes, as
they protect the biometric templates and produce typical cryptographic keys.
Janbandhu et al., (Janbandhu and Siyal, 2001) proposed an Iris-based digital signature frame-
work based on 512-bytes Iris templates and a key generation bio-cryptographic scheme. To
overcome the irrevocability of the key generation approach, randomly generated numbers are
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Figure-A III-1 User enrollment process.
employed to modify the iris template. To integrate this scheme with standard public key in-
frastructures (PKI), e.g., DSA and RSA, the random prime numbers generated by the PKI (to
produce the public and private keys), are adjusted to be as close as possible to the Iris template.
Mohammadi et al., (Mohammadi and Abedi, 2008) proposed a similar approach, where Iris
templates are integrated with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Orvos., (Orvos, 2002) intro-
duced a key-binding scheme, where keys of the digital signatures can be encrypted by means
of fingerprints. However, this scheme is abstract and no details of the employed key-binding
methodology is presented. Kwon (Kwon and Lee, 2004) et al., propsed a fingerprint-based dig-
ital signature framework based on a key-binding scheme. The authors employed the concept of
key encryption proposed by Soutar et al., (Soutar et al., 1999), where no features are extracted
from the fingerprint, but rather an image processing method is applied to lock the private key
by the template.
For most of the aforementioned biometric-based digital signature proposals, accuracy of gen-
erated keys by means of genuine and forgery biometric signals are not reported. Moreover, the
employed biometrics, like iris and fingerprint, might not be user convenient, costly, and not
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suitable for some business applications. For instance, it is not practical to accomplish a re-
mote bank check deposit by means of the customer fingerprint, instead signing checks by hand
would be more convenient and compatible with the already existing paper-based processes.
3. Handwritten signature-based digital signature
3.1 Overview
The proposed system employs the fuzzy vault scheme (FV) (Juels and Sudan, 2002), as a
key-binding mechanism for digital signature key management. Typical cryptographic keys are
generated through standard public key infrastructures (PKI), and the private key is locked in a
secure FV by means of the user handwritten signature image. Later, a user signs his document
digitally by providing a genuine handwritten signature sample. Also, a user can delegate a third
party for producing digitally signed documents, based on his handwritten signed documents.
Any party involved in the transaction, who has the user public key, can validate the digital
signature, and hence the authenticity and integrity of the document. The proposed framework
consists of three main processes: 1) user enrollment, 2) signing, and 3) verification.
3.2 Enrollment process
Figure III-1 illustrates the user enrollment process. The cryptographic keys are generated ac-
cording to the employed public key infrastructure (PKI). For instance, for the RSA scheme,
a private (signing) key K, a public key e and a shared parameter q are generated for a user.
Parameters e and q are published to parties, who are supposed to receive and verify documents
belonging to the specific user. The private key K is locked by means of some features, ex-
tracted from user’s handwritten signature templates {Ts}Ss=1, and constitutes a user fuzzy vault
FV . A user profile contains the FV and user identification data is constituted. This profile
might be sent to the user, so he can digitally sign his documents on his own. Also, the user pro-
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Figure-A III-2 Framework of the proposed digital signature method based on the
handwritten signature images.
file might be sent to a trusted party, that can issue digital signatures on behalf of the user. This
party extracts the handwritten signatures embedded in the user document, unlocks the user pri-
vate key K from the FV by means of the extracted signature image, and then produces a digital
signature and attach it to the digitized document. This last scenario simulates the witness party
in paper-based agreements or transactions.
3.3 Signing process
Figure III-2 (see the left side) illustrates the signing process. To digitally sign a document, the
embedded handwritten signature image Q is extracted and used to decode the user FV. If Q is
genuine, it correctly unlocks the signing keyK ′ from the FV, whereK ′ and the original private
key K are identical. The document is then signed by means of K ′ and q. A specific message
E is extracted from the document, e.g., for bank check applications, E could be the value of
the check. Then, E is encrypted by means of K ′ to constitute a digital signature DigSig, and
it is attached to the digitized document.
160
3.4 Verification process
Figure III-2 (see the right side) illustrates the verification process. A recipient, who has the
user public key e, can verify the attached digital signature. DigSig is decrypted by means
of e and q, and retrieves the message E ′ . The original plain message E is extracted from
the document. The digital signature passes the validation test, if both E and E ′ are identical.
In this case, the recipient is sure that the original document is authentic (contains a genuine
handwritten signature). Also, this indicates integrity of the document (e.g., the check amount
is not changed after the check is signed).
3.5 Private key locking and unlocking
User
Representation
Selection
FV Encoding FV Decoding
UR
Private Key Locking Private Key Unlocking
{Ts}Ss=1
Ts FI
UR= (FI,Δ)
d
Q
d′
FV
Fuzzy Vault
User
Representation
User Profile
UR= (FI,Δ)
Figure-A III-3 Locking and unlocking of the digital signature private keys within secure
FV tokens, by means of the user offline handwritten signature samples.
Figure III-3 illustrates how the private keys are locked and unlocked in/from secure FV tokens.
To lock a private key K, the enrollment handwritten signature templates {T}Ss=1 are used to
learn a user representation UR. This representation consists in vectors FI and Δ. Vector
FI = {fIi}ti=1 consists in the indexes of the best t features, that discriminate between gen-
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uine and forgery signatures. Vector Δ = {δi}ti=1 consists in feature dissimilarity thresholds.
Assume δfQTi is the dissimilarity between two samples Q and T , measured by feature fi. The
dissimilarity feature threshold {δi} is selected so that: δfQgenTi ≤ δi and δfQfrTi > δi, ∀ gen-
uine sample Qgen and forgery sample Qfr. In a preliminary version of our FV implementation
based on the offline handwritten signatures (Eskander et al., 2011), boosting feature selection
approach (BFS)(Tieu and Viola, 2004) is employed to select the most discriminative feature
FI . Recently, this feature representation is enhanced by learning the feature dissimilarity vec-
tor Δ (Eskander et al., 2013f), in a dissimilarity representation space 1. The features indexes
vector FI is used to extract a feature representation F T = {Fi}ti=1 from a prototype signature
Ts. Then, F T locks the private key K in a FV. To this end, K is used to generate an encoding
polynomial p, by splitting K of size KS-bits into k + 1 equal chunks (c) of size l-bits. These
chunks are used as polynomial coefficients. So that the encoding polynomial p is given by:
p(ai) = ckak
k + ck−1ak−1k−1 + .....+ c1a+ c0. (A III-1)
The extracted features F T are quantized in elements of l-bit, to constitute a locking vector
A = {ai}ti=1. Genuine FV points {A,P (A)} are constituted by computing the polynomial,
given by Eq.A III-1, for all elements of A. To hide the genuine points, z chaff (noise) points
{Aˆ, Pˆ} are generated, so that they do not collide with the genuine points. Finally both genuine
and chaff points are merged to constitute r FV points {A˜, P˜}, where r = t+ z.
To unlock the private key K, a query handwritten signature image Q is extracted from the doc-
ument, and used to decode the FV. A query feature vector FQ is extracted from Q, based on
the pre-selected feature indexes FI . Feature quantization is done, as that for the FV encoding
process, and the FV unlocking vector B = {bi}ti=1 is constituted. Elements of B are matched
1Details of the BFS and dissimilarity learning is out of the scope of this appendix. For more details, see
(Eskander et al., 2011) and (Eskander et al., 2013f). This method relies on recent works proposed by Rivard
et al., (Rivard et al., 2013) and Eskander et al., (Eskander et al., 2012), for designing writer-independent and
writer-dependent offline signature verification systems, respectively.
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against all points of the FV, so that the chaff points are filtered out. For the preliminary version
of our FV implementation (Eskander et al., 2011), elements of A and B are strictly matched.
Two elements are considered matching if they have exact quantized values. In this work, the
modeled dissimilarity threshold vector Δ is used for adaptively matching elements based on
their expected dissimilarities (Eskander et al., 2014a). Two elements are considered match-
ing if their dissimilarity is less than the corresponding dissimilarity threshold. The resulting
vector {A¯, P¯} is used to reconstruct the polynomial p′ , by applying the Reed-Solomon error
correction codes (Berlekamp and Elwyn, 1968). Finally, the coefficients of p′ are assembled to
constitute the key K ′ . If the FV is correctly decoded, the unlocked key K ′ is identical to the
user private key K. For more details about the FV encoding and decoding processes and the
dissimilarity representation, see (Eskander et al., 2011) and (Eskander et al., 2014a).
4. Experimental methodology
The Brazilian database (Freitas et al., 2000) is used for proof-of-concept simulations. This DB
contains three types of signature forgery: random, simple and simulated. Random forgeries
do not know neither the writer’s name nor the signature morphology. For simple forgery, the
forger knows the writer’s name and he produces a simple forgery using his writing style. A
simulated forgery has access to a sample of the signature and imitates the genuine signature.
The signatures were provided by 168 writers. Signatures of first 60 writers include: 40 genuine
signatures, 10 simple forgeries and 10 simulated forgeries per writer. Of them, 30 genuine
signatures, besides some of signatures selected from the last 108 users (that represents random
forgeries), are used for the user representation (UR) selection task. For performance evalua-
tion, the rest 10 genuine samples, 10 simple, 10 simulated forgeries, and 10 random forgeries
(belong to the last 108 users) are used.
In the preliminary version of this work (Eskander et al., 2011), we employed extended-shadow-
code (ESC) features (Sabourin and Genest, 1994). Here, we investigate a multi-type feature
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extraction approach, where directional probability density function (DPDF) (Drouhard et al.,
1996) is also employed. Features are extracted based on 30 different grid scales producing 60
different single scale feature representations. These representations are then fused to produce
a feature representation of huge dimensionality (30, 201) (Rivard et al., 2013).
For digital signature key generation, the RSA scheme is employed (Rivest et al., 1978). Keys
of different sizes are generated, where the private key K is locked in a FV. Digital signatures
is produced by means the private key K ′ , unlocked from the FV by means of query signatures.
Verification of the digital signatures is done by means the public key e.
The FV parameters are set as follows: the quantization size l is set to 16-bits. Different key
sizes (KS) are employed (128, 256, 512, 1024-bits). Number of genuine FV locking points t
is determined experimentally for the different key sizes.
The Average Error Rate (AER) is employed for performance evaluation and computed as
follows:
AER = (FRR + FARrandom + FARsimple + FARsimulated)/4. (A III-2)
False Reject Rate (FRR) is the ratio of genuine query signatures that failed to decode the FV,
and produce valid digital signatures. FARrandom, FARsimple and FARsimulated are the ratio
of random, simple, and simulated forgeries, respectively, that succeed to decode the FV, and
produce valid digital signatures.
5. Experimental results
Table III-1 reports the experimental results for different key sizes. In (Eskander et al., 2011),
only ESC features are employed and features are matched strictly. Here, when the DPDF
features are added and features are matched adaptively, the performance is enhanced as AER is
reduced from 17.75% to 10.08%. It is found that the proposed FV method could secure large
keys with acceptable accuracy, so it could be integrated in practical digital signature schemes
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Tableau-A III-1 Performance of the proposed manuscript signature-based digital
signatures.
Parameters
KS-bits 128 (previous work) 128 256 512 1024
(Eskander et al., 2011)
t 20 20 40 140 200
z 180 180 360 1260 1800
Measure %
FRR 25 11.53 13.55 5.31 11.26
FARrandom 3 2.05 2.00 2.71 0.98
FARsimple 7 2.39 2.28 3.31 1.31
FARsimulated 36 24.38 19.28 29.26 17.43
AER 17.57 10.08 9.27 10.14 7.75
like RSA. However, the size of the FV locking vector t should be increased for the large keys.
Also, two important aspects are noticed: 1) different key sizes result in different performance
for the different users. This motivate future investigation for adapting the key length for each
user, 2) the performance differs for the different signature templates that locks the FV. This
motivates further work to address prototype selection for FV encoding (Eskander et al., 2013f).
6. Conclusions and future work
A framework for digital signature by means of the handwritten signature images is proposed.
The private keys are locked by the user signature templates and released only when a user pro-
vides a genuine signature sample. This framework facilitates various industrial applications
like remote bank check transactions, ATM and credit card transactions, automation of business
procedures including legal agreements, etc. Also, the proposed system permits delegation of
authority, as a third party who stores the user profile, can generate signed digitized documents
on behalf of a user based on his embedded handwritten signature. A fuzzy vault system is
designed to protect the signature keys, where boosting feature selection process is employed
in a dissimilarity representation space. Accuracy of FV decoding is increased through apply-
ing multi-type feature extraction and matching the FV encoding and decoding features adap-
tively, based on the modeled feature dissimilarity. Decoding accuracy of genuine, random and
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simple forgeries is acceptable, even with large cryptography keys. Resistance of the system
against simulated forgeries needs enhancement, and further work is needed to detect this type
of forgery. Also, future work should be conducted to increase the system accuracy, through
adapting the FV parameters and select the signature prototypes for the specific users (Eskander
et al., 2013f).

ANNEX IV
IMPROVING SIGNATURE-BASED BIOMETRIC CRYPTOSYSTEMS USING
CASCADED SIGNATURE VERIFICATION–FUZZY VAULT (SV-FV) APPROACH
Signature-based FVs are designed in a dissimilarity space, where distances between feature
pairs are the space constituents. Feature representations selected in such dissimilarity spaces
have shown acceptable level of robustness against signature variability, while they lack dis-
criminative power against skilled forgeries Eskander et al. (2014a).
In chapter 4, the limited discriminative power of FVs is alleviated by using an additional pass-
word, so that the false accept rate (FAR) is reduced without significantly affecting the false
reject rate (FRR). However, enhancing system accuracy comes with the expense of the user
inconvenience.
In this appendix, a novel user-convenient approach is proposed for enhancing the accuracy of
signature-based biometric cryptosystems. Since signature verification (SV) systems designed
in the original feature space have demonstrated higher discriminative power to detect impostors
Eskander et al. (2013c), they can be used to improve the FV systems. Instead of using an addi-
tional password, the same signature sample is processed by a SV classifier before triggers the
FV decoders. Using this cascaded approach, the high FAR of FV decoders is alleviated by the
higher capacity of SV classifiers to detect impostors. The content of this appendix is published
in the 14th International conference on Frontiers in Handwriting Recognition (ICFHR-2014)
(Eskander et al., 2014b).
To this end, SV module is designed in the feature space by applying a two-step BFS approach
as proposed in Chapter 3. Also, FVs are produced through a dissimilarity based approach as
illustrated in Chapter 4. During authentication, a query signature is verified by the SV module.
The sample is processed by FV decoders for cryptographic key unlocking, only if it is verified
by SV module.
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Figure-A IV-1 Proposed cascaded SV-FV system in the verification mode: different
feature representations F¯ and F are processed by a SV classifier and a set of FV
decoders, respectively. The FV module is triggered only if the SV module produces a
positive classification label.
Figure IV-1 illustrates the proposed cascaded SV-FV system in the verification mode. First,
a feature representation F¯Q is extracted from a query signature Q according to the WD-SV
representation stored in system database. The WD-SV classifier is used to verify the signature
sample as illustrated in Chapter 3. Since SV classifiers have demonstrated higher discrimina-
tive power than that of the FV systems, so a range of forgeries are filtered at this step.
Then, the FV module is triggered only if Q is verified as a genuine signature, ie., SV (Q) = 1.
In such case, a feature representation FQ is extracted from Q according to the user FV stored
in system database. Instead of unlocking a single FV, a set of FV templates {FV Tr}Rr=1 are
used for improved recognition. Every FV is unlocked as illustrated in Chapter 4, where a FV
produces a positive label (FV (Q) = 1) when it is successfully unlocked. Finally, a majority
vote (MV ) rule is applied so that unlocked cryptographic key K is released to the user only if
majority of FVs are successfully unlocked.
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The Brazilian database Freitas et al. (2000) is used for proof-of-concept simulations. To design
the FV module, the first 30 genuine signatures of each user are used to produce 30 different
FVs/user. For FV encoding, t = 20 genuine vault points are produced from a signature image.
To this end, the feature values are quantized in l = 8-bits. To conceal the genuine points,
z = 180 chaff points are injected, so total number of FV points r = 200. Length of encoded
cryptographic key K is 128-bits, that encodes a polynomial p of degree k =7.
To design the SV module, features are extracted from the 30 genuine signature/user. A single
SV classifier is produced for each user, where a BFS process runs for 100 boosting iterations.
Average dimensionality of the resulting WD representations is (N = 40). A zero classification
threshold is used in all experiments (θ = 0).
To investigate the viability of the proposed cascading approach, both pure FV and SV systems
are compared with the cascaded SV-FV system. The impact of fusion of multiple FVs on the
decision level is tested by repeating the experiments for single FV decoding (R = 1) and for
multiple FVs where R = 15.
For the 60 users in the testing set, 40 test samples per user are employed (10 genuine, 10 ran-
dom, 10 simple, and 10 skilled forgeries). In case of FV systems (either pure FVs or cascaded
SV-FV systems), each test sample is verified against the 30 genuine FV templates, for a total
of 72000 (60× 40× 30) verification trials. For the SV systems, each of the 40 queries per user
are verified once against the SV model, for a total of 2400 (60 × 40) verification trials. For
performance evaluation, the average error rate (AER) is computed as follows:
AER = (FRR + FARrand + FARsmp + FARskl)/4. (A IV-1)
where FARrand, FARsmp, and FARskl are computed for random, simple, and skilled forg-
eries, respectively.
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Tableau-A IV-1 Comparison of the SV and FV systems to the proposed cascaded
SV-FV system
Performance measure
Method
SV only FV only Proposed approach
R = 1 R = 15 R = 1 R = 15
FRR 7.83 11.53 7.69 14.00 10.87
FARrandom 0.01 2.05 5.02-05 0.00 0.00
FARsimple 0.17 2.39 1.92 0.30 0.33
FARskilled 13.50 24.38 23.26 10.80 11.38
AER 5.38 10.08 8.21 6.55 5.64
Genuine template Skilled forgery
Figure-A IV-2 Example of skilled forgeries that are filtered by the SV module.
Performance of dissimilarity-based FVs is encouraging. For instance, for a user with signatures
shown in Figure 4.4, the single-type–single-resolution feature extraction technique produced
FVs with FRR = 100%. In this case, out of the 20 locking points, only 10 points are filtered
by the unlocking sets (error = 10). For FVs with error correction capability  = 6, these errors
are not canceled by the FV decoder. On the other hand, applying multi-feature extraction and
the dissimilarity-based BFS approach produced FVs with AER = 0%, as the mismatch errors
are within the FV error correction capacity (error < 6).
However, due to FV scheme limitations, such accurate recognition does not apply for all users
in the testing database. For instance, for the user with signatures shown in Figure IV-2, although
his signatures are stable (FRR = 0%), they are easy to imitated by skilled forgeries. For this
user, FARskilled = 16%.
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On the other hand, SV classifiers have shown higher accuracy due to the relatively complex
model of the SV classifiers, as compared to simple FVs. For instance, for the user with signa-
tures shown in Figure IV-2, all skilled forgeries are detected by the SV classifier.
In case of the proposed cascaded SV-FV solution, the accuracy is enhanced through filtering
most of forgeries by the SV classifier. For instance, impostor signature, shown in Figure IV-2
(right), could unlock a FV by the template shown in Figure IV-2 (left), when a pure FV is
used. On the other hand, for the cascaded SV-FV solution, this forgery is detected by the SV
classifier and it is filtered before triggering the FV. For this user, FARskilled = 0%, when the
cascaded SV-FV system is employed.
Table IV-1 presents the simulation results for all users in the testing dataset. The pure FV
system, with a single template (R = 1), has shown AER = 10.08%. When multiple FVs are
decoded (R = 15), the AER is reduced by 18.5% (from 10.08% to 8.21%). However, this
comes with expense of increased decoding complexity. For the pure SV systems, the perfor-
mance is much better (AER = 5.38%). However, this solution produces simple classification
labels and can not secure cryptographic keys.
In case of the cascaded SV-FV solution, the AER of cryptographic key decoding is decreased
by 35% (from 10.08% to 6.55%). More specifically, accuracy of detecting skilled forgeries is
much increased, with out high impact on the genuine accept rate, whereAERskilled is decreased
by 58.65% (from 24.38% to 10.80%). When multiple FVs are fused (R = 15), the AER is
decreased by 13.89% (from 6.55% to 5.64%). Generally, this result is comparable to that of the
pure SV classifier. Hence, using the proposed approach facilitates securing cryptographic keys
by means of offline signature images with similar level of accuracy as that of the classical SV
systems.
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